

**Taiwanese Philosophy and the Preservation of Confucian Tradition**  
**International Conference**

**17-18 October 2019**

**Chamber Hall of the University of Ljubljana**

Organized by:

University of Ljubljana / EARL Ljubljana and Department of Asian Studies

Center for Chinese Studies and National Central Library in Taiwan



# Taiwanese Philosophy and the Preservation of Confucian Tradition

## International Conference

### Statement of Purpose

Although the philosophical currents in modern and contemporary Taiwan belong to the most influential and important streams of thought in contemporary East Asian theory, they are still unrecognized as specifically Taiwanese. The main reasons for the immense importance of Taiwanese philosophy for East Asia and the contemporary world are twofold. First, they can be found in its contributions to the preservation of traditional Chinese, especially Confucian thought. Secondly, its development of specific innovative philosophical approaches and systems profoundly influenced the theoretical discourses in the entire East Asian region. The philosophical currents in modern Taiwan were mainly developed during the second half of 20th century, in which the philosophical theory in mainland China was largely limited to the Sinization of Marxist thought. Hence, for many decades, Taiwanese philosophy represented the only driving force of developing, modernizing and upgrading traditional Chinese thought and its syntheses with Western thought. Hence, they soon also gained a wide spread popularity in most of the other East Asian societies that were traditionally influenced by classical Confucian thought, as for example Japan and South Korea.

The conference, organized by Ljubljana University, the EARL in Ljubljana and the TRCCS at the National Central Library in Taipei under the academic leadership by Professor Jana S. Rošker, Ph.D., will bring together leading European and East Asian scholars investigating the thought of Taiwanese philosophers. It aims to introduce their work to the wider international academic public, and to discuss and exchange knowledge regarding their philosophical approaches, ideas and methods. It will furthermore also illuminate the political, social and ideological backgrounds of the specific Taiwanese philosophy.

Given the fact that numerous Taiwanese philosophers belong to the pinnacle of contemporary theoretic achievements in the Chinese language area, and because there is still an almost complete lack of awareness of this fact in the European academic circles, the conference aims to clarify and to expose the following issues:

- The role and the function of Taiwanese scholars in the preservation of the Chinese intellectual (especially Confucian, but also Daoist and Buddhist) tradition;
- Taiwanese interpretations of Chinese philosophy;
- Introductions of recent Taiwanese philosophy and its authors, including both the ones who lived and worked in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup>;
- The formation of a recognizable position of recent Taiwanese intellectual streams in the contemporary discourses on philosophy and culture;
- The analysis and explanation of common cultural conditioned threads in the Taiwanese philosophy – the relation between the specifically Taiwanese cultural elements and the theoretical and ideological approaches applied by Taiwanese philosophers.
- Preservation of Confucian Tradition, Political, sociological and intellectual backgrounds
- History and politics: the cross strait relations in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century

## **Welcome Speech:** Distinguished guests, dear colleagues and friends!

Welcome to this conference, which has been jointly organized by the Center for Chinese Studies at the National Central Library in Taipei, the EARL, and the Department of Asian Studies at the Faculty of Arts, Ljubljana University. The meeting is entitled *Taiwanese Philosophy and the Preservation of Traditional Chinese Philosophy*, and it promises to become a stimulating meeting, full of intriguing presentations and hot debates that will hopefully turn out to be not only interesting and informative, but also thought provoking and inspiring. This time, we have gathered in Ljubljana over 25 speakers from various European and Asian countries and we are proud to announce that most of them are well-known and internationally influential scholars in the field of Chinese philosophy. Therefore, we are proud and happy that they have accepted our invitation.

The topic of today's conference deals with the Chinese philosophical tradition. Yet this philosophy did not originate in mainland China, and thus in some supposedly logical "center" of Chinese culture, but on its alleged "periphery", namely on the beautiful island of Taiwan. The main reason for organizing this conference is to show the broader European academic audience that Taiwanese philosophers have played an important role in the development of modern Chinese philosophy, and especially in the second half of the 20th century.

In contrast to the mainland, Taiwanese philosophy of that time had almost no connection with either Marxism or any of the many streams of post-Marxist philosophy. While theorists from the People's Republic of China were mainly dealing with various forms, issues and innovations in the field of the Sinification of Marxism, those working on Taiwan devoted themselves to the exploration and adaptation of other forms of Western modernity, especially those deriving from Kant and German classical philosophy. They wanted to modernize their own (i.e. Chinese) traditions through the ideas of the European Enlightenment. While in the 1950s the Chinese conceptual tradition (in particular, Confucianism) fell into disrepair and was often prohibited, or at least severely criticized, on the mainland, Taiwanese philosophers were constantly striving for its preservation and development.

However, at issue was not only the preservation of tradition; in the second half of the 20th century, several complex and coherent philosophical systems emerged in Taiwan. The creation of these discourses is proof of the great creativity and innovativeness of many Taiwanese theorists. Here, it is particularly important to highlight the Modern or New Confucianism and its most famous Taiwanese representative, Mou Zongsan.

But in post-war Taiwan we can also witness many other forms of investigating and upgrading traditional Chinese thought. In this regard, the Neo-Daoist current and the Taiwanese Buddhist studies are certainly worth mentioning. Besides, modern Taiwanese philosophers have also enriched and advanced the originally Western medieval scholastic thought by establishing a specific school of the so-called Taiwanese Neo-Scholasticism, which was founded at the Fu-jeu Catholic University.

However, the rich palette of philosophical thought that emerged in Taiwan in the second half of the 20th century cannot be limited to these few streams of thought. Therefore, the present conference includes and critically introduces many more currents, streams of thought and individual philosophers, who have decidedly contributed to the creative blossoming of modern Chinese philosophy.

Therefore, this conference will doubtless show that Taiwanese philosophy can be seen as a bridge that links different discourses across time and space by illuminating and exposing various otherwise neglected traditions of Chinese philosophical thought. I also believe that it will show that this connective function and dialogical nature is precisely the greatest significance of contemporary Taiwanese philosophy, and I sincerely hope that it will raise awareness of this significance among the wider circles of European academia. And last, but not least, my sincere wish is also that this conference may serve, similar to Taiwanese philosophy, which is its subject matter, as a bridge connecting many different ideas, viewpoints and values.

Hence, I delightedly declare the conference open for your participation in the hope that you will enjoy the event as much as we enjoyed imagining, organizing and looking forward to it. Thank you!

**Jana S. Rošker**

# Taiwanese Philosophy and the Preservation of Confucian Tradition International Conference

**17-18 October 2019**  
**Chamber Hall of the University of Ljubljana**  
 (Kongresni trg 12, Ljubljana)

Organized by: University of Ljubljana / EARL Ljubljana and Department of Asian Studies  
 Center for Chinese Studies and National Central Library in Taiwan

<b>Thursday, October 17</b>	
<b>9:15</b>	<b>Registration</b>
<b>10:00–11:00</b>	<b>Opening Ceremony:</b> <b>Welcome remarks, books donation and group photo</b> (Linkperson: Maja Kosec) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Tanja Dmitrović</b>, Vice Rector of the Ljubljana University</li> <li>- <b>Tseng Shu-hsien</b>, Director-General of the NCL</li> <li>- <b>Zlatko Šabič</b>, General Director of EARL</li> <li>- <b>Jana S. Rošker</b>, Chief academic organizer</li> </ul>
<b>11:00–12:00</b>	<b>Keynote Speech:</b> <b>Huang Kuan-min</b> Dissemination and Reterritorialization: Mou Zong-san, Tang Jun-yi, and the Renovation of Contemporary Confucian Philosophy
<b>12:00–13:30</b>	<b>Lunch</b>
<b>13:30–15:00</b>	<b>Panel 1 (Chamber Hall)</b> <b>The Great Master of Taiwanese Confucianism: Mou Zongsan</b> <b>Chair: Fabian Heubel</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Ady Van den Stock:</b> Life and Learning, or Learning how to Live? Remarks on Mou Zongsan's Autobiography at Fifty</li> <li>- <b>Jana S. Rošker:</b> A Philosophical Relation between Taiwan and Japan: Models of dialectical thought in Mou Zongsan's and Nishida Kitaro's theories</li> <li>- <b>Tak Lap Yeung:</b> Mou Zongsan's appropriation of "transcendence" and "immanence" and his contribution to the world philosophy</li> </ul>
<b>15:00–15:30</b>	<b>Coffee and tea break</b>
<b>15:30–17:30</b>	<b>Panel 2 (Chamber Hall)</b> <b>Studies of Daoist Philosophy</b> <b>Chair: Jana S. Rošker</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Fabian Heubel:</b> Transcultural Potential. Reflections on Transcultural Zhuangzi-Studies in Taiwan</li> <li>- <b>Lai Shi-san:</b> Zhuangzi's Deconstruction of Chinese-centered Civilization and Its Contemporary Significance—From the Unity to the Difference</li> <li>- <b>Wu Hui-ling:</b> Research in Daoist Thinking Patterns: Wang Pi's "Te Yi Wang Yen"</li> <li>- <b>Steven Marsh:</b> Humor as a part of Life Philosophy: Professor Yeh Hai-Yen's Interpretation of the Zhuangzi</li> </ul>
<b>17:30–19:00</b>	<b>Welcome reception (The Reception Hall next to the Chamber Hall)</b>

<b>Friday, October 18</b>			
<b>09:00–10:30</b>	<p><b>Panel 3 (Chamber Hall)</b>  <b>Taiwanese Philosophy from Broader East Asian Perspectives</b>  <b>Chair: Téa Sernelj</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Phan Thi Thu Hien:</b> Molding the East Asian Dragon: The Creation and Transformation of Various Ecological and Political Discourses</li> <li>- <b>Kang Byoung Yoong:</b> Review and Prospect of Taiwanese Philosophy Scholarship in South Korea: a historical survey of academic publication from the year 1994 to 2018</li> <li>- <b>Marko Ogrizek:</b> Huang Chun-Chieh and Comparative Philosophy: Multiple Ways of Studying Confucian Ethics Across Texts and Contexts</li> </ul>		
<b>10:30–11:00</b>	<b>Coffee and tea break</b>		
<b>11:00–12:30</b>	<p><b>Panel 4 (Chamber Hall)</b>  <b>Confucianism in Modern Taiwan</b>  <b>Chair: Tiziana Lippiello</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Téa Sernelj:</b> Xu Fuguan's Basic Contributions to Taiwanese Philosophy</li> <li>- <b>Yeh Hai-Yen:</b> The Contemporary New Confucianism of Liu Hsu-Hsian</li> <li>- <b>Nicolas N. Testerman:</b> Political Theology and Political Metaphysics in Sinophone Philosophy: Chen Lifu's Invention of the Modern Sovereign</li> </ul>		
<b>12:30–13:30</b>	<b>Lunch</b>		
<b>13:30–15:30</b>	<b>Two Parallel Round Tables</b>		
<b>13:30–15:30</b>	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <p><b>Round Table A (Chamber Hall)</b>  <b>Discourses on Politics of Taiwan and about Taiwan</b>  <b>Chair and discussant: Zlatko Šabič</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Nina Pejič:</b> Discourse surrounding the cross-strait relations and the rise of the People's Republic of China in international relations</li> <li>- <b>Saša Istenič Kotar:</b> China-Taiwan Cross-strait relations: Protecting the Status Quo</li> <li>- <b>Cha Jung-Mi:</b> "Solitary Technological Power in Cyber Space": Taiwan's Cyber Security Strategy for Self-Reliance and Industry development</li> </ul> </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <p><b>Round Table B (Prešeren Hall at SAZU, Novi trg 3, Ljubljana)</b>  <b>Taiwanese Philosophy in the Balkan Region</b>  <b>Chair and discussant: Peng Guoxiang</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Jana S. Rožker:</b> A precarious Relation or the long and windy road of Taiwanese philosophy in Balkan</li> <li>- <b>Nevad Kahteran:</b> The quest of the global significance of Tu Wei-ming's Concrete Confucian Humanity, Daisaku Ikeda's New Horizons in Eastern Humanism, and Lee Ming-huei's Intellectualised Confucianism in the project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans</li> <li>- <b>Ivana Buljan:</b> Sinology and Taiwanese studies in Croatia</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>	<p><b>Round Table A (Chamber Hall)</b>  <b>Discourses on Politics of Taiwan and about Taiwan</b>  <b>Chair and discussant: Zlatko Šabič</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Nina Pejič:</b> Discourse surrounding the cross-strait relations and the rise of the People's Republic of China in international relations</li> <li>- <b>Saša Istenič Kotar:</b> China-Taiwan Cross-strait relations: Protecting the Status Quo</li> <li>- <b>Cha Jung-Mi:</b> "Solitary Technological Power in Cyber Space": Taiwan's Cyber Security Strategy for Self-Reliance and Industry development</li> </ul>	<p><b>Round Table B (Prešeren Hall at SAZU, Novi trg 3, Ljubljana)</b>  <b>Taiwanese Philosophy in the Balkan Region</b>  <b>Chair and discussant: Peng Guoxiang</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Jana S. Rožker:</b> A precarious Relation or the long and windy road of Taiwanese philosophy in Balkan</li> <li>- <b>Nevad Kahteran:</b> The quest of the global significance of Tu Wei-ming's Concrete Confucian Humanity, Daisaku Ikeda's New Horizons in Eastern Humanism, and Lee Ming-huei's Intellectualised Confucianism in the project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans</li> <li>- <b>Ivana Buljan:</b> Sinology and Taiwanese studies in Croatia</li> </ul>
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<b>15:30–16:00</b>	<b>Coffee and tea break</b>		

<b>16:00–17:30</b>	<b>Panel 5 (Chamber Hall)</b> <b>Religion, Ethics and Culture</b> <b>Chair: Marko Ogrizek</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Bart Dessein:</b> The Heritage of Taixu: Taiwan, Philosophy, and Beyond</li> <li>- <b>Lin Ming-chao:</b> The Contemporary Studies on the Ethics of the Zhuangzi in Taiwan</li> <li>- <b>Matjaž Vidmar:</b> “A Confucian Confusion”: Confucian Virtues in the time of Globalisation, consumerism and individualisation of Taiwanese Society in the 1990s</li> </ul>
<b>17:30–18:00</b>	<b>Closing remarks:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Tseng Shu-hsien</b>, Director-General of the NCL,</li> <li>- <b>Zlatko Šabič</b>, General Director of EARL,</li> <li>- <b>Jana Rošker</b>, Chief academic organizer</li> </ul>
<b>18:00–19:00</b>	<b>Ljubljana city tour</b>
<b>19:00</b>	<b>Dinner</b>

<b>Saturday, October 19</b>	
<b>09:00–18:00</b>	<b>Trip to the Slovene seaside</b> (including lunch for all participants)
<b>18:00–19:30</b>	<b>Dinner</b>
<b>20:00</b>	<b>Cultural program:</b> <b>Theatre performance “Zhuangzi and the Riddle of European Subjectivity</b>





**LIST OF PANELS AND ABSTRACTS / DRAFT PAPERS**

(All draft papers are not for quotation.)



## **KEYNOTE SPEECH**



**Thursday, October 17, 11:00–12:00**

**Keynote Speech**

**Huang, Kuan-Min:**

**Dissemination and reterritorialization: Mou Zong-san, Tang Jun-yi, and Refreshment of Contemporary Confucian Philosophy**

**散種與再疆域化——唐君毅、牟宗三與當代新儒家哲學的資源更新**

**摘要：**

當代中國哲學家唐君毅係新儒學的代表人物之一，在經過一九四九年的流亡經驗後，定居於香港，他所提的「花果飄零」隱喻總結了離散（diaspora）的經驗，但也導出「靈根自植」的積極價值肯定。但若從思想資源的散種過程來看，夾在流亡與殖民地之間的生活處境卻逼顯出一種新的思想可能性。文化保守主義若擺脫文化抵抗的姿態，可弔詭地產生文化疆界的重新劃定。「靈根自植」具有再疆域化的概念潛力。有相同離散經驗的牟宗三也透過歷史與文化的診斷，重構一種通向未來的歷史源流。在會通的線索引導下，牟宗三透過重新解讀康德，尋求與儒家思想的會通，藉由「智的直覺」、「良知坎陷」這類哲學術語重新塑造中國哲學論述的可能性。兩位哲學家的作法提供了一種跨越疆界的散種，除了歷史距離之外，在汲取異質的思想資源時，也重新賦予概念的新疆界。這種概念創造與轉化，提供臺灣哲學發展的典範，也有助於更新與調動不同傳統下的思想資源。

**關鍵字：**斷裂，花果飄零，靈根自植，起源，文化認同

Tang Junyi, a contemporary Chinese philosopher, is one of the chief representatives of Neo-Confucianism. After living in exile in 1949, he settled in Hong Kong. His concept of "the wandering of flowers and fruits" (花果飄零) is similar to the experience of dispersion (diaspora), but the same metaphorical strategy also derives its positive value from another Chinese philosophical concept, namely the notion of "self-transplantation of the spiritual roots" (靈根自植). From the perspective of conceptual philosophy and the Confucian value system, "self-transplantation of the spiritual roots" is grounded on certain ethical requirements. However, from the perspective of the process of scattering philosophical resources, the life situation in the colonial exile has enabled him to launch a new philosophical possibility.

If we get rid of the attitude of cultural resistance, and from the redistribution and redevelopment of philosophical resources, the position of cultural conservatism can reconcile the re-delimitations of cultural boundaries. Hence, the notion of "self-transplantation of the spiritual roots" has the conceptual potential of reterritorialization.

Similarly, Mou Zongsan, who had comparable experiences, has also succeeded to establish new spaces for his philosophical innovations. Through reinterpreting Kant, he sought to communicate with Confucianism and to reshape Chinese philosophy through the philosophical terms such as "intellectual intuition" (智的直覺) and the "self-negation of the moral self" (良知自我坎陷).

The practices of these two philosophers provide new possibilities of surpassing borders. In addition to the historical distance, we may hence become able to think about the leap of conceptual boundaries and to explore how the philosophical resources can be revived, and adapted to the requirements of the contemporary world.

## 前言

哲學活動雖然涉及抽象概念，但往往根植於有實感的存在處境。在面對生命情境的重大轉折與社會、歷史條件的劇烈變換之際，在緊迫之際，哲學創造既似受到威脅，又往往能激發出獨特的創造力。莊子所謂的「無用之用」頗適合於描述哲學的功能，但是「置之死地而後生」也有時符合某些哲學創造的情境。以漢語進行哲學創作必須考慮其內蘊的異質性，一方面，哲學作為一種學院建制與一種知識型態，有其源自西方的異質性，另一方面，它也從傳統經典中萃取出哲學元素，面對當代的問題，產生具有活力、有創造性的新可能性。一旦以漢語的「哲學」一詞來試圖對應西方的 *philosophia* 一詞之時，就已經在翻譯的邊界上帶入了轉化傳統、更新資源、創造新方向的可能。

從臺灣的角度看哲學，在臺灣從事哲學活動，往往意識到有複雜的地理、歷史條件。

從地理條件來說，台灣島以及周邊海域內的其它島嶼（澎湖群島）位處於亞洲大陸與太平洋毗連的交界地帶，跨過台灣海峽，可西接亞洲大陸，在西太平洋邊，北臨沖繩群島、南臨菲律賓群島。地緣關係的連結有不同的想像：（1）可以將臺灣視為屏蔽福建的外海島嶼，這一觀點將臺灣、澎湖納入中國歷史；（2）若以連結沖繩、菲律賓來看，北通至日本，南通至馬來西亞、印尼，可形成西太平洋的島鏈群；（3）重構南島語族的遷徙、分布歷程，便是將台灣、蘭嶼、小琉球接上南太平洋的島嶼群，使得台灣原住民的語言、血緣有全然不同於漢民族的歷史圖景；（4）在西班牙、荷蘭的亞洲殖民擴張航線上，臺灣也是與中南半島、菲律賓群島的海上絲路連結。

從歷史條件來說，文化的層疊有原住民傳承的南島語族文明、西班牙與荷蘭的短暫歐洲殖民、明鄭所奠定的漢文化主流、日本殖民注入的全面改造、國民政府的共和體制、民主化的開放國度。臺灣這一小島有著其複雜的歷史轉折，也嵌入世界史的動態中。1895 年與 1949 年分別標示著重要的兩個時刻：1895 年後，在日本殖民統治下，日本鑄造的世界觀改變了臺灣文化的視野，在哲學創造上，透過日語吸收西方知識，形成一種與日本同步的當代性、在 1949 年後，中華民國政府轉至台灣及周邊諸島，帶來大量中國人才，在邊陲重塑中原敘事的史觀。

當代的臺灣哲學發展受到地理的與歷史的斷裂條件，但也在此縫隙中建立起各種連結的可能。在殖民、冷戰、帝國、霸權、離散、解放的各種形態交錯中，臺灣的哲學活動就在這些斷裂與連結的想像中展開，其中也有一種世界性，這種世界性是一種結合著歷史與地理的共通思考，在哲學的繼承、傳播與創造上，確實有值得注意的一些特點。

在臺灣哲學發展中，當代新儒家的兩位代表人物唐君毅（1909-1978）與牟宗三（1909-1995）不可忽略，相當程度地影響著 1949 年以後的哲學論述形貌，本文將說明兩位哲學家都有一種處理斷裂經驗的創造性環節，我稱此一創造性環節為「散種與再疆域化」。

「散種（或播散）」（*dissemination*）一詞，源自法國哲學家德希達（Jacques

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\* 本文原稿發表於曾發表於 2016 年 12 月 25 日至 26 日中國現代文學學會主辦「跨越一九四九：歷史與文學國際學術研討會」以及 2018 年 12 月 5 日至 7 日香港中文大學與新亞研究所合辦「靈根自植之後——紀念唐君毅先生逝世四十周年」國際學術會議，經過修改後即將刊行於《中國哲學與文化》第 17 輯。為提供本次「臺灣哲學與儒學的傳統保存」國際學術研討會與會學者參考，本文修改了前述底稿，並將改寫為英文，在正式定稿前，請勿引用。

Derrida, 1930-2004) 的一本書，藉以闡述哲學上創造性的層面，事實上，即使詮釋學家呂格爾 (Paul Ricoeur, 1913-2005) 所提的「接枝」，也有可能作為核心比喻，與傳統的再生可以連結。「再疆域化」(reterritorialization) 一詞則借自另一法國哲學家德勒茲 (Gilles Deleuze, 1925-1995) 與瓜塔里 (Félix Guattari, 1930-1992) (或可簡略說為德勒茲) 的用語，意在說明哲學創造的條件。

### 一、從花果飄零到靈根自植

唐君毅作為當代中國哲學家有其專業的哲學著作與詮釋立場，而作為新儒家的代表人物，他從人文精神與價值體系的角度來詮釋儒家。同樣地，牟宗三以儒家的人文教為規模，將中國哲學奠基在智的直覺 (智性直觀) 上，倡議儒家有「道德的形上學」。

牟宗三在《道德的理想主義》的序言中披露他身為一個流亡者的見證，斷裂感呈現在「天翻地覆」的描寫上，不過，緊接著這種對現實的無力，卻立即轉成一種跳躍，要面對時代病症的疏導。這種疏導既是以民族生命為主要脈絡，也是以個人的困境為疏導的自我療癒。他表明了一種雙重的思考：一是面對斷裂變局的情感創傷，二是尋求療癒的診斷轉化。

等到 1978 年《道德的理想主義》的修訂版序時，他也已經完成了《才性與玄理》、《佛性與般若》、《心體與性體》，希望疏通的中華民族智慧方向也大致完成。但是在這兩系列作品的對比中，牟宗三仍舊肯定自己的思想著作有一致性，對哲學歷史的疏通「仍不出自三十八年至四十八年十年間所發揚之文化意識之規模。蓋吾人所遭逢之時代問題仍是文化問題<sup>1</sup>。」在牟宗三身上，哲學創造的語詞「智的直覺」通於儒、釋、道三教，被視為中國哲學的核心支柱；但此概念並不是單單從對康德的逆反得出，更多的是帶有個人情感色彩所凝鑄的。《五十自述》(各篇文章成於 1956-1957 年間) 提供的線索相當清楚。他採證道文體藉著佛教「三昧」來說明他沉浸在個人、家、國的崩解痛苦中所體證的「悲情三昧的痛苦哀憐<sup>2</sup>」——，經過悲情三昧的洗禮後，並不是停在自憐自艾，反而是勘出「本心的慧根覺情」，要能夠體現出「天心仁體或良知天理」的悲願<sup>3</sup>。

唐君毅的筆下倒沒有天崩地覆的描述，但在 1951 年出版《中國文化之精神價值》的自序裡卻也提「蒼茫望天，臨風隕涕<sup>4</sup>」來自陳心境，也已經是相當沈重。唐君毅在一九四九年後的著作，多半是正面的、激勵人心的情感，而不是剖析自己痛苦情感的文字。他所寫作的目的仍然環繞著重大的歷史變革，以面對問題原因的鋪陳來取代對於時局的反應。

1955 年出版的《人文精神之重建》是由 25 篇文章結集而成，唐君毅指出：政治衝擊的苦難不是源自政治本身，而是文化衝擊的後果<sup>5</sup>。唐君毅對於問題的診斷與回應是回到文化認同的承認上。面對文化認同的困局，他指出必須如宗教精神那樣，一方面承認自己的罪惡、一方面承擔他人的罪惡，由此而轉化出對自己兼對他人的悲憫心懷。辯證法的表現就在於：為己、為他、為己且為他的三個環節從罪惡承擔轉成為悲憫。基於悲憫的人文精神，唐君毅看待中國現代性的文化衝突說，並不是採善惡鬥爭的論點，而是不同的善的矛盾衝突<sup>6</sup>。辯證法要克服中國現代史上的亂象與政治的苦

<sup>1</sup> 牟宗三，《道德的理想主義》(臺北：學生書局，1982年)，頁2。

<sup>2</sup> 牟宗三，《五十自述》(臺北：鵝湖出版社，1989年)，頁164。

<sup>3</sup> 同前書，頁166。

<sup>4</sup> 唐君毅，《中國文化之精神價值》(臺北：正中書局，1978年)，頁陸-柒。

<sup>5</sup> 唐君毅，《人文精神之重建》(臺北：學生書局，1974年)，頁2。

<sup>6</sup> 同前書，頁274。

果，不是採取去惡的手法，而是融通諸善。順著文化認同的道路，唐君毅面對他自身所處的歷史變局則是結合著辯證法來疏解他所見到的文化衝突。文化認同的核心就在於以人文精神考慮人作為人的價值根據，在此立場上，唐君毅才以儒家精神為此一文化認同的依歸。這是唐君毅處理巨大斷裂感的回應方式。

事實上，除了說理的解答，唐君毅也曾以鮮活的意象來陳述斷裂感，這就是廣為人知的「花果飄零、靈根自植」。唐君毅在 1961 年寫了〈說中華民族之花果飄零〉、1964 年寫〈花果飄零及靈根自植〉，形成一組頭尾一貫的作品。但以身處海外的僑居身分發言，他也承續此花果飄零、靈根自植的意象，另於 1971 年寫了〈海外中華兒女之發心〉、1973 年的〈海外中華子孫之安身之道〉（未完稿）兩篇短文。簡略地說，花果飄零與靈根自植這一組核心意象能夠概括一種離散經驗的反省。

花果飄零，取的是以中國大陸為生命情感與思想的原鄉，離開原鄉，流亡至異地，就如同花果離開大樹，飄零落地。靈根自植，取得是落地生根的意象，是在異地能夠安身立命，採取自尊自重、自信自守的方式體現自己的希望與理想。原本在花果飄零的意象中，偏重的是離散的斷裂悲劇，以母國、故土遭受劫難，被迫離鄉背井的剝離。但是，在價值意識的要求下，即使生活的土地環境已經不再是母國故鄉的模樣，仍要守住價值上的根<sup>7</sup>。從花果飄零推論到基於價值意識的保守，唐君毅指出一種絕望感<sup>8</sup>與精神上的奴隸意識——「以他人的標準為標準」、「以他人的價值為價值」<sup>9</sup>。在絕望與希望的對舉情況下，唐君毅翻轉出絕境中的希望與信心。這是將辯證法推到邊界的宗教式思考：

人能面對絕對的反面之絕望，亦即呈現出絕對的正面之希望與信心。人在病至欲死中，顯出真正求生之願望；人在罪惡深重之感中，顯出企慕至善之願望；人在深崖萬丈之旁，顯出自處之高。<sup>10</sup>

靈根自植的內在動力建立在絕望與希望的辯證中，是以絕望為界限經驗所湧生的希望。所希望的是中國歷史文化不斷絕，但這一希望卻不在於外在環境，而在於離開故土的每個個人，在個人身上就有普遍大公的人類存在理想。

唐君毅和牟宗三兩人都以人文精神來詮釋儒家，也以堅守儒家價值作為守護在政治斷裂中殘破的中國文化。牟宗三借用黑格爾（G. W. F. Hegel, 1770-1831）的歷史哲學來貫串整個中國歷史，其《歷史哲學》、《政道與治道》體現了診斷的分析架構，進而肯定以民主自由重新建立新政治體制的必要。唐君毅則一方面從中國文化的整體面貌來陳述未能有民主政治的文化理由與現實條件，一方面透過現代性中文化衝擊的調停來疏解矛盾，將道德價值放在世界的尺度上來衡量，策略性地申論保存中華文化的必要性。流亡經驗在唐、牟兩人身上的刻痕都是將個人的痛苦情感化作一種文化診斷與再造的契機。哲學著作並不是唐、牟兩人的職業身分所作，而是在流亡的斷裂經驗下所激出的深刻反省；在兩位哲學家的思想事業上，因為銘刻了這斷裂經驗的痕跡，卻也帶出了後斷裂的跨越努力。

從花果飄零到靈根自植的意象使用，已經指出了一條線索。不過，我們希望從此線索導出在二十一世紀思考的另一個可能性。

## 二、散種與再疆域化

<sup>7</sup> 唐君毅，《中華人文與當今世界》（上）（臺北：學生書局，1975年），頁25。

<sup>8</sup> 同前書，頁30。

<sup>9</sup> 同前書，頁34。

<sup>10</sup> 同前書，頁47。



歷史的斷裂與地理的斷裂交織在一起。唐君毅、牟宗三兩位的離散經驗體現在流亡、寄居異鄉（甚至是異國）上。牟宗三個人生命軌跡幾乎就是流浪，自 1949 年到 1959 年任教於臺灣十年，自 1960 年後到香港定居。1949 年流亡後，唐君毅停留在香港，「花果飄零」則是結合他的香港經驗與世界遊歷所見華人的居止而成。然而，在母國、故土/他鄉、異國的對比中，地理的斷裂嵌入歷史的斷裂中，與其說他們關心生活居住的地理位置，不如說他們更關心在歷史文化中的位置。

在唐、牟兩先生的哲學事業中，他們回應斷裂的創傷，則以歷史診斷為主軸；以歷史回顧的方式往前回溯，並導入批判反省；在這一現時代的巨大斷裂中，找到各個歷史階段中的裂痕。簡言之，巨大的斷裂是由各個過去時代的裂痕所組成。在這種歷史重構的作法中，兩者都在批判的態度下企圖指出中國作為有待建立的國家以及中華文化作為有本有源的文化體應該如何走向未來。以斷裂為一個被擱置的現在、一個與自己生命重疊的現在，而建構一個作為創傷起源的過去歷史，進而構作一個可被療癒而恢復整全性的未來。這是一個以歷史性來貫串的思考方式，辯證法提供了理論想像的資源。辯證法導入的否定性可以說明：「到現在為止」，一切創傷的否定性樣態如何得以解釋，而時間性、歷史性又如何在此否定性的操作下，解釋歷史環節所蘊含的裂痕（否定作用帶出的裂痕）。

### （一）靈根自植中差異的潛能

不論這樣的斷裂感如何，目標都是藉由歷史來鑄造統一感。「到目前為止」、「現在」的衝突矛盾與分裂都只是暫時的，從歷史而來的傷痕，也都可以回到歷史尋求和解融通的可能。任何巨大的斷裂都可以銷融在一個單一的歷史中。河流的水意象可以表現為起源的同一性，也可以表現終點的同一性。唐君毅界定「公共普遍之理想」是以「世間千江萬水，無論在什麼地方，同歸大海<sup>11</sup>」為引導隱喻。他對於普遍的同一性，或許可能也有其他的模式（例如華嚴宗「月映萬川<sup>12</sup>」的模式）。但我們以「無論在什麼地方」作為「靈根自植」的對應規定，這種模式是用價值真理來去除地方性與特殊性。依照這種歷史銷融的模式，地理、地域的特殊性傾向於被歷史的同一性所取代。

不過，「花果飄零、靈根自植」的意象卻可能蘊含著另一種保存地域特殊性的可能。如果，以歷史同一性為優先的模式對應著地理上的「北望神州、身居異地」的話，那麼，是否「靈根自植」本身就使得地域的特殊性不能被輕易取消？

或許唐君毅的「靈根自植」就容許兩種表述，當他在陳述一個個人必須自重自守時，他意味的是一個人「需於其面對事實而感受苦痛時，再回頭自覺反省其真正理想所在，內在之光明所在，而先有所自信自守；（...）此亦即吾人於任何環境下，皆可寄託希望與信心之處<sup>13</sup>。」這一個表述的場所論命題是「任何環境皆...之處」，是不受地方、環境的制約。這一個表述中的人的形象是秉持自由意志而自作主宰，唐君毅甚至稱為「絕對的自由主義<sup>14</sup>」。一個能自作主宰的自由人不會受到地方、場所、職位、身分的約束。〈花果飄零與靈根自植〉的結論<sup>15</sup>指出：一個絕對自由的人是「真正的人」。當他能自作主宰時，不會受到任何環境（地方、場所、職位）所改變，「無論其飄零何處，亦皆能自植靈根，亦必皆能隨境所適」。

這樣的自由人是在對比於時代斷裂的診斷中所構思出來的，卻蘊含一種普遍性。唐

<sup>11</sup> 同前書，頁 51-52。

<sup>12</sup> 同前書，頁 372。

<sup>13</sup> 同前書，頁 56。

<sup>14</sup> 同前註。

<sup>15</sup> 同前書，頁 57-58。

君毅在 1971 年〈海外中華兒女之發心〉中推斷二十一世紀會有一個新時代：

此時代，東方將不再對西方求報復，東方的文化與政治，亦將以一新的姿態出現于世界。<sup>16</sup>

此時代之人的社會，將不以血統、膚色、有產無產、有政權與否，加以劃分，而將為一依于人的平等，以成就人之德性、人倫、人格、人道與人文的新時代。此一時代之到來，亦當是一歷史的必然。<sup>17</sup>

所謂「歷史的必然」不是歷史定命論的「必然」，也不是烏托邦主義下的「必然」，比較像是「理想」(Ideal)，或康德意義下，作為「理念」(Idea)的「必然」。在此情況下，唐君毅總是稱 Idealism 為「理想主義」，而不是「觀念論」。他所意味的「歷史的必然」，不是單以中國的政治文化為中心，而是連中國的政治與文化都「必然向人的文化之建立之方向走去」<sup>18</sup>。因此，這種必然是超越國族的「人的文化」，是人文主義的世界公民立場。

沒有必要將唐君毅對二十一世紀的信念當作是預言，也沒有必要問這一信念、理想是否已經實現。我們關心的重點是，唐君毅將自由（自作主宰）跟歷史必然性（作為理想、理念）畫上等號。在場所論意義下的自由，被吸收入歷史的必然性之中。必然性與自由的二律背反，轉成為歷史與地域（地理、地方、場所、環境）的拉張。唐君毅的信念將地理銷融在歷史中，歷史取得了相較於地域的實踐優先性。

但回到前述提出的問題：是否「靈根自植」本身就使得地域的特殊性不能被輕易取消？

用另一方式表述：倘若沒有離散、逃亡、散居於異邦的地域差異，如果沒有外於神州大陸的孤島臺灣，如果沒有懸於珠江口外的英國殖民地香港，那麼，花果飄零盡於大陸神州之內，不復散至神州之外，還有什麼靈根自植的模態嗎？

歷史的斷裂豈不是要預設著地域的隔離嗎？如果不是地域的隔離，那麼還能夠凸顯出歷史的斷裂經驗嗎？所謂的自由，除了精神上的自由之外，豈不也包含著移動、居住的自由嗎？地方、地域的存在不就是使得歷史經驗、自由經驗得以具體化的條件嗎？

## （二）散種：起源的延異

歷史的同一化想要跨越斷裂經驗而回到原初的起源，修補此起源成為一個完整的歷史。這種設想也就設定了現代性衝擊回歸於單一歷史的起源。在單一起源的神話之外，是否至少要注意到「非起源的地方」？歷史的收攏正是在斷裂處發現到無法收攏處。無法收攏的地方卻是對於歷史起源的補充。

德希達在延異 (différance) 的概念下，提出了對於起源的補充 (supplément d'origine)。他透過分析胡塞爾的現前論，指出了胡塞爾所設想的「生動的現前」乃是以「現在」作為對起源的重複。但實際上，每一個「現前」（現在）都不是完整的「現前」，每一個現前在出現時既朝未來開放，也同時進入過去。在這種不完整的「現前」裡，並沒有「起源」的完全再現，也沒有完全重複。每一個「現前」就註定有其殘缺處，也有一個異於起源的東西存在於每一個嘗試再現起源的現前中<sup>19</sup>。

在《散種》(La dissémination) 一書第三篇〈散種〉中德希達分析索列斯 (Philippe Sollers, 1936-) 的小說《數字》，一方面延續其延異的補充邏輯，一方面導

<sup>16</sup> 同前書，頁 61。

<sup>17</sup> 同前書，頁 62。

<sup>18</sup> 同前書，頁 63。

<sup>19</sup> Jacques Derrida, *La voix et le phénomène* (Paris : PUF, 1967), pp.71-73, pp.98-111.

入尼采（Friedrich Nietzsche, 1844-1900）式擲骰的偶然論。關於「現前」（現在，le présent），德希達指出：

現前只有在關聯到自己時才如是地呈現，它也只有在自我分裂、在岔開的角度上、在裂縫裡自我摺疊時，才如是地對自己說，也才如是地看待自己（裂縫：在鎖鏈中的環環相扣裡有『差錯』與『組構』）。在啟動時。呈現絕不是現前的。（...）對現前成立的事情也對「歷史」、對「形式」、對歷史的形式等等成立，就像在形上學的語言中，一切的意指也跟「現前」這一意指不可分離。<sup>20</sup>

在此段引文的前半段重述了「延異」的基本概念，也指出「現前」不能當作同一性（不論是此刻的或永恆的，亦即，不論是內在於時間的或是外於時間的同一性）的具體呈現。這正是「呈現絕不是現前的」（La présence n'est jamais présente.）這一命題所想表達的內涵。但說此一「現前」在「自我分裂」（se diviser），或是說此現前能夠反身地指涉到自己的條件是它「在岔開的角度上、在裂縫裡自我摺疊」（en se pliant à soi dans l'angle, dans la brisure），這就使得同一性的認同涵蓋了一種無法全然收攏的差異。放在身分認同或文化認同上來說，這種認同也同時留下餘地給差異者、給他者。對於歷史也一樣，提供同一性或認同起源的歷史也必須有餘地給非歷史的、給非起源，或至少承認有某種東西與起源並在，但無法被起源所吸納。

斷裂，是一種面對差異無法取消的經驗。斷裂、切割、截斷產生出斷裂點、切面。德希達藉著分析小說的「片段」（一種割裂），來指出小說本身具有的後設層次。但這一後設層次所呈現的是「斷裂」、「切割」、「截面」的經驗本身。德希達的評註點出「生命」與「種籽」（種苗、精子）的內在關係：

離開「原始的」且神祕的統一（這種統一總是在事後遲遲地被重構出來）、斷裂、決斷——既產生決斷也被決斷——撞擊〔這種種動作〕，在投射之際分享了種籽。（...）沒有任何東西本身就是完整的，除非它被他所欠缺的東西所補足，否則它就不是完整的。<sup>21</sup>

我們不必被此段話的性隱喻所誤導偏離，誰能否定生命與性活動的緊密關連？即使是儒家的夫婦之道或《易經》的乾健坤承也容許此一生生天德的正面意義。但此處也不必拘泥於此一方向的解釋。重點在於「種籽」所帶來的「散種」效果。生命的歷程是在多樣化的作用下進行的，沒有多樣性，生命趨於單調，最終將歸於死寂。德希達的說法已經點出差異、多樣性的必要，尤其，起源本身就可能是複多的，而不是單一的。種籽使得生命延續。德希達進一步認為：

育種、散種。並沒有最初的授精。種籽首先就被播散了。「最初的」授精就是散種（播種）。痕跡，人們失去其痕跡的接枝（接種）。<sup>22</sup>

對於起源的補充意味著起源對後續的發展沒有完全的決定，也意味著差異是時間化的特徵。將生命與歷史等而觀之，也意味著兩者都必然要承受分裂、斷裂、分化。生命的開枝散葉、開花結果就是分化的結果。播散種籽如同拋擲出骰子，每一個偶然性都是散開、多樣化、繁複化的連帶狀況。

花果飄零，同時也是種籽的播散，有生命的種籽才有可能長出根苗而靈根自植。這種種籽的播散一旦往外拋擲，並沒有固定的必然軌跡。種籽落地處並非一種恣意的選擇，而是帶有偶然性的；種籽是否能夠植下靈根，也要看落地的地方是否能夠承受此一種籽的未來可能性。植根的種籽必須選擇落下的土地，也受到土地的選擇。花果

<sup>20</sup> Jacques Derrida, *La dissémination* (Paris : Seuil, 1972), p.336.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., p.337.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., pp.337-338.

種籽必須分化而多樣，接受植根的土地場所也是各有差異。種籽與地域兩者都展現出多樣性的條件。

繼續用這一從種籽到生命的隱喻，種籽雖似重複了從母幹來的生命，一旦落地生根，所孕育的生命就各異其趣；生命得到延續，但並不是同一個生命的複製。種籽與土地共同孕育出這一個新的生命體。從這一角度來看「花果飄零與靈根自植」的意象，生命開展的隱喻動力有可能含括著斷裂、多樣性、地域特徵，唐君毅所謂的「保守」就可能未必是單純重複著「起源」（母國）的身分認同，而有可能在「自守自重」的要求中樹立起新生命。

### （三）再疆域化：概念的新境地

如果藉由「散種」的概念來試著轉化「花果飄零與靈根自植」的積極面，那麼，唐君毅所謂「隨境所適」有「創造性的理想與意志，創造性的實踐」的價值生命，也可能轉化為一種思想條件。帶有價值理想的創造也是一種思想的創造。地域的條件是「隨境所適」所隱括的。從一個土地拔出、進入另一個土地，這原本就是運動的常貌，但生命適應的難題卻在於這種播遷之中。一旦這種生命的適應是順著地域的條件而有不同的創造動力，那麼思想與價值也就在這樣的動態性中重新產生出來，它不是單純的複製、也不是憑空的捏造。地域的條件對於思想與價值的再創造（差異的重複）有其不可或缺的功能。

德勒茲與瓜塔里在晚年的《什麼是哲學？》裡面指出，哲學活動是以創造「概念」為主，而「概念」則是以內在性平面（*le plan d'immanence*）作為運作的場所；這一內在性平面本身不是被思想的概念，而是「思想的影像」（*l'image de la pensée*<sup>23</sup>），這種影像是根據思想所意指的、使用思想、在思想中有方向引導而給出的<sup>24</sup>。一個概念的產生與另一個概念的出現決定了不同的哲學主張，簡言之，新概念的創造產生了新的哲學。據此，德勒茲與瓜塔里認為哲學活動必須包含概念的創造與（內在性）平面的設立（*la création de concept et instauration du plan*）：

概念是哲學的開端，但哲學的平面則是設立。平面顯然不在於一種計畫、一種草圖、一種目標或方法；它是一個內在性平面，這內在性平面構成了哲學的絕對地面、哲學的大地或它的解疆域化、它的奠基，在這些（地面、大地、解疆域化）上面，哲學創造出它的諸種概念。<sup>25</sup>

環繞著內在性平面，德勒茲與瓜塔里用的是一連串的場所論用詞：設立（*instauration*）、地面（*sol*）、大地（地球，*Terre*）、解疆域化（*déterritorialisation*）、奠基（*fondation*）。這些用語呈現出哲學的概念創造並不是純然精神性的凌空之舉，也不是仰賴一些哲學天才的靈感，但也不是受到歷史制約的必然產物。哲學創造的偶然性取決於它被創造出來的土地。地域的條件構成了讓新概念得以出現的場所。

德勒茲與瓜塔里也嚴格區分了概念、函數運算符（*fonctif*）、前瞻符（*prospect*）、感受符（*affect*），用以區別哲學與科學、意見、藝術。但在哲學本身的思想運作上，有一種特殊的地域條件，使得這一種思想不能如觀念論傳統或符應真理觀的二元論架構，將思想當作是主體與對象之間的關係，例如典型的命題是「智性與事物的吻合」（*adaequatio intellecti et rei*）或是康德（*Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804*）所謂的哥白尼革命（*Copernican revolution*）。相對地，德勒茲與瓜塔里認為「哲學的形成毋寧是在地域與土地的關係中形成<sup>26</sup>」。這使得哲學有一種「地域哲學」

<sup>23</sup> Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ?* (Paris : Minuit, 1991), p.39.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.40.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.44.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.82.

(géophilosophie) 的特徵。對於這種哲學的地域條件的想法，首先必須注意到「解疆域化」的效果：

土地不斷地在現場操作一種解疆域化的運動，透過這種運動，土地超越一切的地域：土地既是進行解疆域化的、也是被解疆域化的。(…)解疆域化的諸運動與諸地域不可分，這些地域朝向一個外部開放，而且再疆域化的過程也與土地不可分，土地又重新給出了諸種地域。地域與土地是兩種組成份子，伴隨著兩個不可分的地帶，一個地帶是解疆域化（從地域到土地），另一個地帶是再疆域化（從土地到地域）。無法區辨哪一個是優先在前的。要問的是希臘在哪個意義下是哲學家的地域或哲學的土地。<sup>27</sup>

哲學的產生是基於實際的地域與概念活動的內在性平面，以西方哲學起源於希臘而言，就是希臘的風土 (le milieu grec) 與內在性平面兩者相遇的結果，而且是帶有高度的偶然性，而不是根據歷史的必然性<sup>28</sup>。在此種眼光下的哲學就是地域哲學，是根據風土、情境、地理的偶然性<sup>29</sup>產生的。然而，概念也使得運作平面脫離一切限制，而產生解疆域化的運動，這時，概念取得其普遍性。但是當哲學再次出現在現代歐洲時，它使得地域與內在性平面重新相遇，這時，哲學重新又再疆域化 (reterritorialisation)：

絕對的解疆域化不會沒有再疆域化。哲學在概念上又再疆域化。概念不是對象，而是疆域 (territoire)。概念沒有客體 (Objet)，但有一疆域。<sup>30</sup>

但是，德勒茲與瓜塔里並沒有滿足於歐洲中心主義<sup>31</sup>，進一步將哲學的發生朝向未來開放：

概念的創造本身召喚著一種未來的形式，這一創造召喚著一個新的土地與一個尚未存在的民族。歐洲化並不構成一個生成變化，它僅僅構成資本主義的歷史，阻礙著已經順從的民族的生成變化。<sup>32</sup>

地域哲學的偶然性帶入了尼采式的觀點，這種生成變化 (devenir) 有一雙重性：「哲學應該變成非哲學，以便於使得非哲學變成哲學的土地與民族。<sup>33</sup>」至少，在生成變化中，有一種未來的可能性。哲學不再是現成的東西，不再服膺於現成的歷史，而是在生成變化中朝向未來。

根據地域哲學的規定，哲學是由地域與內在性平面的相遇偶然地產生，哲學在過去的歷史出現在希臘（以希臘為偶然的起源），也再度出現在歐洲（偶然地再疆域化於歐洲大陸，但產生民族國家的差別，例如，西班牙和義大利就缺乏哲學的風土，哲學家只像是彗星般地出現<sup>34</sup>），卻也將再度地產生變化，而在未知的未來重新有新的概念創造出現。生成變化配合著地域哲學的規定：

解疆域化與再疆域化彼此在雙重的生成變化中交錯。人們幾乎不再能夠區辨本地的與異邦的，(…)對自己、對自己的語言和國族變成陌生的，這不就是哲學家以及哲學的本分嗎，不就是他們的「風格」嗎，就是人們所謂哲學的不知所云嗎？簡言之，哲學再疆域化三次，第一次發生在過去，再疆域化於希臘人身上，再一

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp.89-90.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.92.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.97.

<sup>31</sup> 當德勒茲與瓜塔里批評中國是靠形象 (figures) 來思考，他們取的是易經的卦象，但忽略了其他的文本，這種觀點也多少帶有一種歐洲中心主義。同時，當他們認為伊斯蘭、印度、猶太思想也不能稱為哲學時，這種偏頗的分辨阻隔了再疆域化的可能，也反映著一種歐洲中心主義。Ibid., p.89.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p.104.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p.105.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.99.

次發生在現在，再疆域化於民主國家，另一次發生在未來，再疆域化於新的民族與新的土地上。<sup>35</sup>

借用德勒茲與瓜塔里的「再疆域化」的說法，我們並不是要將自己投射為未來的新民族與新土地，而是希望藉以轉化「花果飄零與靈根自植」的場所論條件。

### 三、概念挪用的價值重估

唐君毅的意象所要動員的是文化認同，他說理的方式是哲學的，他的論述也成為一個哲學論述。從後設的角度看，斷裂經驗的地理條件已經嵌入唐君毅的哲學論述裡。他所認為的正本清源是重新梳理儒家人文精神，藉以注入所謂靈根自植裡的保守主義（自守自重的實踐哲學，以理想與意志為核心）。從方法論的角度來看，唐君毅的哲學方法帶入了一種混合了康德與黑格爾的哲學體系，尤其是歷史進程的融合觀點極具黑格爾辯證法的色彩。

牟宗三的《歷史哲學》也顯然採用黑格爾的架構，但在分辨「分解的盡理精神」、「綜和的盡理精神」、「綜和的盡氣精神」<sup>36</sup>時，則是套入了分析/綜合、理性/經驗（盡理/盡氣）的康德式區分。至於理性的外延表現/內容表現<sup>37</sup>，雖似沿用自亞里斯多德（Aristotle, B.C. 384-B.C.322）以後的邏輯表述，但也像是康德用法的變形。牟宗三晚年吸納與轉化康德尤為明顯，在詮釋宋明理學的《心體與性體》裡，他也批判康德，從康德所謂「道德形上學」（metaphysics of morals）另轉化出一個特屬於中國儒家哲學的「道德的形上學」（moral metaphysics<sup>38</sup>）。這一稱謂則用以陳述「天道性命相貫通」的命題，結合了宇宙論與心性論。但反對者如勞思光（1927-2012）則僅僅保留心性論，而不同意有宇宙論的混入。晚年的牟宗三更著力於中西哲學的會通，在哲學會通的理路上重新貫串中國哲學史（《中國哲學十九講》），也以康德哲學為高峰分辨出西方哲學的不同傳統，呈現出康德哲學可與中國哲學會通之處（《中西哲學之會通十四講》）。然而，若要論說牟宗三的會通理論基礎，則可以舉《智的直覺與中國哲學》為典型，藉由佛教的判教構想，指出中國哲學能突破康德之處就在於「智的直覺」（智性直觀，intellectual intuition, intellektuelle Anschauung）。

牟宗三的「判教」深具「解疆域化」與「再疆域化」的特徵。判教一詞，源自漢傳佛教的華嚴宗和天台宗，華嚴宗有小、始、終、頓、圓<sup>39</sup>的分別，天台宗則有五時八教<sup>40</sup>的分判。雖然牟宗三以天台宗的判教為基準，但他的動機涵蓋了華嚴宗和天台宗，都是借用「大乘圓教」的概念，將哲學學說定在「圓教」的系統上。解疆域化的作法就在於他將「判教」方法與「圓教」境界從佛教教相的「疆域」抽出來，重新放到新的「土地」上。但是，不同於漢傳佛教的判教已經將印度佛教經典「再疆域化」於漢語的土地上，設立一種批判地閱讀理解佛教文本的體系，牟宗三的作法則又更為複雜，他藉由康德哲學將西方哲學概念也拉近這一新的土地來。牟宗三的「再疆域化」不是單純的中、西、印哲學比較，而是以圓教為哲學體系高峰的判準來判定康

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp.105-106.

<sup>36</sup> 牟宗三，《歷史哲學》（台北：學生書局，1974年），頁167，頁188。

<sup>37</sup> 牟宗三，《政道與治道》（臺北：學生書局，1979年），頁113，頁115。

<sup>38</sup> 牟宗三，《心體與性體》（臺北：正中書局，1981年），頁8，頁136，頁139。

<sup>39</sup> 牟宗三，《佛性與般若》（臺北：學生書局，1997年），頁557。另參照《華嚴金師子章》，收於《大正藏》第45冊，No.1880《金師子章雲間類解》（[http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/zh-cn/T45n1880\\_001](http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/zh-cn/T45n1880_001)），No.1881《華嚴經金師子章註》（[http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/T45n1881\\_001](http://tripitaka.cbeta.org/T45n1881_001)）（於2016/11/28參考）。

<sup>40</sup> 牟宗三，《佛性與般若》，頁619-624。五時：華嚴時、鹿苑時、方等時、般若時、法華涅槃時。八教：頓、漸、秘密、不定、藏、通、別、圓。前四教為一組，稱為化儀四教，是書法的方式；後四教為一組，稱為化法四教，是說法的內容。

德、柏拉圖（Plato, B.C. 428-B.C.348）、黑格爾、佛教、儒家、道家的體系性，他用「判教」來引入一個新的論述場域。在此場域裡，哲學概念重新產生撞擊的可能，亦即，重新產生思想運動。因此，牟宗三的哲學判教產生的「再疆域化」效果是以「智的直覺如何可能？」的問題展開對康德的回應，並肯定有「真我<sup>41</sup>」而建立起中國哲學中的「基本存有論<sup>42</sup>」。

當牟宗三以「道德的形上學」來肯定智的直覺時，他仍然意識到一種共通於康德與佛教天台宗的問題，亦即，現象界存在的問題。故而，他必須承認在「真我」與意識中的「我」並不完全吻合的差異或裂縫，他進而承認有「本心仁體之一曲」，必須有本心仁體的自我坎陷，兩者有「一辯證的貫通關係<sup>43</sup>」。這種辯證關係帶著內部的否定作用，因此，以智的直覺（智性直觀）來統攝時，必須銷融內在的矛盾、對立、與否定。基於此，天台宗的圓教模式便吸收源自《維摩詰經》的「從無住本立一切法」表述，展示了一種依於「曲線詭譎的智慧<sup>44</sup>」的銷融方式。事實上，牟宗三是以辯證法來銷融否定作用而闡述「智的直覺」。他的判教因此是一個複雜的解疆域化和再疆域化的過程。

除了前述的中年著作外，晚年唐君毅的判教展現在《生命存在與心靈九境》上，就安立現象世界的需求來說，他以前四境（萬物散殊境、依類成化境、功能運序境、感覺互攝境）來統攝。第五境觀照凌虛境所涉及的是數理之事，第六境道德實踐境則是一般意義的倫理道德行為與德行。末三境才真正從宗教的價值判斷來安立不同的高低：第七境是歸向一神境（只包含猶太教、伊斯蘭教、基督宗教的一神教體系），第八境我法二空境涵攝佛教，第九境天德流行境以儒家為九境的最高境。

同樣地，唐君毅也體現了「解疆域化」和「再疆域化」的異趣，我們可以用宗教對話的方式來看，也可以用重新安排價值次序的方式來看。從內部的思想運動來說，心靈九境的設立是沿著感通的三重方向（縱觀、橫觀、順觀<sup>45</sup>）開展的。但是，境、境界雖然安上了心靈，顯示了唐君毅一貫的觀念論（理想主義）立場，但心、境的相互涵攝，已經帶入一種場所論的條件。從佛學來的術語（「境」、「心」）卻離開佛學脈絡，成為一種論述世界的方式，描述了整個世界的多重層次。宗教境界的安排，將一神教（主要是面對基督宗教）、佛教（延續了傳統的儒佛之辨）、儒家當作各有其位的境，則是將不同的宗教價值按照哲學的分判來同樣置於境界中並立合觀，這一種作法銷融宗教價值在最後歸依處的衝突，已經同時使得哲學往宗教靠攏（此即「哲學的目標在成教<sup>46</sup>」之說），使得哲學被解疆域化。然而按照哲學所釐清的價值理念來安排宗教境地，也使得宗教被解疆域化。但是，宗教與哲學融合在成教的理念，形成一種新的論述土地，這又使得再疆域化成為一個新的可能。

唐君毅所謂的「心靈」就如同牟宗三的「本心仁體」，帶著濃厚的觀念論色彩。九境的開闢與心靈在境界中的進退，顯示出一種感通的動態過程<sup>47</sup>。在境之中，心靈無論如何地升降進退，卻總是以「各當其位」為準則。這種「各當其位」雖又疊入道德布置與動機（moral dispositif），但卻也使得心靈有一種在對境時的「再疆域化」。最終，哲學（包含宗教）提取了一種有次序、有動態的世界觀。與其說唐君毅重複了

<sup>41</sup> 牟宗三，《智的直覺與中國哲學》（臺北：商務印書館，1980年），頁181-183。

<sup>42</sup> 同前書，頁345。「基本存有論」（fundamental ontology）原係海德格用語，但牟宗三認為「基本的存有論就只能從本心、道心、或真常心處建立」（同前書，頁347），這一論斷並不符合海德格所界定與思考的基本存有論。簡單地說，牟宗三忽略了存有與存有者的差異，亦即，所謂存有論的差異。牟宗三批評海德格犯了「形上學誤置之錯誤」（頁355），這一批評也可以套用在牟宗三自己身上。

<sup>43</sup> 同前書，頁201-202。

<sup>44</sup> 同前書，頁322。參見《佛性與般若》，頁895（「詭譎地建立圓教」）；頁1008-1013（「智的直覺」）。

<sup>45</sup> 唐君毅，《生命存在與心靈境界》（上）（臺北：學生書局，1986年），頁17。

<sup>46</sup> 同前書，頁33。

<sup>47</sup> 唐君毅，《生命存在與心靈境界》（下），頁268。

「一切唯心」的作法，不如說他同時也勾勒出世界得以被形構的一種可能性。再疆域化產生了新的世界，這一世界同時必須從境、位、場所、空間的角度來理解。雖然不再提花果飄零、靈根自植的意象，但是，場所性、地域性的條件已經蘊含在這一晚年的境界論之中。

唐君毅將一種世界的結構化置入他所構建的心靈九境，這是一種奇特的概念裝置，但巧妙地印證了他所說的靈根自植。心靈九境或許不是他中、晚年後身處的香港縮影，大概也不是他所想像的未來世界。心靈（精神）跨越了國界、文化疆界，另行塑造一個獨特的世界景觀。當他以通觀九境的周流運動來貫串時，「一念之轉，即可有此九境之現<sup>48</sup>」，這是一種既開展又收縮的變化運動。心靈的「一念」與「九境」（世界）也同時表現出「進退無恒、上下無常<sup>49</sup>」的變化流轉，在境、世界的場所性（空間、位）之中，由於感通（心與境的感通）所帶入的生成變化產生了思想的內在運動，「境」似乎化為德勒茲所謂的「內在性平面」。一組源自佛學的老字詞（心、境）加上儒家易經的術語（「感通」）經過層層轉化，卻成為一種思想運動的描述詞，進而具有吸納其他價值體系、哲學體系的能力。這就是靈根自植的具體表現。

牟宗三與唐君毅的哲學判教創造了新的思想條件。這種新的條件已經跨越了兩位哲學家在面對歷史斷裂與地理斷裂的創傷經驗，重新設定了面對未來的新可能性。不論在香港或在臺灣，唐、牟兩者實際上都始終心懷神州大陸。但是，他們透過思想的設定既展現出各當其位的概念創造，也就使得他們肉身所在的場所有了新的思想可能性。由於香港、臺灣相較於他們的文化母國都是一種「海外」的疆域，這種隔離卻也表現出一種不可任意吸納、化約、遺忘的存在意義。這使得海外孤懸的異地有一種對文化母國、神州大陸的補充，相對地，重新塑造了一種新的「世界」形象。唐、牟兩位對臺灣的哲學想像有極大影響，在提取傳統資源、跨傳統對話、漢字運用上，都是自成一格的典範。

## 結論

唐君毅、牟宗三從他們各自的、共享的生命創傷出發，轉喻地尋求一種面對歷史又超越歷史的療癒方式，回復一種以儒家價值為本位的「原初健康文化機體」。在這一轉喻式的行動中，又轉為以哲學為回復生機的自我轉化行動。不論是批判的或建構的，他們所採取的哲學的創造活動觸及了一種思想的運動。回復有機體的整全功能卻不單單是描繪了一個理想的起源而已，相反地，此一起源是被建構的。牟宗三藉著一個康德式的術語（智的直覺）建構了「全新的」中國形上學起源，而此一起源蘊含著一種克服康德思想界限的條件。唐君毅所構作的「世界」（境界）也不斷地透過吸納既有的現代性衝突、信仰衝突、東西方衝突（很可以用地理學方式來說這種東、西方）、國族的衝突（以中國為核心的原始形象）來建構一個儒家人文主義的「起源」。換言之，「起源」的認定都在於從「現在」來回溯地重構。這種「起源」與其說早已存在，不如說是被指認的。關鍵就在於這一回溯式的指認。一個整全有機體的隱喻架在文化母國、價值根源上，但這一整全有機體從原來的隱喻場中被拔出，透過哲學的思想運動來促發另一種對於生命動態的想像。透過哲學活動重新賦予生命。但是，這一生命已經不再是那一個被設想的原來的「整全有機體」。經過創傷的痛苦，彌合傷口的療癒已經帶入了「原本不屬於」那整全有機體的東西。「指認」的動作也變得有必要，要在已經產生差異的樣態中「指認」出原本的那一個。事實上，這種指認就已經帶入了思想運動，第一次的骰子已經擲過，再來的是第二次、第三次...。差異

<sup>48</sup> 同前書，頁 271。

<sup>49</sup> 同前書，頁 274。



也已經存在，只有靠思想運動才能重新將已經「解疆域化」的東西「再疆域化」。不論唐君毅、牟宗三的私人意願如何，他們的思想運動已經在香港、臺灣重新疆域化為一種對於起源的補充。這種補充的指認或許比原來設定的母國形象更具有動態效果。

面對斷裂、重新塑造連結、創造新的可能性，這樣的作法隱含著對創傷記憶的跨越。然而，創傷記憶本身已經不再是一個單純的起源，而是一個被指認、被建構的起源。但是，要從哪裡來指認？要從哪裡來建構？什麼是重要的補充？歷史是否已經將某一類型的起源遮蓋了？我們必須面對起源被建構的狀態，同時也藉此考慮新的開始、新的方向。文化身分的再造、概念的創造，在哲學家的生命裡，必須跨越歷史的斷裂與地理的鴻溝；但這意味著，在重構歷史、補充起源之餘，也同時重新挪移看待地理方位的角度。創傷與斷裂所凝聚的記憶綴補，已經是一種思想資源，但如何汲取資源而重新創造出另一番不同的思想條件？這才是跨越的命題（或暗示、命令）在此一個「現在」所能夠再疆域化所設下的門檻。如同歷史與地理的斷裂必須被放在世界史、世界地理的脈絡來看，跨越斷裂的機制也有一世界史、地理哲學的意義。唐君毅和牟宗三的再疆域化具有世界哲學的視野，離散經驗與思想經驗的結合中也可以在世界地理中重新標記。新的思想動能來自這一個世界的重新形構的可能性，在這一新的世界圖像中，地方性不再只是座標上的一點，而是世界構成的一個要素。地方性也承受了解疆域化與再疆域化的效果，這也就可能醞釀出新的創造條件。散種的事實豐富了各種有創造性的多樣性，承接種籽與提供資源則是新生命的希望所在。

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**PANEL 1:**

**The Great Master of Taiwanese Confucianism: Mou Zongsan**



**Thursday, October 17, 13:30–15:00**

**Panel 1: The Great Master of Taiwanese Confucianism: Mou Zongsan**

**Ady Van den Stock:**

**Life and Learning, or Learning how to Live? Remarks on Mou Zongsan's Autobiography at Fifty**

While contemporary academic philosophers are usually (perhaps unjustly) not suspected of leading the most interesting of lives, the properly philosophical refusal to draw a sharp delineation between living and thinking, as expressed for instance in Socrates' famous rejection of an "unexamined life", arguably remains of considerable intellectual as well as "therapeutic" interest to this day. In any case, it seems safe to say that philosophy, frequently blamed for its supposed "uselessness", has the potential to make life more interesting, even if it almost never provides ready-made normative solutions and often even proves unable to offer anything in the way of emotional guidance or reassurance. In this paper, I will explore the problem concerning the relation between philosophy and human existence by delving into Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Autobiography at Fifty (Wushi zishu 五十自述) from 1957, fifty being the age when Confucius claimed to finally "know the mandate of heaven" (知天命). While sometimes identified as the most "philosophical" of all New Confucian thinkers, Mou's highly abstruse and complex reinvention of Confucianism, one mediated by Kant's transcendentalism, was grounded in what he took to be the traditional Confucian affirmation of a veritable "learning of life" (shengming de xuewen 生命的學問), in which human existence is not extrinsic to, but rather appears as both the beginning and end-point of philosophical reflection. In this respect, it is worthwhile considering how Mou deals with the relation between "learning" and "life" in his own autobiography. How does Mou portray his own (intellectual) development? Which turning-points does he identify in his own life, and how are these "immanent" experiences related to his transcendental and metaphysical concerns? Does Mou approach philosophy as something conducive to leading a fuller and more meaningful existence, or does his predominantly tragic outlook reflect a definitive rupture between "learning" and "life" under modern conditions? These are some of the questions I will try to engage with in my paper.

**Jana S. Rožker:**

**A Philosophical Relation between Taiwan and Japan: Models of dialectical thought in Mou Zongsan's and Nishida Kitaro's theories**

**Abstract**

The article opens with a discussion of recent theoretical and methodological innovations in the field of comparative philosophy. In this regard, I propose and explain a new possible method of contrasting particular aspects of divergent philosophical texts or discourses and denote it as a “philosophy of sublation”. Then, the paper provides a concrete example for such a post-comparative method of reasoning, I will try to apply a “sublation philosophy” approach for a reinterpretation of certain aspects of the complex philosophical intersections between modern Japanese and Chinese philosophies through the lens of a contrastive analysis of Nishida Kitarō's and Mou Zongsan's dialectical thought. In this way, I hope to shed some new light upon some general questions regarding different models of dialectics.

**Keywords:** Mou Zongsan, Nishida Kitarō, comparative philosophy, philosophy of sublation, dialectics

**1. Post-comparative philosophy: from *fusion philosophy* to the *philosophy of sublation***

In recent years, the theoretical foundations of comparative philosophy have been subjected to many fruitful and interesting debates. Some researchers (e.g. Ouyang 2018: 244) believe that, technically, any philosophy is comparative, because “comparison in general is a basic function/apparatus of critical thinking, which characterises philosophy” (ibid). It is unquestionably true that contrasting different concepts or ideas, categories, and patterns or models of reasoning by distinguishing between and associating them, belongs to the basic features of any reasoning. This implies that not only philosophy, but also the entire system of thinking as such is based upon contrasting objects and forms.

However, one certainly also has to be aware that comparison is a much more complex cognitive method that goes beyond simple contrastive procedures and exceeds them. Therefore, the notion of “comparative philosophy” is neither tautological, nor redundant (Li Chengyang 2016: 534).

Yet, recent controversies that arose in the field of intercultural philosophy<sup>1</sup> have plainly shown that the concept of comparison as such is likewise rather difficult. More precisely, these debates have clearly pointed out that the very process of comparing different philosophies as such is unavoidably linked to numerous methodological problems, which have hitherto not been comprehensively analysed and are therefore still far from being truly solved. Comparative philosophy in general brings about many tricky issues, but these issues become much more complex in the field of intercultural philosophical comparisons, i.e. when we are comparing philosophies belonging to different linguistic and cultural traditions. As Rafal Bańka reveals (2016: 605), intercultural comparative philosophy needs a different methodological approach than other comparative methods that are working in the scope of a single philosophical tradition. The former is primarily and necessarily concerned with problems of possible conceptual and heuristic (in)commensurabilities, because it has to

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<sup>1</sup> See for instance Chakrabarti and Weber 2016: 2,3; Banka 2016: 605; Burik 2009: 3-9; Coquereau 2016: 153; Li Chengyang 1999: 6-9 and 2016: 533-4; Möller 2019: 31ff; Neville 2016: 499-500; Ouyang 2018: 243; Weber 2013: 3ff, 2013a: 596ff, 2014: 151, and 2018: 258ff.; Shen 358, and others.

establish a unifying discourse supervening on them. He also points out that even though such comparative philosophies create spaces where different philosophical traditions can be encapsulated in one philosophical language, they necessarily still treat the material they work on as culturally discrete (ibid).

However, the issue is even more complicated, and the problem addressed above goes even further, particularly when comparing East Asian and Euro-American philosophies. It is not only connected to the fact that we have a “unifying methodology built on culturally discrete materials” (ibid). The core problem is that the methodology in question is almost always a system underlying one of the philosophies under comparison, and due to the prevailing historical, social and political aspects of the global relations this “unifying methodology” is usually the Western one. The methodology that has been developed in the course of the Euro-American philosophical tradition widely serves as the standard methodology for any philosophical inquiry. There is usually no third, “objective” methodology. Analogously, the same holds true for the abovementioned “one philosophical language” (ibid). All this necessarily leads to the unfortunate fact that even in the so-called globalised era, all intercultural philosophical comparisons are still grounded on the “now well-known but still persisting (political) reality of overall Western-centric academics” (Coquereau 2016: 152). Precisely because of the awareness of these underlying biased standards, any coherent and consistent philosophical comparison cannot remain limited to the method of paralleling and describing differences and commonalities of various abstract entities. In this sense, intercultural comparative philosophy is certainly more than just “the erecting, detecting, smudging, and tearing down of borders” (Chakrabarti and Weber 2016: 2) between different philosophical traditions. Since these traditions were shaped in “different parts of the world, different time periods, different disciplinary affiliations” (ibid), such philosophical comparisons have to “separate and connect at the same time what are very likely or unlikely pairs of, or entire sets of, comparanda (that which we set out to compare)” (ibid). As already mentioned, these questions go far beyond simple divisions and linkages. Any comparative discourse or procedure which aims to provide new knowledge must also include interpretations and evaluations, and hence judgements. In intercultural comparisons, these evaluations are necessarily linked to the abovementioned problems of Western-centric methodology and its axiological presumptions. In their Introduction to the important book *Comparative Philosophy without Borders*, the editors Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber also repeatedly warn against the relatively common supposition of comparative philosophy as a discourse, which establishes fruitful interrelations and dialogues between different traditions. It certainly holds true that such assumptions are not only idealist, but also superficial. Ideas, arising from such grounds, may therefore not provide us with any “magic formula to which all comparison could be reduced” (ibid).

Based on reflections and analyses of such conceptual and axiological questions, Chakrabarti and Weber propose the idea of “fusion philosophy” (ibid: 6) that could, in their view, function as an innovative method of transforming traditional comparative philosophy by surpassing its limitations and fixing its inconsistencies. “Fusion philosophy” refers to cross-cultural philosophising rather than doing merely comparative philosophy. In other words, it means “philosophically comparing” rather than merely “comparing philosophies”. This thought-provoking idea was a result of a self-critical account of comparative philosophy that has been long overdue. Chakrabarti and Weber’s argumentation provides us with a sound and ambitious definition for the future of such a new model of cross-cultural philosophies (Coquereau 2016: 152).

Nevertheless, in my view, the concept of “fusion” seems to be a somewhat unfortunate terminological choice, for it denotes the result of a process in which two or more entities have

been joined together, forming a single new entity<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, it is often associated with the process of melting, which normally results in a unity in which particular elements of the two or more entities that have been melted (or fused together), become completely unrecognisable and are essentially alienated from their previous forms and contents. The integrated unity, which arises through a fusion, is, of course, a qualitatively new substance, but, on the other hand, it does not include any external and utterly different elements that were not – in one form or another – already included in at least one of the amalgamated entities. If we thus consider fusion as a metaphor for a particular method of philosophical reasoning, then we have to admit that genuine philosophising as a creative process can hardly arise from amalgamated unities of distorted elements. Instead, it has to be shaped upon consideration of discrete, previously existing philosophical grounds on the one side, and enriched by separate new understandings on the other. Only on such foundations can new philosophical insights simultaneously bring about new cognitive substances.

Proceeding from such reflections, we might consider denoting this new methodological transformation with the term “synthesis philosophy”. Synthesis also implies a qualitatively new stage of development, and one in which some elements of the two or more entities from which it arises are preserved, while others discarded. Yet, especially in philosophy, the term synthesis is often overburdened with the orthodox Hegelian view, in which synthesis is normally a result of two reciprocally excluding and mutually contradictory entities, while comparisons can include both distinctions and commonalities of the *compranda*. An additional (and perhaps even more severe) problem arises when we consider the mechanistic nature of such dialectical processes, which seem to develop through and by themselves and to proceed more or less automatically from one stage to the next. As such, a “synthesis philosophy” would probably likewise mostly be seen as something that fails to provide space for genuinely new conceptions created by individual minds.

We might thus consider replacing it with the notion of a “philosophy of sublation”. Even though the term “sublation” also represents part of the Hegelian lines of thought and could therefore also be seen as problematic, it is still much less of an issue. Besides, “sublation” also includes all three connotations that are of crucial importance in any process in which something new arises from interactions between two or more existing entities. In this philosophical sense, “sublation” refers to the three notions of arising, eliminating and preserving. Besides, in contrast to “synthesis”, the notion of “sublation” refers to a process rather than a stage. If we consider the original meaning of the word sublation, which is applied as a *terminus technicus* in the field of chemistry, where it means a technique of adsorbing material to be separated on the surface of an immiscible liquid (mostly in the form of gas bubbles), it could truly serve as a good metaphor for such “cross-cultural philosophising”. Considering this later (or original) sense of this term, “sublation philosophy” actually means the exact opposite of “fusion philosophy”. For of all these reasons, I believe “sublation philosophy” could better and more precisely denote new forms of cross-cultural philosophising than the term “fusion philosophy”, as proposed by Chakrabarti and Weber. However, as already mentioned, this is probably only a question of nomenclature<sup>3</sup>. In spite of the importance of precise terminology, what ultimately counts is nevertheless the actuality rather than its name, the content rather than its label.

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<sup>2</sup> Definition of the term “fusion” in English by *Oxford Dictionaries*.

<sup>3</sup> In order to distance themselves from the many methodological problems of comparative philosophy delineated above, several scholars have begun to apply a more generalised term “post-comparative philosophy” (see for instance Möller 2019: 31ff, Weber 2013a: 596). Because he also finds the term “fusion philosophy” somewhat problematic, Ralph Weber recently prefers to denote his vision of such a methodology with the term “post-comparative global philosophy” (Weber 2018: 7).



In order to provide a concrete example for such a post-comparative method of reasoning, I will try to apply a “sublation philosophy” approach for a reinterpretation of certain aspects of the complex philosophical intersections between modern Japanese and Chinese philosophies through the lens of a contrastive analysis of Nishida Kitarō’s and Mou Zongsan’s dialectical thought. In this way, I hope to shed some new light upon some general questions regarding different models of dialectics. Even though much has already been revealed about the methodological grounds of these systems, such a cross-cultural perspective may offer us a new angle from which their general structure can be perceived in an innovative way.

## 2. Frameworks of reference

Let us begin with delineating the substantial features of different dialectical models. Because every philosophical system is inevitably embedded into a semantic network that can be called a framework of reference, the same applies for different models of dialectic reasoning, which are necessarily parts of such systems.

The term framework of reference<sup>4</sup> was first introduced by the Chinese analytical philosopher from Hong Kong Fung Yiu-ming 馮耀明. In his book *Zhongguo zhexuede fangfalun wenti* 中國哲學的方法論問題 (*The Methodological Problems of Chinese Philosophy*), he assumes a certain grade of incommensurability between the methodological systems of the so-called Western and East-Asian traditions (Fung 1989, 291-2). He asserts that this phenomenon is connected with the incommensurability of referential networks, which is linked to the impossibility of transferring certain concepts from one cultural-linguistic context into the other. All of this leads logically to a certain degree of impossibility with regard to making comparisons among different methodological systems.

These problems are, however, not limited only to theories or methods, which spring out of different cultural traditions; they also occur within every research project, focused on objects within a single language or tradition. Actually, what we are here confronting is a universal problem, which has been discussed by a broad range of Western theories (Kuhn, Quin, Lakatos, Feyerabend, etc.). Fung reminds us in this context of the well-known example of the relation between Newton’s and Einstein’s theories: because they represent different referential frameworks, the functions and semantic connotations of the same notions applied in them are also different, in spite of the fact that they are described in the same language.

This means that scholars who deal with philosophical texts from different cultural traditions have to take into account that each of these texts always belongs to a specific referential framework. The specific features of this framework are determined by the application of different concepts and categories, resulting in different methodological procedures. The classical Chinese (and most of the traditional East Asian) frameworks, for instance, include the following characteristics<sup>5</sup>:

- They represent dynamic, processual and highly contextual discourses;
- They are holistic systems;
- They include immanent and transcendent aspects;
- They are binary (but not dualistically) structured;
- They operate in accordance with the process of correlative complementarity.

<sup>4</sup> In Chinese original: *canzhao kuangjia* 參照框架

<sup>5</sup> The referential framework of Nishida’s philosophy includes most of these characteristics, perhaps with the exception of the last one, for, as we shall see later, his dialectic is grounded in interactions between pairs of mutual contradictions.

In the following text, I will briefly discuss the main features of these methodological foundations. Already in the pre-Socratic period, i.e. in the earliest development of so-called European philosophy, the kinetic nature of the dynamic Heraclitan framework was replaced by Parmenida's view of the unchangeable substance of being. In contrast to such development, classical Sinitic philosophy always remained rooted in a dynamic worldview of reality defined by everlasting change and transformations. This elementary, processual view of actuality has – *inter alia* – led to the impossibility of the development of formal logic, for its three basic laws could not be established in a continually changing reality<sup>6</sup>. The processual network was embedded into a holistic structure, in which the existence of every single object, idea or category was determined through its relations to the others. Such a holistic, relational framework was not limited to the immanent realm; due to its dynamic nature, it also encompassed transcendent dimensions, which surpassed the limitations of mere empirical reality. But this all-embracing holistic reality is meticulously structured in accordance with the so-called binary categories. This means that every object, every phenomenon can be analysed in terms of its forms, its contents or properties through the lens of two opposing ideas or poles. The most general pair of such opposites is *Yinyang* 陰陽, originally denoting the relation between latent and manifest elements of the object under inquiry. The list of binary categories is endless and here we shall only mention two of the most prominent ones. While *Benmo* 本末 (literary: roots and branches) discusses the relation between cause and effect, or the general and the particular, and even deduction and induction, *Tiyong* 體用 (literally body and application) examines the relationships between substance and function, between the essential and the accidental, the content and the application. However, in our present discussion, the most important binary category is *Youwu* 有無, which refers to interactions between absence and presence<sup>7</sup>. But concerning the topic of this paper, the actual mode of interaction between the two oppositional poles of a binary category is of utmost importance.

The Chinese frame of reference is determined by the previously mentioned principle of correlative complementarity. The central peculiarity of this principle is particularly evident when we contrast it with the model of the Hegelian dialectic. In Hegel's triadic model, a thesis is negated by an antithesis. Thesis and antithesis are mutually exclusive. This means that they are not only in opposition, but also in contradiction to each other. The tension created by this contradiction allows the occurrence or the effect of the sublation in its triple meanings of preservation, elimination and elevation. The synthesis that takes place by virtue of sublation constitutes a qualitatively new and higher phase of dialectical evolution, and also preserves in itself some elements of the thesis and the antithesis while eliminating others. In the system of correlative complementarity, however, the two oppositions do not exclude one another; on the contrary, they are interacting in a mutually complementary and interdependent relation (see Laozi s.d.: 2). This means that the two opposing poles are in

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<sup>6</sup> Even though the three basic laws of traditional formal logic, i.e. the law of identity ( $A = A$ ), the law of difference or the law of the excluded contradiction ( $A \neq \neg A$ ) and the law of the excluded middle or *tertium non datur* ( $A \vee \neg A$ ) cannot maintain validity in a system of processual logic, the elementary principle of Nishida's Basho dialectics, which was described by Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki (Tosa 2014: 9.30'-9.40') as "A is A because A is non-A" ( $A = A \therefore A = \neg A$ ) could be completely valid and easy to understand in such a framework.

However, in this particular case, the validity of the preposition is not conditioned by the processual nature of the framework as such, but rather by a specific mode of unifying contradictions.

<sup>7</sup> This relativity, which is embedded in reciprocal relations between the oppositional poles of every binary category, has been expressed particularly clearly in classical Daoism. Laozi, for instance, repeatedly emphasises that no concept can exist outside the relation to its counter-concept, and therefore there can be no absolute meanings. (See for instance Laozi s.d.: 2).

opposition, but not in contradiction to each other<sup>8</sup>.

In contrast, in the Chinese framework such an absence of contradictions leads to a formal harmonisation and continuous unification process of the two opposites. Such a system cannot produce any external synthesis that could manifest itself in some kind of a completely new, unprecedented state. The mutual interaction between the two opposing poles, and the movement that they form, is characterised by constant balancing. In other words, it is characterised by the continuous pursuit of harmony. In this dynamic framework, the synthesis is included in the interaction of the two opposites and in all it produces. We will discuss this issue in more detail in later sections.

Based on the differences between these two models, we will now briefly introduce the main features defining two concrete modern East Asian systems of dialectical development. These are Nishida Kitarō's model of *Basho* dialectics on the one hand, and Mou Zongsan's model of the self-negation of the moral self on the other. Let us begin with the latter.

### 3. Mou Zongsan: ontology of two levels and the self-negation of the moral Self

Mou Zongsan aimed to explain how the world of empirical objects and the realm of transcendent *noumena* are related to one another in a Buddhist-inspired “two-level ontology” (兩層存有論). The first level refers to the empirical, and the second to the transcendental realm. Both levels are part of the one and the same reality, which is composed of two aspects. In delineating the fundamental features of this model, Mou was inspired by the Mahayana Buddhist text *The Awakening of the Faith* (大乘起信論) and its central supposition according to which “One spirit can open two gates (一心開二門)”. This implies that the subject of recognition has access to two approaches to this reality. Mou based his idea of ‘double ontology’ on the Kantian distinction between phenomena and ‘things in themselves’:

If we start from the assumption that ‘man is finite as well as infinite’, we must apply ontology on two levels. The first is the ontology of the *noumenal* sphere, or the ‘detached ontology’. The second is the ontology of the sphere of appearances, or the ‘attached ontology’ (Mou Zongsan, 1975, 30).

Double ontology is thus divided into the noumenal and phenomenal, or the attached and detached ontology (執的存有論, 無執的存有論). Within the frame of these two ontologies, he defines detachment and attachment as follows:

‘Detached’ corresponds to ‘the free and unlimited heart – mind’ (in the sense of Wang Yangming’s clear heart-mind of the cognitive subject)... ‘Attached’ corresponds to the ‘attachment of the cognitive subject’ (ibid, 39).

Confucian metaphysics, which is also included in Mou’s noumenal ontology, is understood as not only ‘detached’ but also ‘transcendental’ (ibid). A metaphysics of this kind is possible due to intellectual intuition (智的直覺). Hence, the ‘detached ontology’ corresponds to the free and unlimited heart-mind (自由的無線心). Parallel to this ontology of detachment is the ‘attached ontology’. Thus, both the ‘detached’ and ‘attached’ ontologies are linked to the cognitive subject or cognitive perception.

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<sup>8</sup> In the classical Chinese sources, we can find numerous texts that point to the impossibility of the existence of contradictions in the real world of actuality. The most well-known (and the one which explains the Chinese name of the very concept of contradiction), is perhaps Han Feizi’s story about the impossibility of the simultaneous existence of impenetrable shields and all-penetrating spears (Han Feizi s.d. Nan yi: 4).

The contrast between finite and infinite does not mean that for Mou both areas have to be excluded, but that ultimately there are two perspectives that are aimed at the same reality and therefore require two different, but not mutually exclusive, forms of knowledge. The form of the finite is characterised by empirical recognition or the cognitive mind. Mou denotes the form of knowledge that characterises the infinite realm of *noumena*, with the term intellectual intuition<sup>9</sup>. Mou's interpretation leads to a positive interpretation of the thing-in-itself and intellectual intuition, although both concepts have only the function of a 'negative concept' within the critique of pure reason. According to Mou, however, both realms of the finite and infinite emerge from the subject and can hence be developed in a positive sense. Although Kant rejects human being's ability to possess and apply intellectual intuition and allows it to God alone, the three major teachings of Chinese philosophy, namely Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, all admit that humankind has intellectual intuition, for humans are infinite subjects (無限的心).

Mou thought that through our capacity for intellectual intuition, human beings are "finite, yet infinite" (有限而無限). He accepted Kant's system as a good analysis of our finite aspect; that is, our experience as beings limited in space and time and also in understanding, but he also thought that in our pursuit of intellectual intuition we also exceed our limitations.

Mou argued that Kant's refusal to consider intellectual intuition had far-reaching implications, for without the integration of this concept into his epistemology, Kant's entire construct of the autonomous subject would collapse, while the metaphysical construct of the world and of human existence also rests on very fragile foundations. The same was true for Eastern thought, for without this concept traditional Chinese philosophy would likewise be deprived of its ideal foundation. The concept of human intellectual intuition thus occupies the centre of Mou's philosophy. As Sébastien Billioud (2012, 70) writes, this concept underpins both his interpretation of Chinese philosophy, and his critique and superseding of Kant's thought:

If we do not recognise that human beings in their limited existence possess the possibility of intellectual intuition then, given Kant's interpretation of the significance and function of such intuition, all of Chinese philosophy is impossible. And not only this: for Kant's entire moral philosophy would also become an empty discourse. But there is no way I can resign myself to this fact. Thus, by means of the Chinese philosophical tradition, we must establish the conditions for the possibility of human intellectual intuition.<sup>10</sup> (Mou Zongsan, 1971, *Foreword/2*)

A human being, then, is capable of overcoming her finiteness and of penetrating into the realm of detached ontology. Intellectual intuition can thus overcome the limited subject of the ontology of attachment. However, with the mastery of this higher level of onto-epistemological states of reality, the dialectical process of human realisation is not yet complete. The subject subjects itself to forms and categories in a process that Mou calls the "self-negation" (自我坎陷) of the transcendent subject. On this lower level of comprehension,

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<sup>9</sup> This form of knowledge is not a concept, neither is it the result of dialectical reasoning. However, this moral self, or self-intuition, which pours out spontaneously from one's inner self, is – through its conscious awareness – also permeating everything else that exists (Mou Zongsan 1971: 200), for "it is omni-inclusive and the source of everything. It not only determines each individual's moral behavior, but also the existence of every plant and tree" (他是涵蓋乾坤，為一切存在之源的。不但吾人之道的行為由他而來，即一草一木，一切存在...因而有其存在., *ibid*: 191).

<sup>10</sup> 如果吾人不承認人類這有限存在可有智的直覺，則依康德所說的這種直覺之意義與作用，不但全部中國哲學不可能，既康德本人所講的全部道德哲學亦全成空話。這非吾人之所能安。智的直覺之所以可能，須依中國哲學的傳統建立。

which Mou calls the “cognitive mind” (認知心), the mind uses empirical intuition and the related cognitive processes to grasp things as discrete objects that are subjected to causal laws. On this level, objects are separated from one another and from reason; they are embedded into particular temporal and spatial positions and possess numerical identities. In spite of the Buddhist and Kantian inspirations, Mou’s approach represents a dialectical model that can only be understood and explained within the classical Chinese referential framework of a process philosophy, determined by dynamic correlative complementarity.

#### 4. Nishida Kitarō and the “self-identity of absolute contradictions”

Let us now turn to Nishida Kitarō’s dialectical model. Nishida’s philosophy is based on attempts to overcome the subject-object dichotomy, returning to the pure consciousness that exists before this division. In this context, he has developed the dialectic of the “self-identity of absolute contradictions (絶対矛盾的自己同一)”, which his first translator (Schinzinger) translated with the much easier to understand and simpler phrase “the unity of opposites”<sup>11</sup>. The central term in this system is *Basho* or *Topos* (場所), a “place” in which subject and object can correlate through mutual interaction as a whole and, as such, it equates to being and at the same time to nothingness.

*Basho* is neither subjective nor objective existence; since it is the place which comprises both worlds, and since it is where all existences – the objective, but also the subjective existence, which can never be objectified – are “localised”, *Basho* itself is not a form of existence. It is nothingness. However, it is not a nothingness in contrast to being, i.e. it is not a “relative nothingness”, because it is that in which any existence appears as something determined. Hence, it is the absolute nothingness (絶対無). All existences are self-determinations of this absolute nothingness. In this way, Nishida aimed to reach the ultimate principle in which the subjective can be unified with the objective. *Basho* is the place where all opposites are sublated: it is the unity of one and more, of affirmation and negation, of immanence and transcendence. This is what Nishida denotes with the phrase “the self-identity of absolute contradictions (絶対矛盾的自己同)”.

This dialectical method is based on the viewpoint of the dialectical universalities (弁証法的一般者). Nishida distinguishes three possible worlds of such universalities:

- The natural world is the level of objects that are thought and spoken about. These objects exist because they have their place in the natural world. However, their logical place itself is not accessible for judgements, since it is only the background on which the objects appear. In order to perceive itself, the natural world has to become aware of itself as the universal of self-awareness. The resulting self-relation has its place in the world of consciousness.
- The same condition holds for the world of consciousness: its logical place lies beyond the world, which it determines. This difference, in turn, compels the self to pass through the world of consciousness and enter the intelligible world in order to gain

<sup>11</sup> However, exactly because of its (over)simplified nature, this translation is too general and unprecise. Although easier to grasp, it might hence lead to misunderstandings. First of all, in his original definition, Nishida explicitly applies the term “contradiction (矛盾)” and not opposition (対立). As we have seen in the first section, every “contradiction” is an “opposition”, but the reverse is not true. Hence, translating 矛盾 as “opposition” is not actually wrong, but in Nishida’s system it is important to note that we are dealing with notions that are not only oppositional, but also in mutual contradiction. Analogously, every “self-identity” is a kind of “unity”, but it is important to point out the specific nature of Nishida’s “unity”, for it explicitly refers to a “discontinuous continuity” (Maraldo 2019: 8) as a totality which holds together differences without subsuming them into a higher unity.

self-awareness. The consciousness does not perceive itself; it knows of itself not by perception, but by its being intellectually determined as “consciousness with a content”. The logical place of this determination, then, lies in the intelligible world.

- The intelligible world is the world of ideas of the true (真), the beautiful (美) and the good (善). Here the transcendental self is defined by intellectual intuition (the intelligible universal) as a spiritual being. The ideas correlate with the aesthetic, moral and religious consciousness. The three ideas follow a certain hierarchy: Since the artistic consciousness still sees a single self and not the free self, it must be absorbed in the moral consciousness. The moral consciousness has no concrete object in the world, but tends toward the idea of the good. Here, all that is, is what ought to be in a unity of facts and values. However, the idea of the good can only be achieved through a religious consciousness that overcomes and transcends itself in the religious-mystical experience through self-denial<sup>12</sup>. Its ultimate place is the Absolute Nothing, which cannot be described philosophically or conceptually, since every statement about it would destroy its undifferentiated unity by separation and isolation.

The epistemological foundations of this dialectic rest on Nishida’s presumption that all knowledge is obtained through judgments. He proceeds from Hegel’s premise that the particular is the determined universal (Nishida 1966: 86). In this paradigm, judgments are self-determinations of the universals, since the particular (the judging individual self) is not relevant to the meaning of the truth of the judgment. In this general judgment, the logical categories of the natural world have their place. Here, Nishida understands being as “having its place” and thereby as “being determined” (ibid: 90). The contradictory self-identity is a relation between being and the world in which contradictions are absolute and being is a unity of self-identity.

In a positive ontology of being, it now becomes apparent that the difference between the world and the place cannot be eliminated, because the place remains the background of the universals that cannot be discursively grasped. This leads Nishida to conclude that the universal must have the meaning of the place. While independent things interact with each other, the place determines itself. As such, as long as something determines itself, it cannot affect other things. As the place determines itself, things interact and influence each other. The particulars, however, convey themselves. In order to overcome this subjective dialectic, Nishida then defines the place as non-representable and thus as nothingness. The religious self does not point to another place, but is itself its place that cannot be grasped. Hence, this place is nothing and at the same time it allows everything that exists. Nishida (1966: 130) denotes this relationship as the absolute nothing (絶対無).

## 5. A comparative analysis of the two models

In the next step, let us briefly analyse these two dialectical models by means of a contrastive comparison.

In Mou Zongsan’s model of double ontology, the level of the “attached ontology” corresponds to the empirical subject, while the level of the “non-attached ontology” parallels to the transcendent subject. In Mou’s system, these two subjects are in no contradiction, because it allows the transition from one to the other.

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<sup>12</sup> Nishida explains this process in the following way: “In order that the conscious Self may transcend itself and enter a world of intelligible being, the Self must transcend its own will. In the uttermost depth of our will there is something which transcends and resolves even the contradiction of the will. This something has its place in the ‘intelligible world’”. (Nishida 1966: 81)

Through self-cultivation, the empirical, cognitive subject can transcend its limitations and move into the realm of the infinite, that is, to the level of the “non-attached ontology”. In order to function in the phenomenal world and become able to recognise it, the transcendent subject can – through its self-negation – descend to the limited level of the “attached ontology”. What is produced and continually reinforced through this mutual interaction is progress on the socio-political and scientific levels. Hence, in spite of the fact that this model does not create any external synthesis in a teleological sense, it is not at all a mere one-dimensional, infinitely pulsating reciprocity with no real effect.

On the structural level, Nishida Kitarō’s dialectic is more teleological, for it necessarily ends in absolute nothingness, which is at the same time the origin of all beings. Nishida’s tripartite ontology is organised in such a way that the two lower levels (the level of the natural world and the level of the world of consciousness) are associated with the phenomenal, while the level of the intelligible world is associated with the transcendental sphere.

The (self-)perception and awareness of the lowest level of the natural world is made possible by the achievement of its logical place, which is at the level of the world of consciousness. The self-perception of consciousness, however, is made possible only by the achievement of the transcendent level of the intelligible world (Nishida 1966: 71). The movement from one level to the next is stimulated by the respective forms of contradiction between the being (the place) and the world.

In this system, absolute nothingness is not an external synthesis, for it rather refers to the place in which these contradictions dissolve and true reality – to speak with Heidegger – nothings.

Such a comparative analysis thus reveals several similarities and differences between these two models of reasoning:

1. Because both philosophers belong to the initial period of East Asian modernity, their systems have been created in dialogue with – or with reference to – modern Western philosophical theories. Thus, certain elements of Nishida’s system can be compared to some extent with Heidegger’s phenomenology<sup>13</sup>, and certain aspects of Mou Zongsan’s theories with Kantian epistemology. In the construction of their respective dialectical models, both refer in part to Hegel. But neither Nishida nor Mou can be directly equated with any of these Western philosophers, since, as we have seen, they are based on completely different frames of reference. Hence, these systems, Kant on the one hand, and Heidegger on the other, can only be regarded as contrast-inspiring stimuli.
2. Both systems also belong to theoretical elaborations and modernisations of Buddhist philosophy, although Nishida’s model comes from Zen Buddhism, while Mou’s System is based on the theory of the *Huayan* school. In Nishida’s neontology, particularly in his logic of the *Basho*, in my opinion, one can also perceive some echoes of Nagarjuna and his logic of double negation.

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<sup>13</sup> Although these similarities must be treated with caution: “However, although still largely unrecognised, significant differences between the political and metaphysical stance of Heidegger and his perceived counterparts in East-Asia most certainly exist. One of the most dramatic discontinuities between East-Asian thought and Heidegger is revealed through an investigation of Kitaro Nishida’s own vigorous criticism of Heidegger. Ironically, more than one study of Heidegger and East-Asian thought has submitted that Nishida is that representative of East-Asian thought whose philosophy most closely resembles Heideggerian thought”. (Rigsby, 2010, 511).

3. Basic Buddhist elements are hence something that connects both theories, because on this foundation both philosophers were able to build their twofold ontologies of distinction between phenomena and *noumena*. According to Nishida, the phenomenal sphere includes the natural world and the world of consciousness, while the intelligible world is the sphere of the transcendental *noumena*. In Mou Zongsan's case, this distinction is based on the two states of consciousness (the phenomenal and the noumenal), which go back to the *Tiantai* Buddhist model of the "one mind opening two doors"
4. Even though both philosophers view this transcendent sphere as a moral one, this deontological morality is in Nishida's system overcome and transcended by religious consciousness, by which it flows into absolute nothingness. In Mou's dialectics, however, it returns (and is reduced) to the level of tangible ontology through the self-negation of the transcendent subject.
5. Both philosophers also use the concept of intellectual intuition. In his theory, Mou removes Kant's epistemology by granting this transcendental method of knowledge of the thing in itself to man. In Nishida we find the intellectual view only at the level of the intelligible world. The world of consciousness and the natural world are overcome and perceived through active intuition. But in the eventual attainment of the *topos*, that is, of absolute nothingness, intellectual intuition is also overcome<sup>14</sup>, for in the self-identity of the absolute contradictoriness, the self also dissolves itself as the determining universal. In this place of "mystical intuition", knowledge is no longer gained through cognition and can no longer be conceptually understood or conveyed.
6. None of these systems produces an external synthesis. Whereas in Nishida's theory, subject and object, or being and the world, dissolve in absolute nothingness, Mou sees the two opposites (the empirical and the transcendent subject) as continuously interacting in a complementary relationship. Both are in continuous transformation and the system as such is constantly producing new entities and qualities.

These similarities and differences become even clearer when we try to posit these two philosophers, and the traditions from which they come, into a direct dialogue with each other. In this sense, it is important, *inter alia*, to clarify some misunderstandings concerning the foundations of their particular philosophical work.

## 6. From ontology to meontology

When Nishida tried to explain his "absolute nothingness" and to posit it in contrast to the past East Asian philosophical traditions, he wrote, among other things:

Even if we call Daoist culture a culture of non-being, it is still imprisoned in non being (*mu* 無), captured in the form of non being. Its present was not a moving one but a simple infinite present. (Nishida 1970, 252)<sup>15</sup>

Later in the same text he emphasises that his concept of "eternal now" (永遠の今) means something completely different from the Daoist "simple infinite present" (唯無限の現在), which, in his view, is just a kind of reciprocal pulsation that always stays in the same place.

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<sup>14</sup> In this regard, Nishida explicitly states that intellectual intuition "is related to knowledge through concepts, because it has not yet given up [the element of] intentionality. But when it comes to transcending even that intellectual intuition, and when that which has its place in absolute Nothingness is conceived, no more statement can be made with regard to this; it has completely transcended the standpoint of knowledge, and may perhaps be called 'world of mystic intuition', unapproachable by word or thinking" (Nishida 1966: 135).

<sup>15</sup> 無に囚はられて居る、無の形に囚へられて居るものである。その現在は動く現在ではない、唯無限の現在である。




By contrast, his own “eternal now” functions as a “moving present” (動く 現在), because time itself spreads out of the intimate “translocation” of reality.

In a slightly different way, Nishida writes the same thing by emphasising that Chinese culture is “that spirit that searches endlessly [何所までも] for the truth”, and that its spirit is “solidified and fixed in itself” (Dalissier 2010, 144).

Incidentally, this has always also been the main reproach made by Chinese Marxists of China’s own traditional dialectics: since it does not lead to new, ever-higher stages of development, it is essentially conservative and anti-progressive. And yet, consciously or unconsciously, it also served as a model within which the concept of permanent revolution could be constructed and substantiated. In contrast to Marxist or Hegelian dialectics, this model of dialectical thinking was anything but teleologically constructed. Precisely the absence of a synthesis meant that this kind of development never tended towards a final goal, because within its framework opposites would persist in every phase of social development.

However, it is very much open to question whether the Daoist comprehension of the complementary principle can actually be reduced to an uncreative one-dimensional pulsation, especially when we consider that it springs from the infinite creativity principle of the *Yijing* (生生不息), which is also reflected in Laozi’s creative cosmology, (see for instance Laozi s.d. 42)<sup>16</sup>. In his cosmogony, *Dao* as the ultimate principle creates the Oneness; this unity produces binary oppositions, through which a dialectical triad is born that ultimately produces everything that exists.

The fact that this dynamic and ever-changing dimension of the traditional Chinese model is also creative, i.e. that it can only exist in the constant production of new qualities, entities, and objects, also becomes very clear if we look at the Neo-Confucian schema of cosmogony, the so-called Taiji Diagram or the Diagram of the Ultimate Reality. This schema was composed by Zhou Dunyi in the 11<sup>th</sup> century.



In this diagram, the ultimate reality produces five phases through movement and stillness (or yin and yang). This “reciprocal pulsation” does not remain on the level of simple static (i.e. one-dimensional) pulsation, for it is a continuously productive force. Then, the dynamic interaction between these five phases divides into two oppositional poles that have been metaphorically denoted as the male and female antipodes, because they create and give life to

<sup>16</sup>道生一二二生三三生萬物。“The Way creates the Oneness, the Oneness produces the Two, the Two brings forth the Three and the Three brings everything which exists into life”. The passage could be explained as a cosmogonic process, beginning with the ultimate principle (of Nothingness) that creates the binary dichotomies (comprehensible through the method of binary categories). In the next step, these dichotomies form the dialectical Triad, which brings forth everything that exists.

everything that exists<sup>17</sup>.

So much for the reproach of an eternal reciprocal pulsation, which is – in Nishida’s view - always thrown back on itself and could therefore – at the most – merely form a circle. As we have seen, this system of complementarity does not remain in a circle, but rather forms a dynamic spiral that continually leads to qualitatively new levels of existence.

Let us now turn to the second aspect of Nishida’s criticism, which is closely related to the first one that has been discussed above. According to this criticism, the Chinese (or Daoist) concept of non-being constitutes a simple opposition to being. Yet the classical Chinese cosmology is a bit more complex than it seems at first sight.

As previously mentioned, the second chapter of Laozi’s *Daode jing* asserts the correlative complementarity of opposites. The most basic dichotomy, or the most basic binary category in this cosmology, is the dichotomy of *you* and *wu*, which were commonly translated as being and non-being or nothingness. Due to the dual ontological nature of the classical Chinese discourses, which can be expressed by the previously described concept of immanent transcendence, and especially because of the correlative and dynamic nature of ancient Chinese philosophical discourses, such a translation seems problematic. Therefore, I prefer to translate the two notions composing this binary category with the terms presence and absence.

As we have seen, Nishida believed that classical Chinese cosmology was not only based on, but also limited to, the complementary interaction between absence and presence. However, we must not forget that the binary categories merely represent a method of development of the phenomenal world, or a method of comprehension of this development. The synthesis of the two opposites, which, as noted above, does not form a qualitatively different, separate phase of development, is unspeakable, unnamable, and discursively not detectable. It is *Dao*, or the Way that is at the same time the ultimate principle of any existence. It brings forth all things, guides them and aligns them with the *Li* 理, the all-embracing and coherent structure of the universe. Since it is therefore unnamable, it can only be presented indirectly, as a latent manifestation of the interaction between presence and absence<sup>18</sup>.

However, this method is not to be understood in the sense of a *creatio ex nihilo*, but rather in the sense of a *creatio ex nihilo continuum*. This basic scheme was further elaborated in the third century by the metaphysicians of the School of Profound Learning (玄學). Wang Bi, who belonged to the most prominent members of this stream of thought, has explicitly argued that the concept of *Wu* could not be limited to the function of a contrastive oppositional notion of the concept *You*; on a meta-philosophical level, it moreover represented the ontological basis of reality. Wang wrote: “In spite of the great wideness of heaven and earth, their core is absence” (Lou 1980: 93).<sup>19</sup>

On the other hand, however, he still remained faithful to the principle of complementarity defining all mutually opposing antipodes, and he emphasised that the complementary interaction between any two antipodes (any binary category) is always rooted in the same

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<sup>17</sup> In his book *The Substance of Heart-Mind and the Innate Moral Substance* (心體與性體), Mou Zongsan (1969) has addressed the philosophical significance of this schema for the understanding of the dynamics between parts and wholeness and the reasons for its long-lasting impact on the formation of the specific Chinese metaphysics of morality.

<sup>18</sup> See for instance Laozi, s.d. 40: 天下萬物生於有，有生於無。(All things under heaven sprang from the presence and that presence sprang from absence).

<sup>19</sup> 天地雖廣，以無為心。 Sometimes, Wang describes this absence with a (somehow more concrete) compound *xuwu* 虛無 (void), and at times, he even replaces it by the term *xu* 虛 (emptiness).

origin:

“Beautiful and ugly is like love and hate. Good and evil are like right and wrong. Love and hate grew out from the same root, and right and wrong came through the same door”<sup>20</sup> (ibid: 6). This ultimate principle of complementarity is always unnamable, empty, and immovable, for every (form of) presence started from the vacuity (*xu* 虛), and every (form of) movement began in quietude (*jing* 靜). Hence, even though everything that exists is functioning in a binary way, it finally always returns to this empty stillness, which is their ultimate authenticity.

Through Wang Bi's commentaries, Laozi's original complementary correlativity of presence and absence is developed into a primacy of absence which becomes the ultimate principle of existence and attains an ontological priority. For the first time in Chinese intellectual history, we encounter an axiological distinction within binary categories that were hitherto functioning in a completely balanced complementary way. In this way, Wang Bi has profoundly transformed traditional models of correlative dialectical thinking and laid a cornerstone for the later development of proto-dualisms as created by the Neo-Confucian philosophers of the Song and Ming dynasties. Wang names this basic principle, which can only be described negatively, the fundamental absence (*benwu* 本無). He identifies it with the pure, original substantial root (*benti* 本體), which is single, all-embracing, all-pervading and always in accord with all cosmic and existential laws. Hence, on this meta-level, it can no longer be translated with the term absence, but rather with nothingness. In this framework, Wang's *benwu* (本無) can be well compared with Nishida's absolute nothingness (*zettai mu* 絕對無).

In Wang Bi's System, the unity or universal wholeness of existence is – contrary to earlier views – not part of existence itself, which is manifest, diverse and nameable. *Wu* or nothingness is the source of all phenomenal existence, but it is located in a transcendent realm, beyond all differences and descriptions. In this sense, Wang Bi's meontology can certainly be compared to that of Nishida. Both systems can also be related to certain Buddhist approaches: the concept of nothingness (無) can be linked to the concept of emptiness (空), which is an important aspect of Buddhism, (particularly of Zen or Chan Buddhism). On the other hand, it is well-known that Zen (Chan) Buddhism in China has emerged as a synthesis of Confucian, Buddhist and Daoist philosophy. In this sense, Nishida's philosophy was undoubtedly, albeit perhaps indirectly, *inter alia* also influenced by the Daoist philosophy of traditional China.

## 7. Conclusion

In his Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy, Mou Zongsan has described the Daoist concept of *Wu* (無) in the following way:

*Wu* does not possess the ontological nature. Yet, when its wisdom is thoroughly developed, it can also imply an ontology; that, however, cannot be a Western-style ontology, but pertains to the practical, and can thus be named practical ontology<sup>21</sup>. (Mou Zongsan 1997, 93)

Thus, according to Mou, “nothingness” as such is not an ontological concept, but a practical one, one that ultimately means letting things be as they are. Mou concluded that this “letting things be as they are” requires great wisdom, for it can only be achieved through a state of

<sup>20</sup>美惡，猶喜怒也；善不善，猶是非也。喜怒同根，是非同門。

<sup>21</sup>無沒有存有論的意味，但當‘無’之智慧徹底發展出來時，也可以函有一個存有論，那就不是西方為標準的存有論，而是屬於實踐的(practical)，叫實踐的存有論。

emptiness beyond any tangible aspects to which one might be clinging. In this sense, he considered Daoist philosophy that is based on the concept of nothingness as a practical ontology or a practical metaphysics, which are exactly the same terms often used to describe or define Nishida's philosophy or the general orientation of the Kyoto School.

Mou's own dialectics, on the other hand, does not belong into the realm of nothingness. It is still deeply rooted in the Confucian, positively defined view of affirming life. Hence, in his own system, "great wisdom" is tightly and necessarily connected with this axiological determination, which does not allow a continuous preservation of "letting things be as they are". It rather includes a duty of interfering with the course of life in a morally guided agenda of a continuous interaction between the transcendental and the empirical self, which brings about a sinicised notion of an acting autonomous human subject.

However, a comparison between these two models of "practical dialectics" is fruitful: although it does not lead to a genuine "unity of oppositions", it points to the manifold possibilities of creating different models of dialectical thought as such. In this sense, it comprises a shift of perspective, based upon a sublation of previous modes of perception. Such alternations of horizons that go beyond the common views of the laws and paths of reasoning are always a precious tool of philosophical reasoning, because they cannot only point to additional, different methods of perceiving and interpreting our complex reality, but also represent an indispensable precondition of any philosophical innovations or new insights.

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**Tak Lap Yeung:**

**Mou Zongsan's appropriation of "transcendence" and "immanence" and his contribution to the world philosophy**

**Abstract**

"Transcendence" and "immanence" are not original concepts in Asian philosophical traditions. Nevertheless, many contemporary Asian philosophers adopted this conceptual pair as one of the most important terminological appropriations from the West for the sake of reinterpreting their own philosophy thoughts. In this paper, we take one of the founders of New Confucianism, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三(1909-1995), who spent his entire late academic life in Hong Kong and Taiwan, as an example to illustrate how the contemporary Asian philosopher adapted and adopted the alien philosophical concepts.

At first, by the comparative philosophers' observation, we gain a general picture regarding the inner references about "transcendence" and "immanence" in the transcultural philosophical context. We will see the philosophical and theological assumptions towards the relationship among human, world and God in the West. Then we will examine the modification of this conceptual pair by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger. We will see the change of the meanings of this conceptual pair, from an antagonistic relation to a cooperative relation. Afterwards, Mou's reception and modification of this conceptual pair will be discussed according to his understanding of Western and Chinese philosophy. We will see how Mou illustrates the special character of Chinese philosophy by his modification of these terms in the context of his dispute with Kant's and Heidegger's understanding of transcendence and human finite.

By the above reconstruction, I believe, we can not only see the significance of a transcultural discourse that reveals the basic differences rooted in different cosmos-metaphysical traditions but also, through an understanding of the modification of terms, participate in a dynamic debate regarding the pros and cons of different philosophical systems.

**PANEL 2:**  
**Studies of Daoist Philosophy**





**Thursday, October 17, 15:30 –17:30**

**Panel 2: Studies of Daoist Philosophy**

**Fabian Heubel:**

**Transcultural Potential. Reflections on Transcultural Zhuangzi-Studies in Taiwan**

Taiwan is a region of East Asia in which the complex effects of hybrid modernization have been experienced in particularly direct and painful ways. But this situation also gave rise to perspectives in the study of philosophy, which differ significantly from the Chinese mainland. Why did transcultural philosophy find good conditions for development in contemporary Taiwan?

My paper will address this question by situating the recent development of "transcultural Zhuangzi-Studies" within a larger cultural and political constellation.

**1. Trans-culture: Passing through the old and the new, East and West**

Taiwan is a region of East Asia in which the complex effects of hybrid modernization can be experienced particularly direct and harsh. But this situation also gave rise to perspectives in the study of literature and philosophy, which differ significantly from the Chinese mainland. The defeat of China in the first Sino-Japanese war has urged Chinese intellectuals to radicalize their reflections on China's modernization. With the Hundred Days of Reform in 1898, a tendency toward revolutionary change emerges, which engages old and new China, East and West in a dynamics of cultural communication unprecedented in Chinese history. In this sense, transcultural research has to deal, from the very beginning, with two strands of cultural development, which are interconnected but, nevertheless, distinguishable from each other: one is the relation between the old and the new, the other the relation between Eastern and Western culture(s) – since the 19th century, the relationship between China and Japan has, of course, seized to be mainly intra-Asian in character and underwent deep changes due to Western influence. Very soon the urgent need to respond to the challenge of Western modernity and the imperialism associated with it has led studies of the West in China to intellectual experiments going well beyond the framework of comparative studies, which are often based on the assumption of two or more separate and intrinsically homogeneous cultural entities. The transcultural dynamic, which emerged in this situation of crisis, has been fueled by the disturbing necessity to come to terms with the West and, moreover, has been also affected by the complicated and highly disputed relationship between different historical layers of Chinese culture(s), old and new, past and present. Between 1895 and 1945 Taiwan enters into a transcultural situation, in which increasing Western influence, mainly mediated through the Japanese reception of Western knowledge (this also applies to philosophy, literature and the fine arts) is intertwined with the tendency towards Japanization of language, education and everyday culture which encounters the strong historical influence of Han-culture (漢文化) or sinogrammatical culture (漢字文化) introduced by immigrants from mainland China, especially since the 17th century.

**2. The problem of Republican culture and scholarship**

Next to 1895, 1949 is the second key date in the history of contemporary Taiwan. For quite a long time it seemed that the democratization of Taiwan is linked to a steady, but irreversible desinicization (去中國化), leading to growing independence from mainland China, first culturally and then, eventually, also politically. But new tendencies in the field of

cultural philosophy suggest that Taiwan may culturally enter into a phase of post-desinicization (後去中國化) or re-republicanization (再民國化). This emerging discourse deserves attention, because it can only gain importance when the tendency towards desinicization is recognized, at least partially, as legitimate: desinicization has been of critical importance for the decentering (去中心化) of a certain narrow minded Chinese or KMT-nationalism in Taiwan. The attempt to enable the Republic of China on Taiwan to resist PRC influence culturally and politically thus is connected to the conviction that an important theoretical aspect of this resistance is the critical and normative reconstruction of the Republican heritage, which could help to overcome the split between Taiwan and the Republic of China. Critically insofar as the necessity is recognized to break with the Sinocentrism that has been official ideology of the KMT-government after 1949 and even, more or less, continues to be influential well until today – the political instrumentalization of Chinese culture in Taiwan found its main expression in the movement for the renaissance of Chinese culture, directed against the Great Cultural Revolution on the mainland. Normatively inasmuch the response to the challenge of hybrid modernization opened up in the early Republican period – the communication of the changes pervading old and new, East and West (通古今中西之變) – now can be reevaluated.

In this context, transcultural studies pay particular attention to the difficult communication between Taiwan's Han-Chinese or Chinese-speaking, sino-(grammatical) culture, which dominated Taiwan long before 1895 and the strong cultural influence of Republican China after 1949, which for long has been ensured through authoritarian rule and thereby only in heavily mutilated form. Desinicization therefore can be seen as a highly legitimate attempt to counter this later wave of cultural Sinicization (or: Republicanization) deeply entangled with one-party rule. But now it becomes increasingly clear that it is necessary to distinguish between the legitimate dimension of desinicization, which aims at overcoming the dictatorial legacy of the KMT, and a desinicization that is motivated by a Taiwan-nationalism, which in itself shows the pathological traits of modern nationalisms fixed to a vision of purified cultural identity. Desinicization understood as necessary move beyond the anti-democratic legacy of Republican China thus appears to be an imported condition for the possibility that the deideologization and decentralization of Chinese culture in Taiwan can enhance further cultural and political democratization. This would also be an important step on the way of realizing the normative content of Republican China beyond KMT-ideology. At least, such a perspective allows to link the cultural and intellectual potential of Republican China before 1949 to the transcultural potential accumulated in 20th century Taiwan. It further presumes that the different nationalistic positions (China nationalism versus Taiwan nationalism) all pose a major obstacle to a democratization of Taiwan, which can, with regard to its transcultural situation, only succeed when a reconciliation between Taiwan and the Republic of China can be achieved. Furthermore, this reconciliation can be regarded as a condition for the possibility that the Republic of China on Taiwan remains important as a cultural and political alternative to the communist regime of the PRC.

### **3. Beyond the cliché of radical anti-traditionalism**

If the normative content of Republican culture before 1949 can be seen in the development, however experimental, of modes of communication between old and new China, East and West, and if these new discursive perspectives made it possible to conceive the idea of the “three principles” (Sun Yat-sen) and of a “communication of the three traditions” (通三統) – may they be understood as tradition of the way, tradition of politics and tradition of science (道統、政統、學統) or as conservatism, liberalism and socialism – it becomes clear that Republican scholarship was able to reflect on the challenge of hybrid modernization in a way that cannot be simply labeled as “anti-traditional”. The transcultural

perspective therefore leads to the reinterpretation of early Republican culture, especially the literary revolution (1917) and the May 4th Movement (1919). Under the influence of the Great Cultural Revolution, an interpretation of the culture situation in the early Republican period has emerged that sees it primarily as a precursor for the Great Cultural Revolution, just like the teleological logic of history, written through the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party, understands the revolution of 1911 mainly as a preparation for the revolution of 1949. Although this view is based on a historical teleology that has fallen into severe crisis at least after 1989, it still is very influential even among Anglo-European scholars of Chinese studies. In contrast, the transcultural turn in the study of literature and philosophy of the early Republican period leads to criticism of the widespread and unilateral emphasis on radical anti-traditionalism, which has largely neglected the richness and complexity of the modes of communication between old and new, East and West developed at the time. An interdisciplinary cooperation between studies in literature and philosophy can be especially fruitful for attempts to go beyond the cliché of anti-traditionalism in the understanding of early Republican culture, in which literary and philosophical developments were strongly interrelated.

#### **4. Hybrid modernization**

The concept of hybrid modernization is suited to deal with those dynamic processes of transcultural entanglement and hybridization of internal and external resources that have been constitutive for the political and cultural revolutions of China since the 19th century. From this perspective, attempts must appear problematic that enter into cultural and spiritual traditions from their supposed beginning or origin. This also applies to the massive use of etymological evidence (what did this or that word originally mean: metaphysics, subject, politics, etc.?). As a consequence, rather than entering from the comparison between ancient European and Chinese civilizations into intercultural philosophy, I propose to enter from the experience of the cultural rupture that the external modernization of China and the revolutionary dynamic it has triggered and regard this as a condition of possibility not only for the understanding of contemporary China but also for the understanding of classical Chinese culture. Thus, any attempt to work with resources from the cultural and historical archive of China is necessarily to be regarded as a reconstruction, which is accompanied by a destruction of catastrophic proportions. The experience of rupture, and the awareness of a fundamental crisis associated with it, has been accompanied by profound, self-tormenting doubts about traditional Chinese culture that, in early 20th century, deeply influenced the attempts by Chinese scholars to come to terms with Western knowledge. From the start, the type of intercultural philosophy that rapidly develops in 20th century China takes shape within a comparative framework emerging out of a strong sense of crisis.

#### **5. The problem of asymmetrical interaction between China and Europe**

Richard Wilhelm, who had close contacts to many important Chinese intellectuals of his time (Wilhelm 1926) has been strongly aware of the fact that the growing interest of Chinese scholars in Western philosophy cannot be separated from the severe crisis China plunged into when entering the brutal dynamics of modernization. In this context of political and cultural revolutions, comparative studies on Eastern and Western philosophies emerged after the founding of the Republic of China. The problem of the difference between Western and Eastern cultures and their philosophical foundations emerges in a moment of urgent need, in a moment when the awareness of a deadly threat to cultural identity spreads. It is therefore impossible to neglect the fact that the comparative interest in cultural differences between East and West, as well as the related effort to reconstruct the intellectual history of China with the help of categories imported from the West, have been produced by the hybrid dynamics of Chinese modernization. Contemporary Chinese philosophy thus begins with an intercultural

confrontation. The revolutionary modernization the order of knowledge underwent since the abolition of the Confucian system of education in 1905 led to an asymmetric relationship between the two sides: European indifference towards China now stands in sharp contrast to a strong Chinese interest in Europe. From a European point of view, therefore, the crucial question is whether and how this asymmetry of knowledge can be somehow brought into balance.

It is crucial to realize that this communication has remained largely asymmetric throughout the 20th century and that the philosophical reflection on the modernization of both Eastern (especially Chinese, Japanese and Indian) and Western (mainly European and North American) resources are accessible *in China* (but much less in Europe), where they enter into a dynamic of transcultural mixing. This opens up to the possibility that aspects of so-called Western philosophy can be criticized by referring to Chinese sources and vice versa. This transcultural dynamic leads to conflict lines that not only divide different intellectual currents but also run through individual intellectuals and their philosophies. Internal contradictions may, for example, run through a person who is, on the one hand, a passionate defender of cultural identity and the much-vaunted spirit of Chinese culture, but who uses at the same time a language strongly influenced by Western terminology to express this spirit. Such a hybrid constellation is characterized by a tendency toward comparative contrasts that touch upon the problem of (cultural) difference and identity, but also by possibilities of creative transformation that fuses different resources into something new, into something for which the old comparative categories of East and West, Chinese and European are obviously inadequate.

## 6. The example of transcultural studies in the *Zhuangzi*

The development of transcultural research on the classical book *Zhuangzi* may serve as an example to further explain some of the possibilities connected to the transcultural turn in the study of Chinese literature and philosophy. Since 2007, the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at Academia Sinica has organized a series of conferences on the contemporary significance of the *Zhuangzi*. The series started from the observation that since around the year 2000 French-speaking sinology showed a strong interest in the *Zhuangzi*, an interest that was marked by references to contemporary French thought and philosophy (phenomenology, post-structuralism). Thus the possibility emerged to enter into an interaction between French sinology and contemporary Chinese (sinogrammatic) philosophy (當代漢語哲學) in Taiwan which, at the same time, would continue the research in the late Foucault on which, in 2005, the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy held an international conference, in which multiple possibilities to relate Foucault and different aspects of Chinese philosophy, ancient and modern, had already been discussed. French research in the *Zhuangzi* now promised to be an important link between the history of self-cultivation, self-techniques and self-care in Europe discussed by the late Foucault on the one hand and the rich sources of cultivation practices developed in Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist philosophy on the other.

However, the further development of these discussions quickly moved beyond the theoretical interest in the notion of the body and self-techniques, but entered into a dynamic field of problems designated by the notions of body, subjectivity, qi-energy, politics and possibilities of critical thought inspired by novel ways to relate the past and the present – the discussions were strongly influenced by Swiss sinologist Jean François Billeter, whose four lectures on the *Zhuangzi* held at the Collège de France in Paris have strongly inspired recent French research. Billeter expressed provocative criticism of an energetic, qi-oriented interpretation of the *Zhuangzi* that developed readings of this classical text, which would exceed the range of individual experience and imbue the notion of the subject with cosmological dimensions. For him, this kind of cosmological reading – which, for him, has

been the corner stone of a whole hermeneutic tradition beginning with Guo Xiang (died 312) – not only contains the problem of being rather esoteric, but also has a political significance, which is highly problematic, because it allowed for the uncritical integration of the *Zhuangzi* into the imperial order of the Confucian state. To bring to the fore the critical potential of the *Zhuangzi* covered up already by its foremost editor and commentator is the declared aim of Billeter's research.

In my point of view, it is no coincidence that this approach fell on fertile ground in Taiwan. Sandwiched between a strong tendency towards cultural desinicization and increasing disinterest in Chinese philosophy on the one hand, and the new enthusiasm for Chinese tradition in the PRC, often embossed with the arrogance and blindness of cultural nationalism, on the other, scholars feel the urgent need to rethink and reform the study of Chinese philosophy from a transcultural perspective. In particular, the question of how to give the work with Chinese sources a critical turn, through which it would be able to regain analytic and diagnostic force when confronted with contemporary problems, could no longer be neglected and therefore became the topic of passionate discussions. Billeter's critical perspective proved to be an important stimulation for further attempts to understand and unleash the transcultural potential of the *Zhuangzi*.

At this point, however, the dialogue with French-speaking *Zhuangzi* research slowed down and the effort to rethink the significance of the *Zhuangzi* by linking it to cultural and political experiences of contemporary Taiwan began to take shape more and more clearly and consciously. In the conferences on the *Zhuangzi* since 2009 there has been on the one hand the tendency to deepen the reference to critical theory (in particular the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School) and, on the other, to pay special attention to interpretations of the *Zhuangzi*, which put emphasis on his theory of the thing (物論) or on the “equalization of things” (齊物) – especially Wang Fuzhi and Zhang Taiyan became interesting as commentators for whom the *Zhuangzi* has been crucial for the development of critical or even revolutionary thought. Especially Zhang Taiyan's interpretation of the chapter on the “equalization of things” proved to be important, because it enables a connection between early Republican scholarship, the self-reflection of Chinese revolution(s) and the deideologization of Chinese culture in Taiwan. Thereby perspectives of research have opened up whose depth and further potential can hardly even be estimated at the moment. Here the transcultural potential of Taiwan has found a philosophical expression, which testifies for an astonishing autonomy and freedom of thought, but also critically reflects contemporary problems in a way that may be important even outside the Chinese-speaking world. The reason for this can be seen in the fact that the problem of how to deal with the paradoxical effects of hybrid modernization is universal or is, at least, more and more recognized as universal also in Europe.

## 7. *Zhuangzi*-studies and of contemporary Neo-Confucianism

After 1949, the cultural and intellectual development of Taiwan has been strongly influenced by scholars and artists, who had fled from the communist regime. The philosophical school of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, with its main representatives Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai and their predecessors like Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming, who decided to stay in the PRC after 1949, have pushed forward a theoretical modernization of Confucian learning, which today is generally regarded as one of the great achievements of sinogrammatic philosophy in the 20th century (the development of contemporary Confucian philosophy in itself is a highly transcultural phenomenon). Since the 1990s, their writings have, in turn, significantly influenced the nascent renaissance of Confucianism in the PRC. More recently, the debate between so called mainland New Confucianism (大陸新儒家) on the one hand and Hong Kong/Taiwan-New Confucianism (港台新儒家) on the other is a very interesting field, in which the prospects of cultural and political change in the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan strait can be

observed.

The scholar Yang Rubin, who belongs to the wider context of contemporary Neo-Confucianism emphasizes in his recent book *1949: An eulogy* the outstanding importance of mainland immigrants and sees in their influence a potential for cultural development in Taiwan, which can only be discarded by paying the high prize of cultural self-impoverishment. Critics of this position are tempted to say that this cultural influx is an external, “Chinese” (Republican) influence that has only temporarily found the social and political conditions for development in Taiwan, but ultimately did not grow out of Taiwanese soil and therefore does not belong to Taiwan, but to the Chinese mainland. From the perspective of Yang Rubin, this kind of Taiwan nationalism leads to a cultural impoverishment through which Taiwan would deprive itself of the transcultural potential, which was formed by the dynamics of hybrid modernization. But Yang’s perspective is not limited to the defense of the cultural impact of Republican scholarship in Taiwan after 1949. He goes beyond the so called renaissance of Chinese culture once promoted by the KMT-government in response to the Great Cultural Revolution, but also is highly critical of tendencies in the PRC to instrumentalize “Chinese culture”, once again, in the service of one-party rule. Instead, Yang takes serious one of the deepest problems of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, the difficulty to think *democratic subjectivity*.

Contemporary Neo-Confucianism has, in principle, recognized democracy and science as universal achievements of mankind that not only do not conflict with Confucianism, but should be assimilated to unfold its universalist potential. However, this recognition of democracy and science entails a problem, which makes it understandable why Yang has turned to reflections on the *Zhuangzi* and the idea of a “roaming subject” (遊之主體) to criticize some basic assumptions of contemporary Neo-Confucianism. The possibility of a reconciliation between “inner holiness” (a model of subjectivity oriented on the ideal of the holy person 聖人) and “new external kingliness” (新外王), that is democratic politics, is based on the assumption that the conception of moral subjectivity developed in the idealist “school of the heart” (心學) of Song- and Ming-Confucianism is able to provide the necessary conditions to open Chinese thought up for democracy and science, although this turn from the “tradition of the way” to democracy and science would not be an easy one, but would be accompanied by broken and twisted ways of communication (曲通). The necessity and difficulty to democratize subjectivity and to open it towards a scientific spirit of criticism and experiment has been largely neglected and underestimated in contemporary Neo-Confucianism. Here Yang’s idea of a “roaming subject” derived from the *Zhuangzi*, of a “subject of energetic transformation” (氣化主體) tries to provide a critical perspective, which not only challenges basic assumptions of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, but also dominant Western conceptions of subjectivity. In Yang Rubins reflections, philosophical problems of great depth thus correspond with the ability to unfold the transcultural potential of Taiwan in a way that has in itself the potential to attract attention well beyond its connection to regional experience and a particular language.

**Lai Shi-san:**

**Zhuangzi's Deconstruction of Chinese-centered Civilization and Its Contemporary Significance——From the Unity to the Difference**

**Abstract**

“The Deconstruction of the Center” is a core idea of Zhuangzi, one of the most important thinkers in the Daoist tradition of the Chinese Civilization. In this idea, a dominant civilization (e.g., Chinese culture in the past or Western culture in the present time) more often than not is a violent process of power expansion while establishing its center of order. Despite the fact that this process is usually decorated by the principles of morality or the lights of truth, Zhuangzi uncovers its delicate disguises. A four-face statue of the Yellow Emperor has been a mythological symbol of the construction of a Chinese unity throughout the history, and ancient Emperors Yao and Shun have been adorable metaphors for the politics of “transferring ruling-power to capable candidates”, but Zhuangzi criticizes them as being violent and hypocritical respectively. Zhuangzi suggests that we be aware of violence hidden in the unity of Culture and Politics and appreciate diversity beneath difference and respect the otherness of the marginal. We can know something about the present by learning something from the past. Past and present can be mutually referenced. Zhuangzi's critical thinking as depicted above perhaps sheds some revelatory light on our contemporary regional politics between big and small countries, such as the complex relationship between China and Taiwan, Chinese culture and Taiwanese culture.

**Wu Hui-Ling:**

**Research in Daoist Thinking Patterns: Wang Bi's "De Yi Wang Yen"**

**Abstract**

Wang Bi (226-249) was one of the most important philosophers in Neo-Daoism. The "Neo-Daoism" means the philosophy in the Wei-Chin period (220-420), that is based on Wing-Tsit Chen's translation in his book, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Wang Bi cited Chuang Tzu to illustrate the thinking pattern of "De Yi Wang Yen" (得意忘言). Wang Bi proposed "De Yi Wang Yen" which mean when you grasped the meaning of text classics, the words and language were therefore no more necessary. According to his theory, Wang Bi explained his viewpoint while he wrote commentaries on both *Book of Changes* and *Lao Tzu*. Contemporary scholar Chen Guying (1935- ) has an important contribution to the study of Daoism; he believes that Wang Bi's "De Yi Wang Yen" could explain the influence of Daoism (Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu) on Neo-Daoism, and then this study also could emphasize the importance of Daoism in Chinese philosophy. The presentation introduces and analyses Chen's study "The interpretation method of 'De Yi Wang Yen' and the application of genealogy" (從「得意忘言」的詮釋方法到譜系學方法的應用), which can reveal a modern application of the thinking patterns in Daoist philosophy.



**Steven Marsh:**

**Humor as a part of Life Philosophy: Professor Yeh Hai-Yen's Interpretation of the Zhuangzi**

**Abstract**

Professor Yeh Hai-Yen (葉海煙) has recently retired from decades of teaching Chinese philosophy to many students in Taiwan. I was fortunate enough to benefit from his instruction and am thankful for all that I have learned. In my humble estimation, he has helped shape both the contemporary and future of Chinese philosophy research in Taiwan, especially when it comes to Confucianist and Daoist Ethics.

However, early on, Professor Yeh wrote about Zhuang Zi's Life Philosophy, highlighting and interpreting the many aspects of Zhuang Zi's philosophy as well as their relevance in today's world. In his thesis *The Life Philosophy of Zhuang Zi*, Professor Yeh delineates an overview of life's meaning and purpose according to the ancient thinker. One aspect that Professor Yeh stresses is that the philosophy of Zhuang Zi starts from the limited but strives for the unlimited.

Keeping this notion in mind, this paper would like to look at the aspect of humor in the Zhuang Zi and how it is used and developed as a way of life toward the unlimited. I would then like to extend on Professor Yeh's work and take a look at how Zhuang Zi's use of humor could be tied in with the modern incongruity theory of humor as well as highlight its specific philosophical implications.



**PANEL 3:**

**Taiwanese Philosophy from Broader East Asian Perspectives**



**Friday, October 18, 9:00 –10:30**

**Panel 3: Taiwanese Philosophy from Broader East Asian Perspectives**

**Phan Thi Thu Hien:**

**Molding the East Asian Dragon: The Creation and Transformation of Various Ecological and Political Discourses**

**Phan Thi Thu Hien<sup>71</sup>, Tho N. Nguyen<sup>72</sup>**

**Abstract**

The dragon is a special imaginary figure created by the people of East Asia. Its archetypes appeared primarily as totemic symbols of different tribes and groups in the region. The formation of early dynasties probably generated the molding of the dragon symbol. The symbols of dragons carried deep imprints of nature. It concealed alternative messages of how ancient people at different locations dealt with or interacted with nature. Under the pressure of standardization during the medieval and late imperial periods, the popular dragon had to transform physically and ideologically. It became imposed, unified, and framed, conveying ideas of caste classification and power and losing its ecological implications. The dragon almost jumped from the semi-ecological domain into a totally social caste system.

However, the people reacted differently toward this imperial agitation. Many people considered the “standardized” dragon as the symbol of the oppressed. Because of continuous orthopraxy and calls for imperial reverence, especially under orthopractic agenda and the surveillance of local elites, the popularized dragon imbued within local artworks or hid under the sanctity of Buddhas or popular gods in order to survive. Thank to this alternatively disguised tactic, the popular dragon survives and partially maintains its ecological narratives. Entering the era of controversy when the last imperial dynasties ended in East Asia in the early twentieth century, the dragon was de-centralized dramatically. However, the loss of ontologically ecological discourse and other popular values likely turns the dragon into a symbol of the past rather than a figure of livelihood.

Life is changing radically as the world plunges deeper into the postmodernist era. In spite of various debates on the effects and future of postmodernism, the human mindset is largely liberalized. Scholars in both East Asia and the West are brainstorming together to develop a new form of Confucianism (New Confucianism) in which ecological discourse has been emphasized. In this framework, the article aims to firstly apply the theory of standardizing/orthopraxy in late imperial Chinese culture to analyze the hidden political and cultural discourses in the symbol of dragon in traditional East Asia, then deploy the concept of restructuring/reconstruction in cultural practices to “mold” the post-modern dragon. Under the New Confucian perspective, the dragon symbol needs to be re-defined, re-molded’, re-evaluated and reinterpreted accordingly, especially under the newly-emerging lens - the ‘anthropocosmic’ view.

**Key words:** Dragon, East Asia, discourse, New-Confucianism, ‘anthropocosmic’.

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## 1. Introduction on East Asian Dragons – ‘kings of all creatures’



([www.telegraph.co.uk](http://www.telegraph.co.uk))

2012 was the Year of the Dragon according to the East Asian zodiac. That year, the Chinese government introduced a stamp of a dragon. The dragon was depicted facing the viewers. Its mouth was wide open, its fangs ready to bite, and its claws (five in each foot) preparing to attack. The stamp surprised the public and sparked debate among Chinese commoners and scholars about the design of the dragon. Many scholars and people preferred an image of a friendlier and more humane dragon instead. The image of the dragon on the stamp, on the other hand, displeased many East Asians who were familiar with the hierarchical order and imperial power embodied in the Chinese dragons. They interpreted the image of the dragon on the stamp as an unfriendly sign from China. Thus the stamp and the book both raised new questions among East Asian scholars. Has the de-centralized Chinese dragon of the Maoist era been “recentralized” recently? What message does the “recentralized” dragon convey to its East Asian neighbors and the world as China rises in the twenty-first century?

The studies of Chinese dragon (a representative of East Asian dragons) were conducted mainly by Chinese scholars. Their research focused on Chinese dragons as a symbol of national identity and Chineseness; therefore, the scholars formed the center-periphery split structure between standard and non-standard dragon features. Such ideas can be found in the works of Sun Zuoyun (1960), Li Ting (1963), Liu Dunyuan (1978), Yuan Dexing (1978), Wang Changzheng (1985), Yu Ziliu (1985), Wei Yanan (1986), Xu Nailiang – Cui Yanjun (1987), Xu Huadang (1988), Qiu Pu (1988), Wang Weiti (1990, 2000), Zhong Tao (1991), Chen Shuxiang (1993), Zhang Daoyi, Pan Lusheng (1999), Pang Jin (1993, 2000), Xu Jingliang (1998), Ye Yingsui (2001), Wei Zhiqiang (2003), Wang Shuqiang, Feng Dajian (2012), etc. (see Wang 2000). On the other hand, some scholars focused on the diversity of East Asian dragons as well as their diverse origins. For example, Wen Yiduo (1942, 1993), Zheng Xiaolu (1997), Xiong Yongzhong (1991), and other scholars particularly stressed the Hundred-Viet/Baiyueh origin of Chinese dragons. Previously, two Russian writers, D.V. Deopik (1993) and N. I. Niculin (2006) had also confirmed the Hundred-Viet/Baiyueh’s contribution to the shaping of the Chinese dragon (cited in Trần 2004).

In the West, few scholars have published works that have taken anthropological or artistic perspective on the Chinese dragons. The few scholars who have published works about Chinese dragons include Schuyler V. R. Cammann’s *China’s dragon robes* (1952), Hayes, L. Newton’s *The Chinese dragon* (1973), Peggy Goldstein’s *Long is a dragon* (1991), Tao T. Liu’s *Dragons, Gods, and Spirits from China* (1994); Valery M. Garrett’s *Chinese dragon robes* (1998), Andrew Chittick’s “*Dragon boats and serpent prows: naval warfare and the political culture of China’s Southern borderlands*” (2015), Martin Arnold’s *The dragon: fear and power* (2018), etc. However, the discourse about Chinese and East Asian dragon is still a new issue in Western academic circles. The Western peoples do have their own dragon symbols which are normally

conveying negative implication, this paper is limited to the analysis on the East Asian dragons.

The primordial East Asian dragon carries an ecological narrative. The dragons are said to originate from ancestors questioning and doubting their “mysterious” nature. Chinese writer, Ning Yegao, called this “the vague thinking” [模糊思维]. It appears when people encounter their natural environment change unexpectedly (Ning 1999, p. 23). Accordingly, people composed the symbol of the dragon as an imaginary “god” who could represent themselves in dealings with the upheavals of the natural world. As a result, the traditional dragon is supposed to be good at swimming, diving, running, flying, transforming, sanctifying, etc. By installing and absorbing both secular components and sacred powers, the dragon has become the “king” of all creatures.


As society evolved and formed social caste systems, people cultivated and modified the dragon to include more social features in which many were mutually opposing and destructive, making the dragon symbol an “arena” of both natural and social discourses.

Pre-imperial Chinese dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou) successfully applied the agenda of “conquering, admitting and subjugating the new cultures.” The rulers generously accepted partially the symbolic figures of lands and tribes they reached. For example, archaeologists found pig-head figures in Hongshan culture in northeastern China and crocodile-like and snake-like figures in areas from Lower Yangtzi River to North Vietnam. The symbolic figures have been recognized as proto-dragons (Nguyen 2016). Remnants of these archetypes still remain in some specific categories of dragons nowadays, such as snake-like dragon, fish-like dragon, crocodile-like dragon, bull/buffalo-like dragon, tiger-like dragon, horse-like dragon, dog-like dragon, bird-like dragon, bear-like dragon, tree-like dragons, etc., in the genealogy of East Asian dragons.


Because of the centralization of Huaxia Chinese civilization, all components of symbolic figures were put in a larger and systematic structure to standardize the mold of dragons. All of those animal-like dragons were alternatively scanned and selected for their progressive parts which largely represent the bureaucratic interests. The Chinese dragon continued to evolve in the framed model during imperial periods, finally molding the “orthodox” dragon comprising three main parts and nine similarities [三停九似]. In Song Dynasty, Luo Yuan said that the Chinese dragon was made up by nine components: deer horns, camel head, rabbit eyes, snake body, pearl-like belly, fish scales, tiger legs, eagle claws, and cow ears. Accordingly, the standard dragon has a total of 117 scales. Of the 117 scales, 81 were yang scales (9x9, symbolizing the good features) and 36 yin scales (9x4, the unwanted features). Both yin and yang components make the dragon in line with the mysterious circulation of heaven and earth, thus innately conveying sacred power. The Chinese dragon was much modified and standardized in the Song and Ming dynasties but was continuously nurtured and castigated by pre-modern local elites because of Confucian orthodoxy.



*Beast-like dragon in Jin Dynasty, China  
(Cai 2001, 192).*



*Tang Dynasty dragons of China (Nguyen Ngoc Tho, photo taken in Xi'an, May 2013).*



*Lizard-like dragon in the Tang Dynasty  
(Cai 2001, 188).*



*Bear-like dragon of Hongshan culture  
(www.artchn.com).*



*Two chi'long in "Luoshen fu 洛神赋", Jin  
Dynasty (Wang 2000)*

## **2. Standardizing the dragon: the imperial orthopraxy**

If the early period of the evolution of Chinese dragons was identified with the bottom-up way of building methodology, the late imperial periods witnessed the strong top-down standardization and imperial superimposition on the symbol as a means of state-governing.

The concept of "standardizing", as defined by James Watson (1985, p. 323), is the way "[t]he state, aided by a literate elite, sought to bring locals under its influence by co-opting certain popular local deities and guaranteeing that they carried 'all the right messages[:]...civilization, order, and loyalty to the state.'" The late imperial Chinese states strongly supported standardized cults, rituals, and symbols, believing that ritual orthopraxy could serve as a powerful force for cultural homogenization (von Glahn 2004, pp. 251-3). Stephan Feuchtwang (1992, pp. 57-8) called this action an "imperial metaphor," and E. P. Thompson dubbed it the "symbolic control" (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 18). In Chinese culture, the standardized dragon functions similarly to a god. Paul Katz emphasized that "cultural integration in China was attained via the standardization of culture, here defined as the promotion of approved deities [...] by state authorities and local elites" (Katz 2007, pp. 71-90).

Claiming to be "orthodox" is a vital part of Chinese popular culture. Rawski (1985) stressed that Chinese culture had become highly integrated partly because of the efficacy of its educational values. Symbolic practices are a key means of cultural integration, strongly fostered



for political purposes by the state and its agents. State-sanctioned symbols “produced a high degree of cultural unity, transcending social differences in mythic interpretation and variant local ritual practice” (Sutton 2007, p. 5). As a matter of fact, the overwhelming political and social narratives of the dragon symbol restrain and hinder the deployment of its ecological implication almost throughout the imperial periods.

However, standardization has been demonstrated as an interactive procedure in which different groups interpret symbols according to their general understanding and their own interests. David Faure (1999, p. 278) argued that standardization was “a channel whereby knowledge of state practices and institutions entered villages.” Elites and religious specialists hold rituals to assert the legitimacy of their own interests, even when confronted with state hegemony. Philip Kuhn (1980), as well as Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin (1990), all affirmed that local elites got enough capacity to create and maintain their influence in the local communities. Both Joanna Meskill (1979) and Keith Schoppa (1982) praised the active role of local elites in maximizing the interest of local commoners (see also Barrett 2012, pp. 52-56). Though, there were a number of cultural elites who were instrumental in promoting orthopraxy as a mechanism of control (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 131). As a matter of fact, “the key to being Chinese is acceptance of external, ritual form, not adherence to an internal, conceptual orthodoxy” (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 9-10).

Therefore, at a certain extent, the symbol of the dragon represents “a symbol of submission to authority” (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 43). The emperors deprived the original dragon and reconstructed ones that met their own interests of power (see also Hao 1999, pp. 10-11). This statement matches the idea of Victor Turner who asserted that the symbols were probably used as means and tools to control the society (Turner 1967). Under the pressure of orthopraxy, all types of proto-dragons were carefully examined, only some qualified items were selected. Such orthopraxy was most forceful during the Ming dynasty as one still can see its legacy in contemporary society. The emperor himself completely possessed the “mature” and “pure” dragon which grew fully five claws in each foot while in the mandarin bureaucratic system, Buddhas and gods had to share the immature and impure dragons with three or four claws. As a result, commoners confronted the emperor wherever they saw the symbols of the dragon. They were even prohibited to point the eyes or draw the legs if they planned to depict “a dragon”, which is reflected in the idiom, “Yegong hao long” [葉公好龍/Mr. Ye’s love on the dragon]. The idiom tells the story of Mr. Ye, a local officer who loves dragons. He ordered soldiers to decorate his house with different dragon motives. Such aspiration of Mr. Ye moved the Jade Emperor of Heaven. He appointed the Dragon King to appear in Mr. Ye’s dream to show his gratitude. Mr. Ye, despite his strong admiration to the dragon symbol, turned to be so frightened that he ordered his soldiers to annihilate all dragon motives. He finally realized that he could admire, love and desire the dragon but could never touch it.

The imperial China, Vietnam and Korea regularly held dragon-boat competition as means to perform their military power. In Korea, it is the identical “familism” which alienated and further promoted Confucian virtues and orthopraxy in Korean culture (Lee 2003, p. 133-141; Kim 1991, p. 134), thus traditional Korean dragon largely reflects Confucian hierarchy and social order. The well-known myth *Dragon of the East Sea in order to protect Korea* recalled the wish of becoming the East Sea guardian dragon of the great king Munmu in early Korean history. Furthermore, the dragon was closely attached to the birth of national founders; therefore, it has become the feudal symbol (Hye-yong Tcho 2007, p. 99).

Japanese culture is a mixture of both indigenous tradition and Chinese Confucian values. The Confucian ethics can be found in Japan’s earliest history, such as the *Kojiki* (A.D. 712) and the *Nihon shoki* (A.D. 720). Imperial Confucianism was “less emphasized in Japan during the Tokugawa period” (see Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, pp. 3, 13, 31, 40). As the O Yo-mei school (Wang Yang-ming) strongly developed during late imperial periods, Japanese

Confucianism became entirely secularized. The Japanese dragon was thus greatly de-centralized and de-Confucianized. It enjoyed a freer style in both physical appearance and hidden significance.

Joseph Buttinger (1958, 1972) called Vietnam “a smaller dragon”, implying that Vietnamese culture was deeply influenced by Chinese Confucian ideology. Standardization (and/or orthopraxy) was also promoted by local bureaucratic systems during feudal dynasties, however, such aspect was not as strong as in China or Korea. Keith Taylor’s research on Cao Biền [高駢, Gao Pian], a Chinese governor during the Tang-rule period (ninth century ACE.), found that he strongly promoted the Confucian education in Vietnam. However, during tenth – fourteenth centuries, the Đinh, Tiền Lê, Lý and Trần dynasties unified the country and ruled under Buddhist rather than Confucian ideology (Taylor 1976, pp. 149-181). The Ming invasion and rule during the period of 1407-1428 further grounded Chinese-styled Confucian education in Vietnam and helped develop Vietnamese Confucianism (see McHale 2002, p. 398; Whitmore 2010, p. 107). However, the state of Confucianism had weakened, since the Vietnamese “adopted shallow versions of Confucianism rather than internalized it” (McHale 2002, pp. 409-10, 416). John Whitmore asserted that while the Vietnamese “dealt with in Confucian terms, does not hide the non-Confucian nature of the society it describes” (Whitmore 1976, p. 200). In Vietnam, Confucianism is not seen as a Chinese tradition but rather as a native expression of Vietnamese values (Richey 2013, p. 60). As a matter of fact, standardization (and/or orthopraxy) was not strong in Vietnamese culture. The country failed to resist the French colonists just two decades later (1858-1859) and became a colony until 1954. No matter how strong it was, Confucianism did not entirely transform Vietnamese society (Nguyen 1998, p. 99). As a result, Vietnamese culture is quite diversity, including how dragons are portrayed. According to Andrew Chittick, Song China and Lý Vietnam during the tenth – twelfth centuries annually organized the event as a significant part of the military and political culture. The Chinese persistently decorated the boats with dragon designs while in Vietnam, by comparison, “the more diverse earlier decorative practices were retained and adapted to local preferences” (Chittick 2015, pp. 148-9, 156).

### **3. Upward Responses: Various Reactive Narratives of Related Social Groups**

Commoners did not completely submit to the symbolic hierarchy embodied in the dragons as emperors and bureaucrats had expected. Local commoners gained the supports from local elites in many cases and responded wisely to the orthopractic process to take back their interests. They managed to design and utilize the symbol of the dragon symbol as a way to show their militancy and solidarity. Since dragons were engrossed by the emperors, and hierarchical system was applied to the symbol, Chinese commoners took their efforts to compose various creative forms of dragons, such as kui’long [夔龍/quỳ long], chi’long [螭龍/li long], zhu’long [竹龍, bamboo dragon/trúc long], mei’long [梅龍, apricot dragon/mai long], etc. Physically, these popular “immature” dragons lack some radical parts (such as legs, claws, muscles, etc.); therefore, they were allowed to be used widely. In comparison with the “mature” imperial and bureaucratic ones, the popular dragons embody largely decorative values rather than socio-political narratives. In certain cases, these decorative dragons were manipulated by the imperial palace and bureaucratic systems for their own uses.



*The kui'long dragon in a ceramic cup – Ming Dynasty (Tie 2001, p. 119)*



*An apricot dragon in the Temple of Treasure Goddess in Bắc Ninh, Vietnam (Nguyen 2016)*

People of Yuecheng District, Zhaoqing city of Canton province (China) reserve their highest reverence to the local goddess, the Mother Dragon [龍母娘娘]. The goddess took shape from an historical event that happened during the early Qin dynasty (early second century BCE). The Qin Emperor wanted to pacify the local lands. Yi Husong [易乎宋], the leader of local Hundred-Viet armies, was killed. Since then, the local people deified her as a goddess who controlled the Xi-jiang River (Western River). Her master temple was built in town known today as Yuecheng 悦城. Modern visitors arriving at the temple were told the story of Mother Dragon and her five little dragons resisting the attacks from Qin imperial troops. Such spirit not only praises local identity but also confesses the anti-centralization and anti-orthopraxy pressures by the local traditions (see Ye and Jiang 2003).

*The photo of Mother Dragon in Yue'cheng, Zhaoqing, Canton, China (Nguyen 2008)*



In *the Journey to the West* [西遊記] by Wu Cheng'en (吳承恩, Ming Dynasty), one of the Dragon King's son was defeated by the Monkey King. He transformed into a horse to escort Master Xuanzang to the land of the Buddha - "the West". Similarly, one can easily find various images of dragons in local Buddhist and Taoist temples in China, Korea and Vietnam nowadays. Getting attached with religious traditions is known as one of the creative ways to maintain the symbol of dragon in hands of the commoners.

Recently, Dr. Du and Dr. Liu from Jiangxi presented at Harvard (in February 28, 2019) a case study at D Village, south of Nanchang city, Jiangxi province of China. Villagers took advantage of local history and cultural resources to renovate and perform the collective bench dragon dance with hundred performers and thousand participants. Accordingly, the villagers wrap up

their narrative of anti-imposition on their land ownership by the local authority and state-sponsored developers. The symbol of the dragon and local deity were used as a form of disguised “tool” for their upward resistance and village solidarity. Unluckily, corruption was found among the village leaders those who reserved their rights of organizing the dance and distributing exchange gifts, causing the suspension of the event in 2017.

In Korea, the dragon joined the Buddhist world since the Three Kingdoms Period (57 BCE – 668 CE) and were officially worshipped as a god during the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) (see Tcho 2007, pp. 93-99). The Korean commoners were more motivated by local familism and imported Confucian hierarchy. They actually tightened the Confucian application in their practical society which ensured a strong and stable cornerstone for Confucian hierarchy. Their respect for the symbol of the dragon strongly represented their desires and interests. Once they confronted the crisis of moral misuse by members of the upper classes (i.e., the kings, *Yangban* families, local authorities, etc.), the dragon became the symbol of resistance. According to Alexander Woodside, Korean, as well as Vietnamese, state officials and elites “expressed a determination to oppose any textual imperialism in Chinese courts histories” that demeaned or disregarded the importance of their statecrafts (Woodside 1998, p. 199). Shawn McHale also concluded that Korea and Vietnam both “combine[d] a discourse on Confucianism with a nationalist and anticolonial narrative of resistance to foreign aggression” (McHale 2004, p. 93). Such a vision could be obviously found in culture. The story of the Guardian Dragon being arrested by the Chinese Marshall Su Dingfang [蘇定方] in Baekche kingdom during an attack from the Chinese Tang Dynasty (see Yoon 1999, p. 133) is thus becoming a significant narrative for this oppositional mentality. However, stories about the symbol of the dragon representing a form of bottom-up resistance or domestic mobilization in Korean culture are not popular, which demonstrates that Korean society was well organized in strong Confucian norms, values, and order (as emphasized and praised by Lê Quý Đôn, a well-known Vietnamese Confucian scholar in the eighteenth century, (see Woodside 1998, p. 197).

In Japan, “Confucian ethical discourse is characterized by a historical consciousness in which the past is valorized with constant reference to the future”, in which Confucianism has “transformed into a set of guiding moral principles divorced from the sanction of any supernatural force” and became “entirely secularized” (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, pp.3, 13). The dragon is thus getting disregarded at a large scale, being depicted both positively and negatively in folk tales and religious stories. As a part of the Japanese dragon culture, the dragon contains the significances of victory and righteousness. The Japanese Mikkyō [密教] Buddhist myth tells a story of the Immovable Buddha [不動明王, the cosmic Buddha] swallowing the rivalry sword. Legend has it that the Immovable Buddha fought 95 heterodox species that had incarnated into the “wisdom fire sword” [智火之劍]. After the heterodox species turned into wisdom-fire sword, he turned into Furikara Fudo-myō-oh Dragon [俱利伽羅龍/Immovable Buddha], used his four claws to seize tightly the sword of heterodox species and swallowed it, therefore defeating them (Nguyen 2016).



*“Fishing the dragon” – Korean painting describing Chinese Tang’s Marshall, Su Dingfang, capturing the Baekje Korean national guardian dragon (Yoon 1999, p. 133)*



*A fair riding on the dragon in a local temple in Kimcheon, Korea (Yoon 1999, p. 21)*

Japanese dragons are identified as the less orthopractic symbols in East Asia. In Japanese, the dragon is called Ryu which was borrowed from Chinese in the late Nara period. Because of its geography location and natural environment, the Japanese was minimally involved in the standardization process. Instead, they tend to absorb natural catastrophes (such as volcanoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc.) into the symbol, making the dragon a reflective figure of both good and bad deeds. As the de-sinicization spirit grew stronger in late feudal periods, more and more Japanese people considered the dragon as an evil symbol (Nguyen 2016). In Japanese mythology, the hero, Susanoo, slaughtered the fierce Yamato-no-Orochi dragon to stop its attacks on the islands. Dojo Temple built during the Heian-period, has highlighted a female dragon Kiyohime [清姫] getting angry and killing the monk Anchin [安珍] – the one she loved, who hide inside the iron bell in Temple (see Great Japan's Fawa Experience 『大日本國法華驗記』).



*The legend Anchin and Kiyohime at Dojo Temple*  
(Source: *World Fine Art; Pictorial History of Japanese*  
*customs, Volume 2*)

*Hero Susano is slaying*  
*Yamato-no-Orochi in*  
*Japanese mythology by*  
*Toyohara Chikanobu [豊原*  
*周延] (1838–1912)*

As stated above, feudal Vietnam was not a strong Confucian state, and the Confucian orthopraxy was not totally effective. Confucianism had to compete with native non-Confucian tradition (as described by Whitmore 1976, p. 200). Furthermore, Vietnam is neighbored by Laos and Cambodia, two Indianized Southeast Asian states, and had indirect contacts with Indian culture via Indian monks and masters. Vietnam's contact with religious figures and its neighbors diversified its traditional culture. In eleventh – fourteenth centuries, Vietnamese royal and bureaucratic dragons looked like an Indian naga snake than a Confucian dragon (See Viện Nghệ thuật 1973; Trần 2012; Lee 2013, p. 345; Tran 2012). There is likely no account demonstrating direct upward response of the commoners concealed in the dragon symbol in Vietnam; however, the densely-populated folk dragon decoration in the country has evidently expressing the dominance of non-hierarchical folk dragons. In contrast to the limited number of orthodox dragons seen in the feudal capital of Hue, “non-standardized” dragons attached to Buddhas, gods and heroes can be found popularly throughout the country. During the Nguyen dynasty when the imperial imposition became stronger in the country, people of different regions intentionally quit the dragon symbol in their mindset, instead, they preferred other symbols such as kirin, lion, tiger, and others.



*Nine-headed dragon protecting the Buddha*  
*– a resonance with local Khmers’*  
*Theravada Buddhism in Camau, Vietnam*  
(Nguyen 2016)

Providing that pre-modern East Asian dragons had popularly been reacted among commoners, the bureaucratic dragon symbol was almost decentralized when East Asia got deeper in touch with the Western civilization in the early twentieth century. In many parts of the region, the dragon symbolizes the old-fashioned past or legacy of feudal conservativeness. After a long period of being cultivated as a symbol of submission, the dragon losses its primordial ontological implication; therefore, it faces the danger of being de-fashioned and forgotten. What a great loss if the dragon symbol disappears or is continuously centralized. Let us reconstruct the dragon symbol under a new angle, the New Confucian perspective.

#### **4. Re-defining and re-interpreting the dragon in the new period of “ecological turn”**

The creation of symbols is a systematically structural process in which human beings construct symbols to carry certain implications subjected to the change of time and space. In their daily lives, people tend to frame events and things into certain symbols to make their own narratives and interpretation. Ferdinand de Saussure (1959/2011) clarified that a symbol includes the structure of two radical components, the signifier and the signified. Levi-Strauss suggested the concept of “binary opposites” to interpret symbols (Levi-Strauss 1964). As a matter of fact, the symbols are closely associated with human beings’ political life, family rituals, rites of passage,

etc. (see further Weber (1916), Parson (1951), Geertz (1993), Howe (2009), etc.). Victor Turner viewed it from a different perspective. He rejected the idea that symbols worked as the patterns carrying social features and social consciousness. He asserted that symbols were used as means and tools to control society (Turner 1967). Schneider especially stressed on the “dynamic” of culture and hence indirectly affirmed the changeability of the symbols (Schneider 1980). Truthfully, regardless of their diverse typology and interpretative significances, symbols always originate from nature and are associated with specific social discourses. They can be interpreted only in their own specific contexts.

A sustainable symbol must be embedded in a well-defined environment and carry shared values in its meanings. To re-interpret the symbol of the dragon, we probably need a reasonable toolkit, such as core concepts, reasonable approaches, good environmental backgrounds, and basic interpretation mechanisms to work on it. Fortunately, New Confucian vision in the early twenty-first century and postmodernist viewpoint can provide radical means and methodology for this mission.

As a symbol, the dragon has been continuously modified and “superscribed”<sup>73</sup> with ideas or implications that reflect the transformations of the temporary society even though state-sponsored standardization has never ended. Consequently, the interpretation of the dragon symbol ought to be contextual. According to Gramsci, culture definitely does not “persist through time, handed down from one generation to another” (cited in Phạm 2009, p.176). Robert P. Weller, a well-known anthropologist, emphasized the importance of context-based interpretation and re-interpretation on socially oriented issues in China and East Asia (Weller 1987, p. 7). Similarly, Thomas Gold in his consideration about identity asserted that “cultural identity [...] was not uniform over time or place” (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 41). Priorly in a publication on the context-based interpretation of religious practices, Clifford Geertz stated that religion as a symbolic system could not exist apart from a cultural context. According to him, symbols “shape and are shaped by worldviews and ethos”, and people's worldview and ethos, their cosmology and their spiritual practices, as mutually confirming entities expressed in symbols and ritual (also cited in Tucker 2004, pp. 22, 23). Therefore, identity is an ongoing tradition which opens various platforms for researchers and readers of different backgrounds and different generations. Symbolic meanings derive from social backgrounds that are constantly produced and reproduced, negotiated, and constructed (see further Stoller 1989; Eipper 1998). Tu Weiming's [杜维明] analysis on the new vision of Confucianism in the early twenty-first century also insisted that “Confucians insist that we begin our journey of self-realization with the acknowledgment that we are concrete living human beings embedded in the world here and now” (Tu 2004, p. 489). Phạm Quỳnh Phương in her research on the historical symbol Trần Hưng Đạo in Vietnamese tradition once dubbed that “although culture might be a collective representation, it is neither a homogenous thing nor a mere social unifier or value enhancer in the Durkheimian sense” (Phạm 2009, pp. 15-16). Truthfully, as more narratives have been continuously attached to the dragon, we can suggest re-defining and re-interpreting the symbol in our era.

One of striking idea that may stimulate new ways of interpreting dragons is Tu Weiming's concepts of ‘anthropocosmic’ and ‘the ecological turn’ of the new wave of Confucianism: the transformed interpretation of the ancient Chinese philosophy, “*Tianrenheyi*, or the unity of Heaven and Humanity as a whole” (天人合一). Accordingly, Confucian humanism is definitely neither secular nor transcendent. Instead, it carries ‘anthropocosmic’ vision and “emphatically rejects anthropocentrism” (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 18; Tu 1998, pp.17-19; Taylor 1998, pp. 44-45; Tu 2004, pp. 480, 489). Fan Ruiping called this vision “a weak anthropocentric account of man and nature and that such an account is cosmic-principle-oriented” (Fan 2005, p. 107). In ‘anthropocosmic’ point of view, the relationship of Heaven, earth and humans is

<sup>73</sup> The term was used by Prasenjit Duara (1988, pp. 778-95).

dynamic and mutually reinforcing (McBeath & McBeath 2014, p. 24; Fan 2005, pp. 105-122), or interactively. The concept of vitalism of the earth and co-creativity of humans was emphasized in which the creativity of Heaven in the Confucian cosmological worldview is paralleled by the vitalism of the natural world (see Tucker 2004 p. 25). From that standpoint, Tu further suggested that human beings should reserve their sensitivity, sympathy, and empathy toward nature as well as human society. “Human beings, as co-creators of the cosmic order, are responsible not only for themselves but also for Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things” (Tu 2004, p. 494). Rodney Taylor called for preserving harmonious relationships with the natural world, with a focus on nonhuman animals (Taylor 1986, pp. 237-63). Tucker went further that “humans are embedded in and dependent on the larger dynamics of nature” (Tucker 2004, p. 20, and asserted that Tianrenheyi<sup>74</sup> in a global ethic that will counteract the ecological crisis (Tucker 1998, pp. 187-210; cited in McBeath & McBeath 2014, p. 24). Such “anthropocosmic” point, if viewed, likely reminds us the past symbols of the dragon itself before the process of standardization in which ecological imprints played the basic role in the ways dragons were shaped and interpreted. The long-standing process of orthopraxy brought the dragon away from its primary status. One cannot deny the fact that the most standard dragons still carry both ecological and social discourses; however, the later has been so strongly emphasized that it could restrain any contiguity between the dragon symbol and human desires of obtaining a harmonious life with nature. As long as the superimposed implications have not been decomposed, the symbol of the dragon will die out in the daily life of the modern community. Many people hoped and believed that the disappearance of feudal regimes in East Asia would restore the ecological narratives embodied in the dragon symbol; however, recent state-sponsored dragon stamps in China might suggest the opposite direction. Therefore, the restoration of the dragon’s ecological imbue ment will be best performed under the “anthropocosmic” vision of new Confucian philosophy. Such a vision can be manipulated as the main philosophical core for the building, the usage, and the interpretation of the dragon in modern East Asia.

As former scholars Liang Shuming [梁漱溟] (1979, pp. 200-1), Mou Zongshan [牟宗三], Tang Junyi [唐君毅], Feng Youlan [馮友蘭] (see Tu 2004, pp. 480-508) as well as current researchers Li Zehou, Tu Weiming, Mary Evelyn Tucker, Wang Gungwu, Robert P. Weller, Adam Seligman, Chen Lai, Cheng Chungying etc. (see Kelly 1998, pp. 93-119; Hammond 2015, p. 104) are positively working towards a harmoniously innate relationship between human and nature. Some of them suggested the idea that Confucian spirituality ought to be appreciated to ensure the fundamental balance of human-nature relationship (see Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, Tu 2004, Tucker 2004). The symbol of the dragon should be built and rebuilt in such a context in which the dragon preserves its authentic response to nature and further develops its updated social discourses which are happening in specific times and places. Social discourses can be changed due to the pluralism in human society; however, natural response as a core value of the symbol must be protected from being distorted. As the dragon’s imprints of nature are promoted, its spiritual power is thus respected both in rational or religious ways. In other words, the deep imbue ment of the dragon in the spiritual world could help maintain the basic essence of the dragon symbol and keep it associated with the daily life of commoners. By applying Tu Weiming’s “anthropocosmic” vision, the dragon can recover its meaning as a symbol of *aspiration*.

In order to create a flexible and liberal values system of the dragon symbol, we should apply the post-modernist point of view in re-defining, re-molding and re-interpreting it. George De Vos noted Durkheim's view that modernization indispensably secularized all practices,

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<sup>74</sup> Regarding the term “Tianrenheyi”, Gerald A., McBeath & Jenifer Huang McBeath put it as “the unity of heaven and humanity or integrity of the universe and humanity considered as a whole” (McBeath & McBeath 2014, p. 22).



therefore, people “must look to some source other than the supernatural for the embodiment of the sacred” (Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 12). The “source” that De Vos mentioned cannot be a thoroughly science-based point of view since contemporary human beings is suffering serious damages in nature so far. Shih Chih-yu once wrote, “Confucianism actually encourages eremitism if state authority deviates from the spirit of the Dao, the essence of which can be sensed only by the individual. In other words, the freedom from overall obligation to people holding office may have given the Chinese a higher degree of liberty in making judgments independent of their social status” (Shih 1995, p. 126; also cited in Kelly 1998, p. 96). We can pursue post-modernist viewpoints in re-defining the dragon if the symbol is definitely decentralized and de-orthopraxis. Furthermore, the postmodernist embeddedness can construct the dragon a symbol of *inspiration*.



*Modern designs of dragon heads (cn.dreamstime.com)*

In a statement regarding the freedom and liberalization in re-defining and re-interpreting human practices in the Neo-Confucian period in China and East Asia, Theodore De Bary and Wing-tsit Chan said that it was not necessarily needed in terms of political ideology but in terms of self-cultivation (cited in Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992, p. 130). Before that, Mou Zongshan, a Neo-Confucian scholar, considered modern Confucianism as “a reformed moral metaphysics”; Confucian scholars cared more about human values and “are occupied with figuring out how these values can lead to human flourishing”. Such an ideology is named “concern-consciousness” (cited in Berthrong 1998, p. 188). Tu Weiming added, “heart-mind specially defines the uniqueness of being human”; therefore, “learning to be human” requires a continuing process of self-consciousness, self-realization, and self-transformation. The “anthropocosmic” viewpoint encourages human beings to “transcend not merely egoism, but nepotism, parochialism, ethnocentrism, and chauvinistic nationalism” (Tu 1994, pp. 179, 184); therefore, it will strongly motivate the de-politicalization of the dragon symbol and create sense of sympathy and sensibility among the users. As Berthrong writes, modern Confucian scholars are actively screening and evaluating to check what should be reserved, modified and what should be abandoned (Berthrong 1998, pp. 191-192), the continuing debates on the overwhelming manipulation of the imperial legacies in East Asia among scholars have dramatically inspired theorists and practitioners in finding new horizons for their expertise’s development (see Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman 1992). Presently, in making the dragons, local artists in East Asia do not care about old-fashioned orthodox features. Instead, they deliberately focus on the structure, the physical appearance and the aesthetics of the dragons to meet the commercialized demands of the market. In most cases, the dragons are made with four-claw

legs. It is because making a three-clawed dragon does not qualify the aesthetic criteria while the five-claw structure is too complicated and ugly”, an ethnic Chinese man said when carving a dragon for the local Beidi Temple [北帝廟] in Vinh Chau town, Soc Trang province of Vietnam (personal interview, 2016). The similar explanation was expressed by another local Chinese in Tanjung Pinang, Indonesia (personal interview, 2017). Truthfully, the modern East Asian dragon-makers are relatively liberal in their mindset, they are not imposed by any hierarchical norms and values. At a certain level, the decentralized dragon can become a symbol of *liberal mindset* and *self-transformation*.



*Twin dragons looking at the Catholic cross at Vọng Dong Church, Thọ Sơn District, An Giang Province (Photo courtesy: Bùi Việt Thành, 2014).*



*Dragon Airline – Hong Kong  
([travel.sina.com.cn](http://travel.sina.com.cn))*



*Dragon Bridge, Danang, Vietnam  
([pda.vietbao.vn](http://pda.vietbao.vn))*

The dragon is a regional symbol of East Asia and the world; therefore, we must preserve the universal lens to re-define and re-interpret it. The founding of the traditional dragon obviously showed the diverse contribution of the archetypes even though it was then reframed and standardized by imperial Chinese emperors more than any other states in East Asia. Confucianism has been recognized as a special philosophical system carrying universal values, thus Confucian practices carry regional and international commonalities. As Tu, Hejtmanek & Wachman (1992, p. 95) stated, the standardized kinship groups and ancestor worship patterns or rituals acted as “the glue that helps hold Sinitic societies together”, and creates “the illusion of unity and interpretive agreement”. It is unfair and inhumane to assert common practices on any single state. In the new era, it is the universal values (especially the ‘anthropocosmis’ concept). The symbol of the dragon should be read as a companion to our ordeals with nature. The ‘anthropocosmic’ vision will actively play an important role in abolishing ethnocentrism or any transformed imperial agitation (if any) in the symbols of East Asian dragon. The dragon must be modified to its regional commonalities and universal values rather than an emphasis on any specific national identity. As long as people know the history of how the symbol of the dragon was formed and developed, they will learn to know the Chinese traditionally framed,

molded and standardized the symbol of the dragon during their imperial dynasties; therefore, it is unnecessary to make any further assertion on that. The dragon symbol is not a symbol of a specific nation-state, it is the symbol of *East Asian-ness*.

If universal values can be grouped as “the notion” of the symbol of the dragon, and Neo-Confucian ‘anthropocosmic’ vision be identified as a special form of “ritual”, then, in applying Seligman and Weller (2012)’s point of view, postmodern liberal mind in shaping, using and interpreting the dragon will directly create and promote common “shared experience” between different classes of people in one country and between peoples of different countries who own the symbol of dragon. As Mary Evelyn Tucker said, “the rituals reflect the patterned structures of the natural world and bind humans to one another, to the ancestral world, and to the cosmos at large” (Tucker 2004, p. 25). Similarly, Tu Weiming put it, “‘Ritualization’ as a dynamic process of interpersonal encounter and personal growth is not passive socialization but active participation in recognizing, experiencing, interpreting, and representing the communicative rationality that defines society as a meaningful community” (Tu 1994, p. 178). The vitality and the significance of the dragon in this ‘ecological turn’ period are easily handled if peoples are actively engaging in making and sharing the experience. By “ritualizing” the dragon symbol and embedding it into the harmonious trinity of Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things, the dragon will become a symbol of *sharing*.

## 5. Conclusion

The dragon reflects the mutual relationship between human beings and nature as well as a spiritual response to nature’s impacts on humans’ lives. The orthopractic history of the East Asian dragon shows that as long as the dragon was seriously imposed in centralization and standardization processes by imperial forces, it was taken further away from its ontological stance, thus causing the constraint and abolishment of its ecological narratives. The more political discourses were superimposed on the symbol of the dragon, the more classification and tension were constructed between the states and peoples. The dragon thus became a tool of political propaganda rather than a symbol. The recovery and revitalization of the dragon symbol today must be alienated with the new vision on the relationship of human beings and nature (at least in East Asia), the Neo-Confucian ‘anthropocosmic’ viewpoint, to ensure the consistency of its ontological foundation. Such a vision has been built up by twenty-first-century scholars in accordance with the application of universal cosmology and postmodernist liberalism. The dragon-molding methodology should be embodied in a more pro-nature and pro-aesthetics mindset which reasonably allows people to shape, define, use, and interpret the symbol of the dragon in an active way. The notion of the dragon, despite the continuous changes driven by imperial political narratives, is widely shared under a postmodernist viewpoint, we further need to set on the ‘anthropocosmic’ vision as a special form of “ritual perception” in order to create the sharing, the sympathy and the mutual respect among the peoples of East Asia. Given the fact that the symbol used to be superscribed with the imperial Chinese state values and interests, the modern people optimistically expect the manifestation of the so-called ‘East Asian-ness’ feature or even universal essence of the symbol of the dragon.

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- Kyohime 月華の劍士 - 一条あかりの必殺技「劾鬼・清姫」を發動させると鐘にまきつく清姫(1)が出現する。
- Kyohime 舞-HiME - 蛇をモチーフにしたチャイルド(モンスター)「清姫」が登場する。クライマックスでは安珍の最期を引用したような場面も展開される。
- Photos are taken from pda.vietbao.vn; travel.sina.com.cn; onmarkproductions.com; vietnamnet.vn; artchn.com; and telegraph.co.uk.



**Kang Byoung Yoong:**  
**Review and Prospect of Taiwanese Philosophy Scholarship in South Korea: a historical survey of academic publication from the year 1994 to 2018**

**Abstract**

The term “Choelhak (철학, 哲學)” was first introduced to South Korea by a Japanese scholar Nishi Amane (にしあまね, 西周, 1829-1897) who translated the English word “philosophy”. As building up the notion, he debased the traditional sense of East Asian philosophy such as Confucianism and argued that Choelhak should reflect Western thoughts and values only. It was his definition that has affected the general interest in South Korean philosophy scholarship up to the present day. Since the first-generation South Korean scholars studied philosophy under the academic environment that adopted the Westernized, modern education system, the majority of the philosophical inquiries they produced have been concerned with Western thoughts, while the East Asian is considered not so much as universal but as particular. It was only the late-twentieth-century that voices started to be made in academia to raise the importance of East Asian philosophy, followed by the establishment of the Korean Society for Asian Philosophy in June 1979. Despite the recent contribution, the subject still calls for discussion in depth and breadth.

This study examined how Taiwanese philosophy has been received and researched in South Korea since the commence to the present day. It took a form of a survey, classifying the articles about Taiwanese philosophy, which were published in South Korea over the years from 1994 to 2018, by the theme. It selected nine philosophers whose influence was profound in Taiwanese philosophy and observed the currents in scholarship on each philosopher. The names of the selected philosophers are: Fang Thomé H., Hu Shi, Huang Chin-Chieh, Lin Yutang, Liu Shu-hsien, Mou Zongsan, Tang Chun-I, Xu Fuguan, Yu Ying-shih.

Sixty-one related papers were summarised and reviewed, and each of them was classified by the publication date, author, language, publisher and keywords. The survey revealed the limitation of Asian philosophy scholarship that includes Taiwanese philosophy in South Korea, regarding both quantity and quality. The survey also suggested a possible solution and direction for scholars in the future.

There are two reasons why Taiwanese philosophy needs more scholarly conversation in South Korea. First, the subject needs to be discussed for a balanced development of South Korean philosophy scholarship, which has been dominantly inclined to the Western philosophy; it is time that one turned the attention to Asian philosophy, precisely Taiwanese philosophy. Also, the subject can provide a new perspective to the global scholars on Taiwanese philosophy outside of South Korea. Research about Taiwanese and Chinese philosophy conducted by South Korean scholars can appear as a unique interpretation of Asian philosophy to scholars outside of South Korea. The study, then, serves a cornerstone that can boost discussion, hence a balanced development in South Korean philosophy studies as well as Asian philosophy.

**Keywords:** Taiwanese Philosophy, Philosophy in South Korea, History of Philosophy, Articles on Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Modern Confucians

**Introduction**

The term Cheolhak(철학), a Korean translation of the English word philosophy, was first introduced to Korea by the Japanese philosopher Nishi Amane (西周). As a late nineteenth-century thinker, Amane was a staunch defender of modernisation by enhancing Western culture while abolishing the old custom of Confucianism. His definition of modernity, which privileges the Western way of reasoning as a prompt for modern science over East Asian

traditional thought, was highly influential at his time. The Euro-central approach to philosophy as Amane's was prevalent when Korea, a country that was then under Japanese rule, adopted and settled the term. (Lee 2016, 42-43) The coinage took place naturally through Japan. It might be, then, not so bold to claim that philosophy scholarship in Korea has been guided into a somewhat misleading way from its start. Since the term philosophy was introduced through Japan, Korea was not free from the psychological undercurrent formed by Japan. While building the national pride over its neighbouring Asian countries, Japan at that time carried inferiority complex towards Western countries. As a result, the term philosophy started to bear a colonial sense from its early stage in Korea.

Accordingly, the academic trend in Korea was dominantly in favour of Western philosophy rather than Asian philosophy. When it comes to the studies of Asian philosophy, the preference level is even higher, leaving the interest in Asian philosophy behind the focus; the first reviewing work of the history of Asian philosophy research was first conducted only in 1993. (Yun 1993) Asian philosophy has been constantly overlooked in South Korean scholarship. Such a tendency has lasted through the twentieth and twenty-first century, hence until today. Once, there was an active movement led by Lee Ki Sang, who criticised his contemporaries' reliance on Western philosophy and instead encouraged domestic thought written in the Korean language. Despite the attempt, the scarcity is still an issue, calling for improvement. (Lee 1999, 25) There is no doubt that the philosophy studies in South Korea today needs a more balanced perspective into Asian and Western thought. To achieve the goal, we need to extend the horizon to understand the subject.

The present study takes a form of survey. The main aim of the survey is to examine the outcomes of researches about Taiwanese philosophy as one of the research topics in Asian philosophy. The survey attempted a comprehensive analysis of the research outcomes in South Korean scholarship, selecting 61 articles published in South Korean academic journals from the year 1994 to 2018. Given that South Korea broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1992, one can state that examining the research outcomes about Taiwanese philosophy from 1994 to 2018 in South Korea means that we are specifically looking at the years from the point when the two nations' relationship was broken. The survey offered a collection of Asian studies database, which was accessible via the institution server of the University of Ljubljana. Sixty-one articles as a sample might not represent the whole number of research on the subject, yet it can be considered as highly approximate. The survey divided collected information into two categories and referred to them as external information and internal information. The number of publication, language, author and institution constitute the category of external information; theme and the content of the research paper constitute the internal information.

Through the work, the survey is expected to contribute to the two following results in scholarship: first, it can be beneficial to scholars who research the history of Asian philosophy, by reviewing the research outcomes on the subject. The work can be positively influential on subsequent studies on Taiwanese philosophy as well as Asian philosophy in the future. The survey can also help Korean scholars find a balanced, undivided interest in their research subject. Another benefit is that it will provide academic assistance to the Taiwanese philosophy scholars in South Korea, not to mention Taiwanese philosophy scholars in Taiwan. Furthermore, the extent of the benefit will reach out to the global scholars outside Asia.

The survey collected published research papers about Taiwanese philosophy. Two South Korean journal search engine platforms were used, namely DBPIA ([www.dbpia.co.kr](http://www.dbpia.co.kr)) and KRPIA ([www.krpia.co.kr](http://www.krpia.co.kr)). The East Asian Resource Library (EARL) in the Faculty of Social Sciences, the University of Ljubljana, provided the two platforms. The survey accessed sixty-one papers in total, all of which were published in South Korean journals from 1994 to 2018. The oldest one from the acquisition is a Chinese article Confucianism and View of Future World by Liu Shu-Xian at the University of Hong Kong, published in *The Study of*

Confucianism. The latest one is Jo Gyeong Ran and Jang Yun Jeong's Korean interview about Continental Neo-Confucianism, published in *Sogang Journal Of Humanities* issue 52. As the two studies suggest, the continuous contribution to the Taiwanese intellectual history for the last decades was published at least under two languages, Korean and Chinese. There were at least two nationalities in the list of the authors.

### Analysis of the Collected External Information

#### The number of publications by year

The number of journal publication each is as follows, one in 1994: one in 1997: one in 1999: one in 2000: two in 2001: four in 2002: one in 2003: one in 2004: five in 2005: five in 2006: three in 2007: two in 2008: six in 2009: four in 2001: five in 2012: two in 2013: seven in 2014: three in 2016: six in 2017: one in 2018. As a sum, there are sixty-one articles.

To clarify the quantitative progress, one can see the change of the publication numbers every five years, as the table below suggests.

The late ninety-ninetieth (1994-1999)	The early two thousand (2000-2004)	The late two thousand (2005-2009)	The early two thousand tenths (2010-2014)	The late two thousand tenths (2015-2018)
3	9	21	18	10
3	30		28	

While only three papers were published by the late ninety-ninetieth, the number soared up to thirty for the next two decades. The phenomenon can be reviewed, then, that the quantitative contribution has been steadily on the rise since the two thousand. Choi Young Seong points out a conference, held in 1997 on the topic of “contemporary genealogy and thoughts of Neo Confucianism”, as a starting point of Taiwanese philosophy scholarship. (Choi 2000, 227) Another possible factor for the rise is, in Choi's view, the inauguration of the philosophy department over the years 1990-1998. The number increased year by year: fifteen institutions installed philosophy department during the period. (Lee 2017, 42-43) Although the central research topic in the majority of the departments was still inclined to Western philosophy, there is no doubt that the academic scope in the discipline went through expansion.

Some remarkable progress was made at that time, as some universities installed research institute for Asian philosophy in faculty, namely The Institute of Oriental Science Studies at Kongju National University (specialised in Asian philosophy) founded in April 1996; Institute for East-West Thought at Dongguk University (specialised in Asian and Western philosophy) founded in July 1998; The Institute of Philosophical studies at Chung-Ang University (specialised in philosophy, Asian philosophy, Western philosophy) founded in May 1998. Their move is distinctive and worth noting in contrast to the other South Korean university institutions built then. While the majority organised faculty and curriculum with a focus on Western philosophy, the three universities considered their unique research environment and encouraged Asian philosophy studies. It might be a little early to call the phase the booming period, yet it can be stated that there has been a persistent interest in the subject over the decades despite the dominance of Western philosophy. (Lee 2017, 51) Taiwanese philosophy constitutes one of the minor yet continuously rising strands in history.

#### Language

The sixty-one papers were published in Korean and Chinese. Forty-six are written in Korean, and fifteen in Chinese. While it should be admitted that the collected data is sourced from the Korean journals only, it is worth being emphasised that there is no article written in English. The significant lack of diversity in research language in Korean academy over the twenty years poses us a critical question regarding the current tendency in every discipline that aims

globalisation.

Out of the sixty-one papers, sixteen papers include Chinese abstract; twenty-one includes English abstract; eight in Korean; one in Japanese and eleven with no abstract. The article with Japanese abstract draws attention since it was published in *The Journal of Japanese Thought*. Korean Association for Japanese Thought currently issues the journal, and the paper was written by Lee Gwang-rae in 2011, entitled "A dialogue between Asian philosophy and Western philosophy". It is included in volume 20.

Language cannot be an absolute factor to evaluate the quality of the research paper. However, language does play a crucial role in securing wider readership. In other words, an academic topic can thrive if it is discussed and written in the universal language due to its advantage for broader circulation. If the language allows easy access, the topic can invite exchanges of ideas across the countries. If we bear that in mind, it is not entirely positive to witness the dominance of Korean and Chinese language in the collected articles. It reveals that the contributions may have restrained the access of international scholars whose primary method of communication method is English

### **Author**

Including co-authors and duplicated authors, out of sixty-one contributors, forty-five were Korean, and twelve were Chinese that includes Taiwan, Mainland China and Hong Kong. Since the articles do not reveal the ethnic background of the author, the present survey is based on approximation after considering their names and institutions. Two contributors published three articles during the period, and six published two papers. In the case of co-authored articles, most researches were conducted by those from the same institution or same nationality. Although the result is made from a moderate amount of records, it should be noted that Chun-chieh Huang from National Taiwan University published three articles over the period. One of the recent publications is an essay entitled *Thinking from East Asia* published in *Critical Review*, 2014. The other two articles are about Yangmingism, published in 2004 and 2005. Huang's contribution to the Korean journal is a promising sign in South Korean scholarship.

Jeong Byung Seok at Yeungnam University also wrote three articles during the period. All of them are concerned with Mou Zongsan, published in 2009, 2011 and 2012. It seems Jeong has maintained his interest in Mou Zongsan's philosophy for the period of time. Apart from the authors in minor numbers who published two papers, most of the contributors published one. As the survey shows, the contributors' nationalities over the 20 years in Taiwanese philosophy scholarship revealed the scarcity of diversity, which causes restricted access too due to the language issue. Even if we set aside from the particular locality of the publishing and considers the subject as a minority in philosophy scholarship, Taiwanese philosophy still calls for the development to get a global recognition from scholars around the world who share the same research expertise. To find out details of the diversity, one can refer to the authors' affiliation. What follows is a list of the institutions to which each author belong.

<b>Names of the institution</b>	<b>Types</b>	<b>Number of the Published Article</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Philosophy Department</b>
Chung-Ang University	University	5	South Korea	
Korea University	University	4		
Chungnam National University	University	4		
Sogang University	University	4		
Chungbuk National University	University	3		

Sungkyunkwan University	University	3		
Yeungnam University	University	3		
Kunsan National University	University	3		
Yonsei University	University	2		
Konkuk University	University	2		
Korea Military Academy	University	1		
Hanbat National University	University	1		Department not installed
Seoul National University	University	1		
Chodang University	University	1		Department not installed
Gwangju National University of Education	University	1		Department not installed
Kangwon national university	University	1		
Soongsil University	University	1		
Dongguk University	University	1		
Daegu Haany University	University	1		Department not installed
Kyonggi University	University	1		
Northeast Asian History Foundation	Education Ministry, government-affiliated organisation	1		
Korea Institute of Oriental Medicine	Ministry of Science and ICT, government-affiliated research organisation	1		
National Taiwan University	University	4	Taiwan	
Tamkang University	University	3		
National Taiwan Normal University	University	1		
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica	National research institute	1		

Hunan University of Science and Technology	University	2	China	
Shandong University	University	1		
East China Normal University	University	1		
Sichuan Normal University	University	1		
Chinese University of Hong Kong	University	1	Hong Kong	
Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University	University	1	Japan	
Columbia University	University	1	The United States	

As the list illustrates, diversity, to some extent, is observed. Thirty-three institutions featured sixty-one papers. In terms of nationality, South Korean institutions were where most authors are affiliated, followed by Taiwan and China. Authors affiliated to Hong Kong, Japanese and American institutions also issued one paper each. The number of South Korean institutions where the authors affiliated was twenty. Chung-Ang University constituted the majority of the outcome: five articles equivalent to 8% of the total. It was observed that each author wrote one article, apart from Park Seung Hyun, who published two. Researchers at Korea University, Chungnam National University and Sogang University published four articles respectively. Also, the result found even proportions of publication throughout the provinces in South Korea. To put it another way, the institutions in the entire country (except for Jeju Island) showed interest in Taiwanese philosophy. There are fifty-five philosophy departments in South Korea, and eleven relevant departments, which means that there are sixty-six higher education institutions that teach philosophy as a degree subject. It is estimated that 30% of them published research papers about Taiwanese philosophy. Some institutions where the faculty do not have the philosophy department also conducted relevant research. Some notable contributions are found. Authors from the university specialised in a specific career, such as Korea Military Academy and Daegu Haany University of Oriental medicine, conducted research about Taiwanese philosophy. Likewise, Northeast Asian History Foundation and Korea Institute of Oriental Medicine earned research outcome. The breadth of affiliation suggests a positive sign that Taiwanese philosophy can develop into a substantial interdisciplinary research subject. That, however, does not mean that Taiwanese philosophy as a research subject is established globally. In order for more growth, continued interest and publication is necessary, as well as more institutions specialised in the subject.

### **Journal and Publisher**

Another beneficial information we can refer to, in addition to the contributor's language, nationality and affiliation, is the name of the journals and the publisher. With the information, one can estimate the progress that Taiwanese philosophy has made so far in South Korean scholarship. What follows is the name of the publishers and journals.

#### <University Affiliated Research Institute>

1. The Institute of CHUNG-ANG Philosophical studies / Philosophical Investigation
2. Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University / CHUL HAK SA SANG : Journal of Philosophical Ideas

3. Gangjin Institute of Dasan Silhak Studies attached to Yonsei University / Tasan & Contemporary Times
4. The Institute of Humanities Research in Konkuk University / The Journal of the Humanities for Unification
5. Humanities Research Institute Sogang University / Sogang Journal Of Humanities
6. Institute of Korean Cultural Studies Yeungnam University / Yeungnam Journal Of Korean culture studies
7. Keimyung Korean Studies Journal / Academia Koreana
8. Center for Korean Studies at Inha University / The Journal of Korean Studies

<Chinese-related Research Association>

1. The Society Of Chinese Studies / The Journal of Chinese Studies
2. The Society For Research Of Chinese Language And Literature / The Journal of Chinese Language and Literature
3. The Korean Society Of Modern Chinese Literature / The Journal of Modern Chinese Literature
4. The Society For Chinese Humanities In Korea / Journal Of Chinese Humanities
5. The Chinese Language And Literature Society Of Korea / The Journal of Chinese Language and Literature
6. Korea Association of Chinese Language Education / The Journal of Korea Association of Chinese Language Education
7. The Society for Chinese Cultural Research / The Journal of Chinese Cultural Research

<Philosophy-related Research Association>

1. The Society of Philosophical Studies / Journal of The Society of philosophical studies
2. The Korean Society Of Yang-Ming Studies / YANG-MING STUDIES
3. The Korean Society of CONFUCIANISM studies / THE STUDY OF CONFUCIANISM
4. Bumhan philosophical society / Journal Of pan-Korean Philosophical Society
5. The New Korean Philosophical Association / Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association
6. Philculture / Philosophy and Reality
7. Korean Philosophical Association / Korean Journal of Philosophy
8. Korean Association For Japanese Thought / Journal of Japanese Thought
9. Korean Society of Modern Philosophy / Modern Philosophy
10. The Society For Humanities Studies In East Asia / The Journal of Society for Humanities Studies in East Asia

11. Korean Academy of Taoism and Culture / Journal of The Studies of Taoism and Culture

12. The Institute For Korean Historical Studies / Critical Review of History

<History-related Research Association>

1. The Society For Asian Historical Studies / JOURNAL OF ASIAN HISTORICAL STUDIES

Twenty-eight journals have published articles about Taiwanese philosophy, and the publishers of eight of them were a university research institute. Three research institutes hold philosophy as their core research subject; two hold it as one of their humanities research subjects; three are primarily concerned with Korean studies. According to the result, there was no research institute that holds Taiwanese philosophy as a core research subject. Instead, institutes which hold relevant interests, such as philosophy, humanities if not Korean studies, were observed to have been researching Taiwanese philosophy. Currently, eleven academic associations of philosophy publish journals where the subject includes Taiwanese philosophy, in order to encourage papers. Several journals, published by research associations for Chinese language, literature, education and culture, dedicated pages for Taiwanese philosophy. Two other associations related to history studies published articles on Taiwanese philosophy. In short, Journals that have published articles about Taiwanese philosophy can be divided into two categories. One is the journals about ‘munsacheol (文史哲)’, as a Korean short form of literature, history and philosophy. The other is the journals about Chinese studies.

At present, there are forty KCI journals and six KCI candidate journals in Korea that consider philosophy as a topic. While contributions made from Chinese studies, literature and history can be substantial, a desirable case will be that the forty-six South Korean journals about philosophy add a category of Taiwanese philosophy and accept a submission. If the forty KCI journals out of the forty-six allow publication, Taiwanese philosophy scholarship can make considerable progress because KCI as a citation database for scholarly journals will boost reference and enhance exposure level.

	Name of Journal in Korean	Name of Journal in English	Name of Association
1	인간연구	The Journal of human studies	가톨릭대학교 인간학연구소 (Institute of anthropology Catholic University of Korea)
2	南冥學研究	Namgyeong Research	경상대학교 경남문화연구원 Gyeongsang National University Gyeongnam Cultural Research
3	철학연구	Philosophical Studies	고려대학교 철학연구소 Korea University's Institute for Philosophy
4	仙道文化	Sundo Culture Studies	국제뇌교육종합대학원대학교 국학연구원 University of Brain education



5	대동철학	Journal of the Daedong Philosophical Association	대동철학회 The Daedong Philosophical Association
6	철학연구	Philosophia, Journal of Korean Philosophical Society	대한철학회 Korean Philosophical Society
7	동양철학연구	Journal of Eastern Philosophy	동양철학연구회 Eastern Philosophy research
8	범한철학	PAN-KOREAN PHILOSOPHY	범한철학회 Bumhan Philosophical society
9	철학논총	CHULHAK-RONCHONG, Journal of the New Korean Philosophical Association	새한철학회 New Korean Philosophical Association
10	생명연구	Studies on Life and Culture	서강대학교 생명문화연구소 Sogang University Institute Life and Culture
11	인문논총	Seoul National University the Journal of Humanities	서울대학교 인문학연구원 Institute of Humanities Seoul National University
12	철학사상	The Journal of Philosophical Ideas	서울대학교 철학사상연구 Institute of Philosophy Seoul National University
13	퇴계학논집	TOEGYE-HAK-LON-JIB	영남퇴계학연구원 The Yeungnam Toegyehak Institute
14	인도철학	The Journal of Indian Philosophy	인도철학회 Korea society for Indian Philosophy
15	인간.환경.미래	Human Beings, Environment and Their Future	인제대학교 인간환경미래연구원 Institute of Human, Environment and Future Inje University
16	철학탐구	Philosophical Investigation	중앙대학교 중앙철학연구소 The Institute of Chung-ang Philosophical Studies Chung-ang University
17	철학연구	Journal of The Society of philosophical studies	철학연구회 The Society of philosophical studies

18	유학연구	Studies in Confucianism	충남대학교 유학연구소 The Institute of Confucianism Chungnam National University
19	가톨릭철학	The Catholic Philosophy	한국가톨릭철학회 The Korean Association of Catholic Philosophers
20	과학철학	KOREAN JOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE	한국과학철학회 The Korean Society for the Philosophy of Science
21	논리연구	Korean Journal of Logic	한국논리학회 Korean Association for Logic
22	니체연구	The Journal of Korean Nietzsche- Society	한국니체학회 Korean Nietzsche-Society
23	동서철학연구	Studies in Philosophy East-West	한국동서철학회 Korean Society for Philosophy East-West
24	동양철학	THE JOURNAL OF ASIAN PHILOSOPHY IN KOREA	한국동양철학회 The Society for Asian Philosophical in Korea
25	美學	Mihak -The Korean Journal of Aesthetics	한국미학회 The Korean Society of Aesthetics
26	철학적 분석	Philosophical Analysis	한국분석철학회 Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy
27	사회와 철학	The Journal of Society and Philosophy	한국사회와철학연구회 A Society for the Research of Society and Philosophy
28	양명학	YANG-MING STUDIES	한국양명학회 The Korean Society Of Yang- Ming Studies
29	한국여성철 학	Korean Feminist Philosophy	한국여성철학회 Korean Association of Feminist Philosophers
30	의철학연구	Philosophy of Medicine	한국의철학회 Korean Association of Philosophy of Medicine

31	日本思想	Journal of Japanese Thought	한국일본사상사학회 Korea Association for Japanese Thought
32	중세철학	Philosophia Medii Aevi	한국중세철학회 Societas Philosophiae Mediaevalis Coreana
33	시대와 철학	EPOCH AND PHILOSOPHY -A Journal of Philosophical Thought in Korea-	한국철학사상연구회 Korean Association for Studies of Philosophical Thought
34	한국철학논집	THE JOURNAL OF KOREAN PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY	한국철학사연구회 The Society of KOREAN PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY
35	철학	CHEOLHAK: Korean Journal of Philosophy	한국철학회 Korean Philosophical Association
36	칸트연구	Kant Studien	한국칸트학회 KANTGESELLSCHAFT
37	현대유럽철학연구	Researches in Contemporary European Philosophy	한국하이데거학회/한국해석학회 Heidegger-Gesellschaft In Korea
38	헤겔연구	Hegel-Studien (Hegel-Yeongu)	한국헤겔학회 The Hegel Society of Korea
39	현상학과 현대철학	Phenomenology and contemporary philosophy	한국현상학회 Korean Society for Phenomenology
40	환경철학	Environmental Philosophy	한국환경철학회 The Korean Society for the Study of Environmental Philosophy

Amongst the forty academic journals and associations, none of them had a research group that aims to study Asian philosophers. Instead, the central topic of the groups tends to be seminal Western philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel or Martin Heidegger. Moreover, no organisation had Taiwanese philosophy or Chinese philosophy as a central topic. Taiwanese and Chinese philosophy has been rather discussed under the broad category of Asian philosophy. Considering that Korea Society for Indian Philosophy was founded in 1988, the time is long belated that an attempt to organise a Taiwanese philosophy association was made for the development of the subject.

Currently, the journals about Chinese studies as well as philosophy accept submissions regarding Taiwanese philosophy. South Korea has twenty-two KCI and one KCI candidate journals on the subject. However, if the journals where Taiwanese philosophy is not a central

topic keep publishing articles, the expected contribution level in future academia raises a question. Aforementioned, we do not have any journals nor association that focus on Chinese philosophy and Chinese intellectual thoughts. Language and literature are the two relevant sub-categories of interest that have led the tradition of Chinese studies in South Korea. More recently, regional studies and international relations studies have started to make contributions. Nevertheless, one notable tendency should not be missed; Neo-Confucianism has steadily drawn the attention of academia.

The Oriental Studies by Dankook University and Philosophy• Thought•Culture by Dongguk University is another promising journal platform where scholars can publish articles about Taiwanese philosophy. In terms of expertise, platforms still need improvement. Although it might be a hasty call to found an association for Taiwanese philosophy, it is high time a research group was organised with a specific focus on Chinese continental thoughts. With that, a regular journal issue publication with expert knowledge will be the next step to achieve. With a robust infrastructure such as association and journal, we can expect a more active exchange of ideas and scholarly communication. It will facilitate a conversation between scholars in different regions, including Taiwan, China, Hong Kong and Japan, and further to Europe and North America.

### **Analysis of the Collected Internal Information**

If the analysis of external information shows an objective overview of the current surrounding Taiwanese philosophy as an academic subject in South Korea, the analysis of internal information demonstrates the content of what the journal articles discuss. Like all academic subjects are, Taiwanese philosophy has a broad interest in the topic, yet the degree of discussion is profound. The richness corresponds to its deep history.

The present survey examined which topics have been discussed in South Korea. It made a catalogue of the content of the 61 articles by keywords; it examined the subject of the articles by the names of intellectuals discussed. Cataloguing the keywords allows one to see in which areas of Taiwanese philosophy South Korean scholars have been interested. It was judged that the cataloguing work could act as a useful material to observe the academic trend in South Korean philosophy scholarship. Listing the names of the intellectuals discussed as a subject allows one to see which Taiwanese philosophers have drawn attention. It was conjectured that the work could be beneficial to scholars who study Taiwanese philosophy.

### **Keywords**

The survey found 226 keywords from the articles. The ranges were diverse from philosophical terms such as liberation (freedom), happiness, truth, society to a four-character Chinese idiom such as "the mind-heart as being empty, numinous, and unobscured (xuling bumei 虛靈不昧). The most frequent keyword was Mou Zongsan. The result is not surprising because he is one of the seminal philosophers in Taiwan. His books have been introduced to South Korea from the 2000s onward, including Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, Correspondence of Oriental and Western Philosophy, Asian Philosophy and Aristotle, Substance of Mind and Substance of Human Nature series, Mou Zongsan's Interpretation of Laozi, Special Lectures on Chinese Philosophy. Apart from Mou, names of other influential philosophers appeared more than 30 times as keywords. The range was diverse from classical thinkers such as Confucius, Mencius and Laozi to modern-contemporary thinkers such as Mou and Tang Junyi. Moreover, the result showed the names of Western philosophers such as Hegel and Kant, and Chinese historical figures such as Mao Zedong and Lu Xun. Thirteen keywords were found, containing the term "Confucian" such as Confucian Ethics, Confucian Orthodoxy and Confucian Society. Twenty keywords contain the suffix "-ism" as the articles were a discussion about intellectual thought. Fifteen keywords appeared more than two times, out of the total 266 keywords, namely: May Fourth Movement, being, Hu Shi, Lin Yutang,

Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, universality, Xu Fu-Guan, Yu Ying-Shi, Mencius, writing in the vignette style (Xiǎopǐnwén, 小品文), A Treatise of the Highest Good (Yuanshan Lun, 圓善論), freedom, 'Chinese Yangming School (Zhōngguó yángmíng xuépài, 中國陽明學派), Immanuel Kant. To rank them by frequency of appearance, Mou Zongsan constitutes the top, followed by Hu Shi, Lin Yutang, Tang Junyi and Yu Ying-Shi. The rank reveals the vital roles the listed philosophers and thinkers have been playing in philosophy studies. Taiwanese philosophy was not an exception in the discipline. The figures mentioned above are leading scholars and philosophers who had led the history of Taiwanese (or Chinese) philosophy. Accordingly, they will continue to serve as a significant subject of study for the next generation.

### Biographies of the Subject Philosophers

The names and information of the philosophers are as integral as the keywords for the twentieth-first century scholars. The present survey selected nine influential philosophers who are considered as most seminal in Taiwanese philosophy. It examined whether each one was discussed in South Korea, and if so, in which way. The selected philosophers are as follows: (1) Fang, Thomé H (2) Hu Shi (3) Huang Chin-Chieh (4) Lin Yutang (5) Liu Shu-hsien (6) Mou Zongsan (7) Tang Chun-I (8) Xu Fuguan (9) Yu Ying-shi (alphabetical order)

#### (1) Fang Thomé H.

There are two publications by Fang that have been introduced in South Korea: the 1989 translation of *The Chinese View of Life: The Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony* and the 1999 translation of *Primordial Confucianism and Taoism*. Fang is a Chinese philosopher who was born in 1899 and lived until 1977. In contrast to his reputation as a representative of Neo Confucianism school in South Korea, Fang Dongmei never considered himself to be a Modern Confucian, given that his philosophical interests also included traditional Buddhist and Daoist thought. (Rošker 2016, 74) His official name was Fang Xun, and personal name was Dong-mei.

After graduating from University of Nanking with a degree in philosophy, he left for the US in 1921 to earn another degree at Wisconsin University. He returned home in 1924 and has taught at Wūchāng University of Education, Southeast University, National Central University and other institutions including National Taiwan University and Fu Jen University since 1947.

His philosophical idea was perfected under the social circumstances that were undergoing an amalgamation and conflict of Asian-Western philosophy. Due to the turbulence, the origin of Fang's ideas tends to be complicated. He adopted Nietzsche's notion of superhuman, Bergson's notion of life and Whitehead's process philosophy; then he revised them all. He merged Primordial Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhist Huayan to establish his own philosophical system about life. In the survey, two articles out of sixty-one in total were about Fang. Ahn, Jaeho's *Mutually Growing Ethics* reads how Fang understands Laozi and Zhuang Zhou. Yun, Ji-won's *Thomé H. Fang's Life Philosophy* considers Fang's philosophical view of cosmos and life.

#### (2) Hu Shi

Hu Shi was born in 1891 and died in 1962. He studied in the US for a degree under John Dewey, whose thought greatly influenced Hu's academic identity as a pragmatist. Hu was a leading figure during the Enlightenment period in China, until 1949, when a communist government was founded in Mainland China. He left for the US as a refugee and later returned to Taiwan to serve a post of Vice President of Kuomintang. His influence was enormous over the field of humanities, including literature, philosophy, folk studies, to name but a few. Accordingly, in the survey, studies about his idea were often related to his political

thought, which constitutes three articles and two articles about literature and one about pragmatism. The first year an article about Hu She was published is 2002, and the latest is 2017. Oh Byung-Soo's *The Formation of Hu Shi's Anti-communist Liberalism in Cold War Era in China: The Ideologization of Chinese Liberalism (1941~1953)* is worth noting since the author Oh's first profession is a historian. His attempt to revisit the Cold War period Asia with a focus on Hu Shi's idea and life can be viewed as distinguished.

### **(3) Huang Chun-Chieh**

Huang is one of the renowned intellectuals in Taiwan, and he published an article in a South Korean journal. Educated at Taiwan University and Washington University, he is now a chief researcher at Research Institute for the Humanities and Social Sciences at National Taiwan University. Huang is a philosopher, thinker and historian. Moreover, his reputation is highly regarded in liberal arts, higher education sector. He is specialised in Mencius and Analects, specifically hermeneutics. Sungkyunkwan University published the translation of his treatise *The History of Mencius' Thoughts* (孟學思想史論) in 2016. The university also published his other book *A History of the Interpretations of the Analects in Tokugawa Japan* in 2011. In the survey, four out of the sixty-one papers were about either his publication or publications about his philosophy. Three out of the four were Huang's own work. He wrote papers about Yangmingism in 2004 and 2005. He also wrote about Orientalism in *Critical Review of History* in 2014. A discussion about Huang's East Asian Confucianism was published in *The Institute for Korean Culture* in 2009.

### **(4) Lin Yutang**

Lin's name is known as Im Eo Dang in Korean. His theory has been influential since the late 1930s. His ideas started to come into attention from the 1950s onward; he earned his fame by his well-known essay *The importance of living*. Lin was born in 1895 and died in 1976. He studied linguistics at Harvard University and continued his academic pathway at University of Jena, Germany and Leipzig University. Later, Lin returned to Beijing to be appointed as a professor at the University of Beijing. He lived in the US during 1935-1966 and moved to Taiwan in 1966. Unlike his title essayist in South Korea, he is also renowned as a seminal thinker in China.

The survey found that seven papers discussed Lin. They tended to be interdisciplinary research, such as linking Lin's idea represented in his writing with other forms of literature and philosophy.

### **(5) Liu Shu-hsien**

Liu is one of the 1934 schools of Neo-Confucian philosophers. Born in Shanghai, China, he graduated from National Taiwan University and went to the US for his PhD. Liu served a researcher post at Chinese University of Hong Kong and Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at Academia Sinica, China. He died in Taiwan in 2016. In 1994, when he was working for Chinese University of Hong Kong, he published a paper in Chinese in *The Study of Confucianism* issue 7, entitled *Confucianism and View of Future World*.

### **(6) Mou Zongsan**

Mou is an emerging philosopher who is recognised as most influential from the 1980s. He is well known for an innovative idea and leading the second generation of Neo Confucianism, as he is evaluated as the most important Taiwanese philosopher from 1980 to the time of his death. An innovative theorist, he was the best known second generation Modern Confucian. (Roške2016, 65) Responding to the reputation, South Korea has paid steady attention to his philosophy. Since the 2000s, attempts have been made to discuss his ideas. Apart from journal articles, there are treaties for a research degree. For example, Kim Chan Ho wrote a Masters

degree thesis on Mou's notion of Perfect Good in 2018. 정우엽 earned his Masters degree in Mou's notion of autonomy. Mou's philosophy is attractive not only to the researchers in Asian philosophy but also those in Western philosophy. In 2017, Song Yohan, an original Kant expert, published an article entitled *Mou's criticism on Kant - How is the distinction between things in themselves and appearance possible?* Addressing Mou's critical interpretation of the Kantian terms Ding an sich' and Erscheinung, Song revises Mou's argument and discusses what significance it bears to read Kant through Mou. In short, Mou is an essential subject for research in Taiwan, and his idea fascinates global scholars beyond Asia.

### (7) Tang Chun-I

Tang Chun-I was born in 1909 in Sichuan, China, and died in 1978. Known as one of the New Confucianists, Tang was diversely influenced by Classical Chinese philosophy, Platon and Hegel. Since he met Mou in 1940, Tang has built up an academic comrade with Mou. Since 1949 Tang left Mainland China and lived in Hong Kong. His ideas were actively received in Hong Kong, Taiwan and the US scholarship. Articles about his philosophy have been published by South Korean and Taiwanese researchers in South Korean journals. Subjects vary including Anxiety of Existence, Philosophy of Culture, Interpretation of Taoism and Humanistic Economic Sociology.

### (8) Xu Fuguan

Xu Fuguan is also New Confucianist. Born in China, 1902, Xu went to Japan to study. While his occupation was in the military, he encountered philosophy, which later allowed him to teach Chinese philosophy at Tunghai University from 1955. The university then had no philosophy department, and Xu taught the subject in the Chinese literature department. As Jana Rošker defines Xu as "a Philosopher of Culture, Philology and Politics", (Rošker 2016, 82) Xu extensively incorporated philosophy with relevant disciplines such as literature, culture, art and politics. In South Korea, four of his works are available in the form of a monograph. *Chinese art spirit* (中國藝術精神) has been influential in the Korean intellectual history. It is a study about the aesthetic spirit in China from many perspectives. He also reads classical music, landscape painting and literary artist style painting by applying philosophy of Confucius and Zhuang Zhou. The survey showed there were four papers about Xu's philosophy. Two of them were written by Korean, and the other two were by Chinese.

### (9) Yu Ying-shih

Yu Ying-shih was born in Tianjin, China in 1930. He moved to Hong Kong in 1950 to study, which continued at Harvard University from 1956. He was awarded a PhD in 1961. From 1973 to 1975, he was a Vice President of Chinese University of Hong Kong. He served as a professor at Harvard University, Yale University and Princeton University. In 2006 he was awarded Kluge Prize, an equivalent of Nobel Prize in Humanities, by the Library of Congress. Some popular works of his are available in South Korea too, namely *Zhu Xi's Historical World, Modern Significance of Traditional Chinese Values System*. There are four articles about Yu's philosophy published in South Korea. The subjects are broad, including "Redology", "comparison of Yun Yang-shih and Li Zehou", "Zhu Xi's historical world in Yu's interpretation" and analysis of Yu's work "*The Scholar and Chinese Culture*".

So far, the survey has examined the philosophers whose ideas have been influential to the contemporary Taiwanese philosophy and South Korean scholarship. The thinkers such as Fang, Thom H. Hu Shi, Huang Chin-Chieh, Lin Yutang, Liu Shu-hsien, Mou Zongsan, Tang Chun-I, Xu Fuguan and Yu, Ying-shih are all prominent figures and should not be missed when one studies the history of Taiwanese and Chinese philosophy, not to mention

philosophy in general. South Korean scholars have maintained continuous interest in them in order not to miss their profound thoughts and works. It is expected the interest will go on to lead both quantitative and qualitative development of the relevant research.

### **Conclusion**

Korean higher education started to raise philosophers from the 1920s. Since the first philosophy department was installed at Keijō Imperial University, the term philosophy, for the next thirty years until the 1960s, had been understood to refer to Western philosophy. (Choi 2000, 179) Despite the rising attempt to reform the tendency for the last few decades, the progress has been slow compared to the passion. For example, the first attempt to review the history of Asian philosophy scholarship was conducted in the 1990s.

When it comes to the subject of Taiwanese philosophy, represented as Neo-Confucianism, the matter bears more urgency. Although Neo-Confucianism constitutes a significant strand in Asian philosophy, there has been almost no review project for the history of the subject studies, nor platforms such as an associations and journal. Given that, it is remarkable to see research in the subject sustained to the present.

The survey analysed sixty-one articles published between 1994-2018 as categorising them into external information and internal information. External information refers to the explicit details of the research such as the author, affiliation and publisher. Internal information refers to the topic and the content of the research.

Given the categories, it was found that research about Taiwanese philosophy has made steady progress despite the absence of dramatic quantitative development. Since the journals are South Korean, 75% of the publications were written in Korean, and the other 25% were written in Chinese since the topic was on Taiwanese philosophy. Considering that there are many scholars specialised in Asian philosophy outside Asia, the survey result revealed limitation in language diversity, including English, which could have eased access. The authors' nationalities share a similar concern. The result showed dominance in South Korean and Chinese nationalities and little number in others. Most affiliations were a university, especially a university that has either philosophy or philosophy-related department. Over the designated period of the survey, twenty-eight journals published articles about Taiwanese philosophy, and 29% of them had the university research institute as a publisher. Journal platforms that accept a submission about Taiwanese philosophy tended to have Chinese Studies or philosophy as a suggested topic for publication. However, there is no association solely dedicated to subjects such as Taiwanese philosophy, New Confucianism and Chinese philosophy. None is there a journal specialised in those topics.

By the analysis of keywords and research subjects, the survey established an overview of the currents in Taiwanese philosophy scholarship. The keywords were as broad as two hundred, and the scope was extensive, covering everyday languages and philosophical terms. Thinkers as a keyword included Asian sages such as Confucius, Mencius and Laozi as well as Western philosophers such as Hegel and Kant. Taiwanese philosophy scholars chose Classical Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy as the subject for their comparative research and interdisciplinary research. Modern-contemporary thinkers of Taiwanese philosophy including Fang, Thomé H, Hu Shi, Huang Chin-Chieh, Lin Yutang, Liu Shu-hsien, Mou Zongsan, Tang Chun-I, Xu Fuguan and Yu Ying-shih were the main subject of study.

The project of the survey was to offer a comprehensive analysis of the research outcome in South Korean scholarship on the topic of Taiwanese philosophy. It was conducted in order to contribute to the historical studies of Asian philosophy in South Korea. It is expected to help Asian philosophy scholarship in South Korea make progress as even as Western philosophy. The work is also expected to help scholars not only in South Korea and Taiwan but also in other regions who research Asian philosophy. It will be worthwhile if the present survey can serve as a cornerstone for those who wish to research the history of Taiwanese philosophy and Asian philosophy.



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**Marko Ogrizek:**

**Huang Chun-Chieh and Comparative Philosophy: Multiple Ways of Studying Confucian Ethics Across Texts and Contexts**

**Abstract**

Confucianism cannot be posited as merely a philosophical tradition, but it can nevertheless be said to possess key elements of philosophy of ethics, which have time and again been able to transcend both the tradition's historical as well as its' cultural bounds. While Huang Chun-chieh points out that it is more appropriate to speak of Confucianisms, plural, basic Confucian values and notions possess the ability to move from context to context while retaining certain characteristics and changing others. The proper approach to the study of Confucianisms should therefore be interdisciplinary, but philosophy should also have a part to play. Understood within the bounds of the project of Confucian ethics (a project that can be seen as dynamic and ongoing), the question becomes whether the study of a broader and more diverse range of expressions of Confucian thought – particularly through the methods of comparative philosophy as an open philosophical dialogue – could help throw new light on important aspects of Confucian ethical thought as such. It is argued that a philosophical study of Confucian thought should also take part across diverse texts and contexts. Taking as an example the teachings of certain Japanese Confucian scholars and contrasting them with newer non-Chinese interpretations (as for example the »role ethics« interpretation ) of Confucian notions, the following presentation tries to show that using methods of comparative philosophy, especially aided by a broader interdisciplinary approach, can be an important way of studying Confucian ethics across texts and contexts.

**PANEL 4:**  
**Confucianism in Modern Taiwan**



**Friday, October 18, 11:00 –12:30**

**Panel 4: Confucianism in Modern Taiwan**

**Téa Sernelj:**

**Xu Fuguan's Basic Contributions to Taiwanese Philosophy**

The presentation deals with the philosophic theory and epistemological methodology of the Modern Confucian Xu Fuguan (1903 –1982), a significant Taiwanese philosopher of the 20th century whose theoretical contributions are in the center of academic interests in China and Taiwan, however almost completely unexplored in the West. Xu Fuguan was a Chinese intellectual and historian who made important contributions to Modern Confucian studies. He belonged to the second generation of Modern Confucianism, the stream of thought that has mainly been developed during the 20th century in Taiwan and Hong Kong. It is distinguished by a comprehensive attempt to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought by means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western philosophical systems. It is defined by a search for synthesis between Western and Chinese traditional thought, aiming to elaborate a system of ideas and values, suitable to resolve social and political problems of the modern, globalized world. The presentation will focus upon three central concepts of Xu's theory, namely the concept of bodily recognition (*tiren*), the concept of concerned consciousness (*youhuan yishi*) and the concept of harmonious dynamics of vitality (*qiyun shengdong*).

**1. Introduction**

Xu Fuguan's fields of research were history, sociology of culture, philosophy, and Chinese literature. Beside his profound research and interpretation of the original Confucianism, he is also noted as one of the first theoreticians of the specific Chinese aesthetics and art in Contemporary Chinese thought.

Although Xu was primarily an excellent essay writer, he also excelled with a wide knowledge on the development of ancient Chinese society especially concerning its political, spiritual, and cultural characteristics. Due to such special interests, he did not publish any excessively profound philosophical discussions, which was otherwise the case with the majority of other Modern Confucians. His fundamental methodological approach which determined his specific vision of the conceptual development of traditional Chinese spiritual culture still remains widely unknown, although the results of his studies in this field are extremely interesting, and could represent an important contribution to the further research in comparative cultural studies. Xu Fuguan's theoretical works are collected in three very extensive monographs.

In the field of intellectual history, his most important works are *The History of the Two Han Dynasties (Liang Han sixiang shi)* and *The History of Chinese Theories on Human nature (Zhongguo renxing lunshi)*, in which he studies the development of Chinese thought, explains its specific features and highlights its basic paradigms. In contrast to other Modern Confucians who developed their interpretations of Confucianism mainly on the basis of the so-called rational idealism (*lixue*) of the Neo-Confucianism developed during the Song and Ming dynasties, that focused on the relation between human heartmind and human proprieties, Xu focused more on the specifics and the limitations of the original Confucianism in his theory. By presenting, analyzing and interpreting these fundamental features, Xu also represents the development of Confucianism in a very innovative and lucid way.

Xu's research on traditional Chinese aesthetics is presented in his work *The Spirit of Chinese Art (Zhongguo yishu jingshen)*, published in 1966 in Taiwan. Xu himself appreciated this work the most in his later years of life. He wanted to highlight the artistic, aesthetic and spiritual value of Chinese art and culture through its comparison to Western aesthetics, philosophy, art and culture. Xu was also the editor of the *Journal of Democratic Discussions (Minzhu pinglun)*, which he founded in 1950 in Hong Kong, when he already migrated to Taiwan. This journal represented a platform for intellectual currents (especially for Modern Confucians) of Xu's time.

Xu's bibliography also boasts with enormous number of essays and newspaper articles, which he wrote almost on daily basis; they mainly address Japan's and Taiwan's political, social and cultural problems of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

## 2. Xu Fuguan's Basic Contributions to Taiwanese Philosophy

In this draft paper, I will focus on Xu Fuguan's fundamental contribution to Taiwanese philosophy, that concern the sociology of culture, philosophy of body and mind, and Traditional Chinese aesthetics.

### 2.1. Xu Fuguan's interpretation of the concept of concerned consciousness (*youhuan yishi* 憂患意識)

According to Xu, the concerned consciousness was established at the moment when a person began to address his problems or concerns through his own actions and efforts. This shift happened in the transition from Shang to early Zhou dynasty, when the traditional deities lost their credibility and the people could not continue to project their worries onto comforting external powers or force majeure.

The questions raised by the original Confucianism in this context were "self cultivation and self perfection (*xiu ji, cheng ji*)," and "the rule by virtue (*de zhi, zhi ren*)," expressed in the phrase *neisheng wang*. Xu believes that the moral and political thought are the most important aspects of Confucianism (Huang 2018, 200).

According to him, the basic characteristic of the Chinese philosophic tradition is its origin in the sense of "concerned consciousness" (*youhuan yishi*), in contrast to the beginning of Western philosophic tradition, which has been marked by a sense of wonder or curiosity to know the human being and the natural world:

The Greeks held rationality to be the defining feature of human being, and the love of wisdom or contemplation the source of happiness. They took knowing as a leisurely activity pursued for the sake of itself. These characteristics of Greek culture resulted in the pursuit of objective knowledge, especially the development of metaphysics and science. Modern Western thinkers inherited this tradition. However, while the Greeks took "knowing" as a way of education, modern Western thinkers shifted knowledge to be the persistent search for power through possessing and controlling the external material world, as expressed by Francis Bacon's famous motto "knowledge is power." (Xu In: Ni 2002, 283)

According to Xu, the entire Chinese traditional culture and philosophy is based on these characteristics of the sense for *concerned consciousness* that have led the Chinese tradition towards the search for virtue and value rather than for science and understanding, and to moral practice rather than to speculation.

Xu believed that the "*concerned consciousness*" results from man's first awakening to his/her

own responsibility to the world and will eventually solve the quandary because he/she is morally autonomous (ibid. 284).

The sense of *concerned consciousness* leads to discovery, understanding and transformation of human beings themselves. It is a psychological state in which one feels responsible to overcome difficulties by virtue of one's own efforts. It originated from a moral conscience, a *concerned consciousness* about not having one's moral quality cultivated and not having learned. It is a sense of responsibility, responsiveness, discernment and self-reflexivity. What it leads to are ideas such as reverence, respect for, and the manifestation of moral character. This sense enabled humans to apprehend the purpose of human life from the perspective of cosmic creativity or religion. In contrast, the Christian idea of the sense of guilt in original sin and the Buddhist idea of suffering and impermanence both lead to a search for an escape from reality, and for a salvation in Heaven and in the tranquil realm in Nirvana respectively:

憂患與恐怖,絕望是最大不同者點,在於憂患心理的形成,乃是從當事者對吉凶成敗的深意熟考而從的遠見;在這種遠見中,主要發現了吉凶成敗與當事者行為的密切關係,及當事者在興未上所應負的責任.憂患正是有這種責任感來的要以己力突破困難而尚未突破時的心理狀態.乃人類精神開始直接對事物發生責任感的表現,也即是精神上開始有了人地自覺的表現.

The biggest difference between the sense of anxiety and the sense of dread and despair is that the sense of anxiety originates from a person's vision obtained through deep thinking and reflection about good fortune and bad fortune, success and failure. The vision entails the discovery of a close interdependence between the fortunes and the person's own conduct and the person's responsibility to his conduct. Anxiety is the psychological state of a person when his feeling of responsibility urges him to overcome certain difficulties, and he has not got through them yet. In a religious atmosphere centred on faith, a person relies on faith for salvation. He hands all the responsibilities to God and will therefore have no anxiety. His confidence is his trust in God. Only when one takes over the responsibility oneself will he have a sense of anxiety. This sense of anxiety entails a strong will and a spirit of self-reliance. (Xu 2005, 20)

In a religious, or in faith-oriented atmosphere, a human being relies on faith (or hope) for salvation. He or she postpones all the responsibilities to God and is therefore not concerned. His or hers self-confidence is in his or hers trust in God. Only when a person takes responsibility for him or herself will have a concerned consciousness. This feeling includes a strong will and a spirit of self-confidence and one's own responsibility (ibid.).

In Xu's explanation of the emergence of concerned consciousness, Xu Fuguan thoroughly explains the connection between the decay or the decline of "primitive" religions and the creation of the idea of moral self, which fall into the basic characteristics of the Chinese (especially Confucian) intellectual tradition.

Most of the Modern Confucians have critically questioned ethical systems that are based on religion of external deities; according to them, such systems represent a primitive form of social faith and belong to the earlier stages of social development, in which the majority of people has not yet established the inner strength and autonomy which could enable them to bear the transience of life, and provide them a possibility to cope with the external world. As Jana S. Rošker (2013, 198) points out, God, as an expression of a higher incomprehensible

and uncontrollable force which has the ability of making decisions about destruction and salvation, is in this context actually only a kind of consolidating consciousness, only a projection of the actual helplessness of the individual and his/her inability to deal with the facts that enable, define and limit its being.

According to this view, for Modern Confucians, people who need religion are like children, who in their immaturity cannot completely separate themselves from the paternalistic care and simultaneous restrictions embodied by their parents. In the context of ethics which is based on the idea of God, the individuals are thus all but able to live an autonomous life, i.e. to possess a truly internalized (or innate) ability to bear the ethical responsibility for their own actions and decisions (ibid.). Xu Fuguan saw the reasons for different concepts of ethics in Chinese and Western societies respectively in different ideological reactions to similar conditions of social transitions. In his view, all culture had their earliest beginning in religion, originating from the worship of God or gods. The peculiarity of Chinese culture has been that it soon came down, step by step, from heaven to the world of men, to the concrete life and behaviour of humans. During the Zhou Dynasty (1459– 249 BC), the preoccupation with earthly matters had started: the spirit of self-conscience was beginning to work and those people developed clear will and purpose. They were moving progressively from the realm of religion to the realm of ethics. Since that early stage, the Chinese people were free from metaphysical concerns. Unlike the Greeks, who at the same critical stage in history moved from religion to metaphysics, the Chinese moved from religion to ethics (Brecsciani 2001, 338).

## **2.2. Xu Fuguan's interpretation of the concept of bodily recognition (*tiren* 體認) on the basis of the unity of body and heartmind (*xin* 心) as the method of the establishment and realization of the moral and aesthetic self**

Xu's interpretation of the unity of body and mind (heartmind) within the concept of bodily recognition (*tiren*). The concept was founded and developed by Xiong Shili, but Xu Fuguan interpreted it in the context of aesthetics and phenomenology. For Xu, the complementary relationship between the body and mind is the basis of Chinese perception.

The relationship between body and mind was of course intensively discussed also by western philosophy, but the breakthrough in this area happened only in the first half of the 20th century, when Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1906-1961) developed the concept of body and subject in which the relationship between human mind, body, and the world was seen as perceptive things that are mutually intertwined and interdependent (see Merleau-Ponty, 1945: *Phénoménologie de la perception*).

Until then, Western philosophy was dominated by Cartesian dualism, with its absolute division between body and mind and comprehending the mind as the substance, capable of recognition, while the body is solely sensory perceptive apparatus incapable of comprehending because the mind is the very one by which we can perceive and thus also comprehend things.

For Xu Fuguan, the Chinese concept of bodily recognition (or embodiment) extends to the realm of aesthetics, as it represents a process in which one transcends selfish desires and utilitarian tendencies and transforms one's biological being into a moral, rational, and aesthetic one.

The traditional Chinese interconnection of body and mind (or heartmind) can already be seen in quotation from Zhuangzi:

三患莫至，身常無殃

“If one manages to escape from the three forms of concern, his body will always remain free from misfortune.”



In another important ancient Daoist work, namely in Laozi's *Daodejing* for instance, we also come across the following statement, implying the same connection:

吾所以有大患者，為吾有身，及吾無身，吾有何患？

“What makes me concerned is the fact that I own a body. Without having a body, what concerns could I have?”

Mengzi 孟子, for instance, laid stress to the fact, that the body is the beginning of all human existence, including their social worlds:

天下之本在國，國之本在家，家之本在身。

“Man always links the world, the country, and the family together when he talks; the world is based on the country and the country on families, while family is based on the body.”

A similarly fundamental role has been prescribed to the body in the Book of Rites (*Li ji*), one of the most important Confucian classics. In this work, we also often come across its relation to the mind (xin 心 hearth-mind or consciousness):

心正而後身修，身修而後家齊，家齊而後國治，國治而後天下平。

“Only after the hearth-mind has been properly settled, the body can be cultivated. The cultivation of the body makes then the regulation of the family possible, which preconditions a good government. A good government, again, is a precondition for the world peace.”

That which is in the center of Xu Fuguan's interest, however, is the relation between the concept qi 氣 in the sense of an organism (i.e. an organic body) and the concept xin 心 in the sense of consciousness or human heart-mind respectively. Although the earliest missionaries who were in China translating the philosophical works of the Chinese tradition, have mostly translated it as a form of matter, i.e. a pure physical entity (Rošker 2012, 275) it is evident that the concept qi can hardly be understood as matter in the “Western” sense.

In fact, the Neo-Confucian philosophers defined it as something which is not necessarily substantial, for air or even a vacuum (the Great void 太虛) is composed of it. Thus, it represents a concept which could be more appropriately defined as creativity, or a potential that functions in a creative way and which can appear in material sphere, but also in the abstract realm of ideas.

However, Xu places the binary category of the heart-mind on the one, and the body at the other, at the center of both, human reasoning and the cosmos. He states:

“Although the ‘heart’ mentioned in Chinese culture refers to a part of the five physiological organs, China regards the heart's functions as where life's values originate, as we regard our ears as where our sound - hearing and color - distinction originate. Mencius takes ears and eyes as ‘small bodies’ because their functions are of small significance, and heart as a ‘great body’ because its functions are great. Great or small, however, they are at one in that they are all parts of human physiological functions. Can we then talk of this physiological part as a mind of Western idealism? Does the West's idealistic mind refer to our physiological part? There may be traces left of our heart if we relate ‘heart’ in China to Western materialism, for physiology is something materialistic and the heart's functions are works of physiology, yet there would be no trace left at all of the heart if we relate it to idealism. (Xu 1975, 243)

He suggests that Chinese philosophy and the heart - mind culture should be considered as a *mesophysics* rather than metaphysics not only because of the above mentioned characteristics of Chinese philosophy, but also because of the physiological basis and implications of the

heart's functions for value (and moral) judgments. (ibid.)

Xu followed Mencius distinction between great man (*junzi* 君子) and small man (*xiaoren* 小人) which includes understanding of the body and its functions as a great (*dati* 大體) and small parts (*xiaoti* 小體) of the body in the following way:

公都子問曰：鈞是人也，或為大人，或為小人，何也？

孟子曰：從其大體為大人，從其小體為小人。

曰：鈞是人也，或從其大體，或從其小體，何也？

耳目之官不思，而蔽於物，物交物，則引之而已矣。心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。此天之所與我者，先立乎其大者，則其小者弗能奪也。此為大人而已矣 (Mengzi, Gaozi I)

The disciple Gong Du asked, "Though equally human, why are some man greater than others?"

Mengzi answered: "He who is guided by the interest of the parts of his person that are of greater importance is a great man; he who is guided by the interests of the part of his person that are of smaller importance is a small man."

The disciple asked: "Though equally human, why are some men guided one way and others guided another way?"

Mengzi replied: "The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by external things. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, it gets the right view of things; by neglecting to think, it fails to do this. These - the senses and the mind - are what Heaven has given to us. Let a man first stand fast in the supremacy of the nobler part of his constitution, and the inferior part will not be able to take it from him. It is simply this which makes the great man."

What Mencius called the great body is the reasoning performed by our bodily heart-mind which consist of the enduring quest for self - improvement and self-cultivation. This self - cultivation is regarded as a cultivation of the body. In other words, if we want to become a great man, we should think with our bodily heart-mind and avoid perceiving the world only by senses. In such way, the body becomes the manifestation of spiritual cultivation:

君子所性，仁義禮智根於心。其生色也，晬然見於面，盎於背，施於四體，四體不言而喻。(Mengzi, Jin xin shang: 21)

That which a gentleman follows as his nature, that is to say, benevolence, rightness, the rites and wisdom, is rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words."

According to Xu Fuguan, *tiren* is a retrospective and active process in which "the subject uncovers moral subjectivity from the pseudo-subjectivity of human desires and affirms it, develops it". One reveals one's own moral nature through "overcoming the self" and "reducing sensual desires." By freeing oneself from these constraints, the subject lets the original mind emerge. The way to determine what desires and inclinations need to be overcome is the same as the way to reveal moral subjectivity: bringing whatever feelings and ideas that one experience before the light of moral subjectivity in one's own heart – mind, and seeing whether one can still take the feelings and ideas at ease. (Ni 2002, 289)

Xu agrees with the Cheng brothers and with Wang Yangming that there exists the identity of the Heaven and the human heart – mind which can be directly experienced through bodily recognition. If so, the Heaven and its moral implications are not something abstract to human beings, but rather something implemented in our physiological and psychological structure. Therefore, we are able to reduce the sensations and feelings that are not following the way of

the heart – mind to achieve the unity of the Heaven as the moral instance and the human nature (ibid.).

The method of achieving such unity is for Xu Fuguan the learning for the self (*weiji zhi xue* 為己者學) which is not the learning merely to understand others but rather serves for discovering, opening, transforming and completing oneself through which one turns the biological self into moral, rational and artistic self.

### 2.3. Xu Fuguan's interpretation of the concept *qiyun shengdong* 氣韻生動

As an aesthetic concept it was first mentioned by Xie He in the preface to his *Record of the Classification of Ancient Paintings* (*Gu huapin lu* 古画品录) written in the 6th century, which is considered to be the first systematic work of the theory of Chinese painting. He appointed it as the first and most fundamental among the six laws in the theory of Chinese painting. Xu exposes in his work, *The spirit of Chinese art* written in 1966 that *qiyun shengdong* was already mentioned by Gu Kaizhi before Xie He although Gu used different terminology, namely the transfer of spirit (*chuanshen* 传神) as the main criteria (or law) of figural painting. Gu claimed that the crucial meaning in the art of painting is the artists' portrayal of the spirit of the object and its representation via the external form. Drawing the eyes for example vividly reflected the necessity of transmitting the spirit. According to Xu, the expression and representation of human spirit was a conceptual shift in Chinese aesthetics that happened in the Wei Jin period. According to Li Zehou, we can refer to the period of Wei Jin as the awakening of man or people. Unlike the rigid emphasis on old traditions, customs, mythology, which were characteristic of the Han dynasty, human being and its personality came in the foreground in Wei Jin or Six dynasties. In the art and literature of this period, the value of human life and the expression of human personality, unique human spirit were at the center of interest. In Wei Jin period, neodaosism or Xuanxue was the main philosophical current which discussed the issues like selfcultivation, relation between human being and the nature (*tianren heyi*) as well as the achieving the unity with dao were prevailing issues also in arts and aesthetics.

As an aesthetic concept, *qi* was first mentioned in the late Han dynasty by Cao Pi in relation to literature in his theoretical work *Discussions on Literature*, where he appointed that:

文以氣為主，氣之清濁有體，不可力強而致。

»qi in literature is the master, it can be dim clear and bright or dim and murky and cannot be attained by force.«

According to Xu, aesthetic *qi* is connected to the creative potential or creative force that is transformed into the artwork. For Xu, *Qi*, which in literary art and in painting expresses itself through ideas, emotions and imagination, is actually an accumulated *qi*. Therefore, the character of the artist that shapes his or hers artwork is determined by his or hers *qi*. The transmission of the spirit (*chuanshen*) is actually shown through *qi*. *Qi*, which sublimates and fuses with the spirit (*shen*), becomes an artistic or aesthetic *qi*. Thus, through the activity of *qi*, the artist's inner life becomes clearly visible, and this is one of the most interesting features of Chinese literary art theory and Chinese art in general. Therefore, the unity of *qi* and *shen* was expressed by the notion *shenqi* 神气 very often at that time. On the other hand, for Xu, *qi* also represents artists moral character (*pinge* 品格) as a lofty quality that creates the background of artwork. In the Wei Jin period, *Qi* in the context of art referred to the power of *qi* (*qili* 氣力) or the momentum of *qi* (*qishi* 氣勢). Often the character *gu* 骨 (framework or bone) was used instead of *qi* which in fact symbolized it and referred to the integral whole of *qi*. The word *yun* first appeared in the Han dynasty. We can find it in the oldest Chinese etymological dictionary *Shuowen jiezi* from the first century where it is defined as harmony, harmonious or to harmonize. In Chinese tradition, *yun* was related predominately to music.

Although at first, *yun* was used in the meaning of rhythm in music, the character *lü* 律 soon replaced it. In music, *yun* in fact means the art of mastering the modulation of the tone, which creates a surplus feeling. According to Xu Fuguan, at that time, the character for harmony (he 和) was replaced by the character *yun* 韵. Like *qi*, *yun* also has different meanings in different contexts. In phonetics (yinyunxue 音韵学) is a tone. In poetry it means rhyme. But in painting, *yun* gained multilayered connotations. According to Xu, no matter if we use *yun* in music or in literature, it contains the meaning to be in harmonious proportion or to harmonize. In poetry or in poetic essays, the meaning of the *yun* becomes more clear if we look at Liu Xie's 刘勰 definition, written in his work *The Heart Mind of Literature and the Carving of the Dragon* (*Wenxin diaolong* 文心雕龙), written just before Xie He's theory of painting, where he says: When different tones are in mutual accord, one speaks of Harmony, when the same sounds respond to one another, one speaks of *yun*. So, *yun* refers to the harmony of sounds. For Xu, *yun* dominates the manner of execution in which *qi* is expressed. One of the meanings of *yun* is for Xu a harmonious sound or the spirit of sound, but in no case, the meaning of *yun* could be understood as rhythmic in the framework of painting. Xu's interpretation of *yun* as the concept expressing the recognition of human relations (or their ethics) refers to the mapping harmony and reciprocity of sounds onto human relations. However, *yun* was also related to the spirit and was, like *qi*, described as *shenyun*. In *Shishuo Xinyu*, the anecdotes from the 6th century the meaning of *yun* referred to the elegance, purity or charm of human personality or personal manner, so for Xu, as an aesthetic concept, *yun* primarily refers to the expression of human character and spirit as revealed in the artwork. He is therefore convinced that *yun* carries the meaning of beauty (or natural charm) of a person, but only as long as it is harmonious and based on the internalization of Confucian ethics.

In Wei Jin period *qiyun* was a phrase for elegant person and referred to displaying of spirit and natural charm from a person's body posture and facial expression. Later, this concept gained much deeper and philosophical connotations which were represented especially in the landscape painting, that expressed the harmonious relation between man and nature (or *dao*). The fusion of *qi* and *yun* into one concept (or I should say, the binary category) happened in the Siw dynasties, when *Yijing* or the book of changes, especially the *yijing* was in the centre of debates. We can also understand *qiyun* in the sense of Wang Bi's binary category *benmo*, where *qi* is the root or the essence and *yun* as branches (*mo*) express how the essence is revealed outwards. When Xie He talked about *qiyun*, he always treated it in connection with artistic work, which, as such, is never determined objectively, but is established by the artist's personality. This relationship has already been addressed in *Wenxin diaolong* 文心雕龙. The artist's personality, contains *yin* 阴 and *yang* 阳, and *gang* 刚 (strong and hard) and *rou* 柔 (softness and tenderness). All four principles that derive from *Yijing* are transferred to the work of art and blend in it. *Yinyang* and *gangrou* are an expression of different states, or dynamics of *qi*. *Qi*, which Xie He speaks of, depicts the beauty of *yang* and *gang* in the artwork (*yanggang zhi mei* 阳刚之美), while *yun* shows the beauty of *yin* and *rou* (*yin rou zhi mei* 阴柔之美), where the basis of beauty of *yun* is purity (*qing* 清). According to Xu, purity refers to personality, which is morally cultivated and free of selfish desires and utilitarian intentions.

Despite the difference between the *qi* and *yun*, we need to know that there is of course a dynamic correlated relationship between them. Even though some scholars saw the *qi* as the guiding principle, in fact none of the two concepts can dominate or be primal. *Yin*, *yang*, *gang*, *rou* must co-exist within the artistic work, and none of them should be over-emphasized or neglected. A work that contains too much *qi* can result in a lack of sensibility, but if there is too much *yun*, it can lead to a lack of internal tension and power. Therefore, maintaining a harmonious balance between *qi* and *yun* is crucial in creating an artwork as well as evaluating its quality and its range.

The concept of *qiyun* primarily represents the fusion of the spirit of artist with the spirit of external world or nature that is based on the ancient Chinese concept *tianren heyi* 天人合一 (*the unity of man and nature or dao*). In this process, it is not about the presentation of the external world in the sense of mimesis, but about the representation of inner experience of the fusion of the individual with the world (nature, cosmos, dao). In this process, *yun* plays a key role, because it carries the balance (or harmony) between individual elements that exists in both, the external world and the inner world of the individual. In addition, this aesthetic concept and law of painting is also linked to the concept *shengdong*, which is less problematic and refers to on one hand, to the manifestation of *qiyun* in the work of art, and on the other, to a dynamic relationship between the author of the artwork, the artwork itself and the audience. Xu strongly rejects Herbert Read's and Laurence Binyon translation of *qiyun shengdong* as rhythmic vitality, where *yun* can be felt as rhythm through harmonious arrangement of brushstrokes. He argues that this is exclusively a matter of human imagination, subjective feeling and metaphor, and that *yun* is not rhythmic in this sense. Of course, *yun* is also linked to the unified harmony of brushstrokes, but this alone cannot create *qiyun shengdong*. In addition, Xu points out that the difference between Western and Chinese painting is that Western painters are focusing upon what is in brushstrokes themselves while Chinese painters are pursuing what is beyond them (namely the dao). In Western painting, rhythm is a surplus that is expressed through the harmony of brushstrokes (or lines). Of course, the Chinese painters are also focusing on brushstrokes, but the final goal of their creative process is that the painter forgets the lines, frees him/herself from limitations and express creativity and the freedom of his/her spirit. Therefore, according to Xu, *qiyun* (or *yun*) cannot be translated as rhythm or something rhythmical. *Qiyun shengdong* is mainly translated into English as rhythmic vitality, spiritual resonance and life motion, animation through spirit consonance, spirit resonance engendering the sense of movement and alike. As we have seen, the concept *qiyun shengdong* as an aesthetic quality, is extremely difficult to translate, because as soon as we want to assign one meaning to it, other meanings, which are also essential, remain confined. Therefore, I propose that *qiyun shengdong* could be introduced as a *terminus technicus* in Chinese aesthetics. (like dao, qi, Yinyang etc.). On the other hand, I would propose to consider the translation of *qiyun shengdong* as the harmonious dynamics of vital creativity.

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**Yeh Hai-Yen:  
The Contemporary New Confucianism of Liu Hsu-Hsian**

**Abstract**

Liu Hsu-Hsian (1934-2016) is a representative figure of Contemporary New Confucianism whose numerous academic and philosophical contributions are worthy of our reflection, as they provide an open-minded and diversified look at modern Chinese thought.

In his early years, Dr. Liu focused in cultural philosophy, integrating the strict philosophical thought process of western philosophy with the humanistic and aesthetic emphasis of oriental cultures. He extended that to find a thread in traditional Confucianism that would tie in with a contemporary image of a “good Confucian,” through the reconstruction of Zhu Zi and Huang Zong-Xi’s theory of “mind.”

He followed this up by taking part in the Global Ethics dialogue in which he contributed a deeper understanding of Confucian ethics with a worldwide audience. Dr. Liu’s Contemporary New Confucianism proceeds from theory to practice, from the individual to the collective, and from the self to the other in developing a broad, systematic, and integrated basis for comparative philosophy.

**Nicolas N. Testerman:  
Political Theology and Political Metaphysics in Sinophone Philosophy: Chen Lifu's  
Invention of the Modern Sovereign**

**Abstract**

Chen Lifu (陳立夫) became Chiang Kai-shek's loyal philosopher, ideological propagandist and bureaucrat focused on modernizing the party's administration following the violent purge of leftists from the KMT in 1927. As chief architect of the KMT's political metaphysics and ethical praxis since Sun Yat-sen, Chen's philosophical contributions to political modernity and theories of sovereignty are substantial, yet he is seldom seen as a philosopher and rarely recognized as a Taiwanese philosopher. There is reason for this oversight as Chen retreated from political life for more than fifteen years in 1950 by exiling himself to New Jersey farmland in the United States. He did not relocate to Taiwan, this time as a settler colonist, until 1966 to assist Chiang in implementing the "Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement". Moreover, even though Chen lived in Taiwan until his death in 2001, his role as philosophical ideologue became largely administrative allowing him to focus on cultural, educational and scientific initiatives. This has tended to overshadow Chen's earlier role as miner of China's cultural essence which he used to develop a political metaphysical system justifying Chiang's position as sovereign and the KMT's fusing of the Confucian conceptual tradition to modern fascism. A contemporary of well-known New Confucian philosophers, Chen is also excluded from this group despite articulating the onto-political myth of cultural essence New Confucian philosophers repeatedly echo in Taiwan such as Mou Zongsan, Fang Dongmei and Wu Kang. By engaging with the emerging field of Sinophone Studies and Taiwanese literary modernism this paper argues for recognizing Chen Lifu as: 1) a New Confucian Philosopher; 2) a Sinophone philosopher; and 3) a vitalist philosopher responsible for constructing a political metaphysics justifying autocratic rule, hierarchy and violence akin to Carl Schmitt, a member of the Nazi party, who contributed greatly to our understanding of the modern state, sovereignty and political theology. Addressing this dark preservation of the Confucian tradition, as well as the re-invention of its autocratic and oppressive tendencies within a modern conception of party politics and governance must be deconstructed before the violent contradictions of modern sovereignty in Taiwanese philosophy can be overcome.





## **ROUND TABLE A**

### **Discourses on Politics of Taiwan and about Taiwan**

Chair and Discussant:

Zlatko Šabič, University of Ljubljana and East Asia Resource Library (EARL)

## **ROUND TABLE B**

### **Taiwanese Philosophy in the Balkan Region**

Chair and Discussant:

Peng Guoxiang, Zhejiang University, P.R. China, Wissenschaftskollege zu Berlin, Germany



**Friday, October 18, 13:30 –15:30**

**Two Parallel Round Tables: Round Table A**

**Nina Pejič:**

**Discourse surrounding the cross-strait relations and the rise of the People's Republic of China in international relations**

**Abstract**

The economic and political rise of People's Republic of China (PRC) in international relations has triggered a new wave of academic discussions on the implications of such rise both in its relations with the neighbours, as well as in its relations with other main actors in the international community. The rise of PRC is a source of fascination as well as uncertainties for the academic community: how to understand its new role in the international system? What to expect in terms of changes in the international governance? As PRC becomes a more active member of the international system, the prevailing answers to these questions will shape public opinion to PRC's increased involvement in international relations. What are therefore the lead perceptions on the rise of PRC among the academic community and what frameworks do the scientists use to determine the implications of its ascending power?

**Saša Istenič Kotar:**

**China-Taiwan Cross-Strait Relations: Protecting the Status Quo**

**Abstract**

The interaction between the governments of the Republic of China (Taiwan, ROC) and the People's Republic of China (China, PRC) has since 1949 undergone significant changes and a number of possible future developments can either hasten or stall the resolution of Taiwan's future status. The variables engaged in cross-Strait interaction come from a highly complex network of actors from both internal and external environment which make the current status quo in the Taiwan Strait extremely vulnerable. China's rise has already altered the balance of power at the Taiwan Strait and between China and the United States. Accordingly, it is going to be increasingly difficult for the Taiwanese government to maintain the current state of affairs in cross-Strait relations. As China's economic, military and diplomatic leverage over Taiwan will only grow stronger, many observers believe, that Beijing will only more likely be tempted to accelerate the progress toward national unification even by military means. How can Taiwan protect its current status quo as a de facto independent country and prevent such scenario to happen?

**Cha, Jung-Mi:**  
**“Solitary Technological Power in Cyber Space”: Taiwan’s Cyber Security Strategy for Self-Reliance and Industry development**

**Abstract**

While the cyber security has been becoming the one of main arenas for the competition between the great powers, the cyber security can be a matter of survival for many small and medium-sized nations. With being a test ground of cyber attacks, Taiwan has become an early bird in making cyber security policy, constructing the integrated government system and developing the technology for cyber security. ‘Cyber security is National security,’ this slogan of Tsai Ying-wen administration on the cyber security shows the Taiwan’s desperateness on defending cyber space. Taiwan has been a strong middle power on the government system, technology, and industry for cyber security. Taiwan can be the good case for the comparative studies on the cyber security strategies of small-middle power states, but it has not gotten much attentions because of its unique international status based on the China's “One China Policy.” This study investigates Taiwan’s unique cyber security strategies which are much more focusing on the self-reliance, the technological development and government organizational readiness, which is different from the cyber security strategies of most small and middle power states which have strong tendency to pursue multilateral solution and the role of “brokerage” as a middle power.

**Key Words:** Cyber Security, Taiwan, Middle Power, Self Reliance, Industry

**I. Introduction**

Cyber security is the global issue which is getting more attentions, but the threat perception and political attention toward cyber security vary from country to country. Taiwan is the frontline in an emerging global battle for cyberspace, according to elite hackers in the island’s IT industry, who say it has become a rehearsal area for the Chinese cyber attacks.<sup>1</sup> The number of “high-impact incidents” in Taiwan-which include targeted attacks aimed at stealing sensitive government data and personal information-tripled from 4 in 2015 to 12 in 2017, according to Chien Hung-wei, director-general of the cyber security department under the Executive Yuan, Taiwan’s cabinet.<sup>2</sup> Taiwan is becoming the testing ground and serious victim of the hacker’s cyber attacks. Therefore, Taiwan’s awareness and securitization on cyber security issues are much stronger than the others.

With being a test ground of cyber attacks, Taiwan has become an early bird in making cyber security policy and constructing the integrated government system for cyber security. Taiwan government officially passed the ‘Developing a National Information and Communication Infrastructure Security Mechanism Plan 2001-2004’, and formed the ‘National Information and Communication Security Task force(NICST)’ in January 2001. Shortly thereafter the ‘Information and Communication Security Technology Center(ICST)’ was set up as the technical unit for NICST in March 2001.<sup>3</sup> Since 2001, Taiwan government has published ‘National Cyber Security Strategy’ every five year and has developed government organization for managing it.

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<sup>1</sup> Reuters. “Taiwan a ‘testing ground’ for Chinese Cyber Army” July. 19, 2013.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/net-us-taiwan-cyber-idUSBRE96H1C120130719>

<sup>2</sup> Financial Times. “Taiwan hit by jump in cyber attacks from China.” June 25, 2018.

<https://www.ft.com/content/8e5b26c0-75c5-11e8-a8c4-408cfba4327c>

<sup>3</sup> National Center for Cyber Security Technology. “About NCCST”

<https://www.nccst.nat.gov.tw/About?lang=en>

As there has been growing number of literatures on cyber security, the case studies and comparative studies on the small and medium states' cyber security policy are getting more published.<sup>4</sup> Especially small or medium states which play the constructive role in making the norm building or initiating the cooperative action for cyber security are mostly focused. Even if Taiwan is a first runner and can be a good case for middle power study on cyber security policy and government organization, but it has not gotten much attentions because of its unique political status. Taiwan is not accepted as a sovereign country internationally because of China's "one China" principle even if it has diplomatic relations with 16 out of 193 United Nations member states. While Taiwan is self-governed and de facto independent, it has never formally declared independence from the mainland.<sup>5</sup> In this reality, studies on Taiwan's cyber security are very limited even if it has value for studying on small or medium states' role in cyber security arena.

Therefore, this study focuses on the cyber security strategy and policy of Taiwan. This study emphasizes that cyber security is much highly securitized in Taiwan. The Taiwan president Tsai's "Cyber Security is National Security" policy represents the current Taiwan government's perception and policy priority for cyber security. This study also focuses on the strategy of Taiwan's cyber security to upgrade its technological capacity and industry development. Especially Taiwan's unique strategies which are much more focusing on the self-reliance, the technological development and government organizational readiness are investigated. It is different from the facts that cyber security strategies of the small and medium sized states mostly have strong tendency to pursue multilateral solution and the role of "brokerage" as a middle power. These uniqueness of Taiwan's cyber security strategy can be explained due to the politically and internationally unique status which Taiwan has. Based on these, this study investigates the concrete vision, policy, law and government organization of Taiwan's cyber security policy. This study on Taiwan's cyber security strategy focusing on self-reliance can be regarded as one of small-medium sized states' cyber security model, especially having the political or international limitation. Because the small-medium states' cyber security strategies can be diverse according to their political and international situations, it is important to outline which types of cyber strategies are used by small-medium states for upgrading cyber security capacity. In this context, this study on Taiwan cyber security strategy can be valuable for enlarging the scope of small-medium states cyber security studies.

## II. Securitization of Cyber space in Taiwan

### 1. Antagonistic Relationships and High Securitization of Cyber Threat

Copen Hagen School has dealt with cyber security as an example of an attempted securitization-Pentagon securitizing the catastrophic impact of hacking on critical infrastructure- that is ruled out on the grounds that it has "no cascading effects on other security issues."<sup>6</sup> Security discourses and strategies can be articulated through the process of securitization which the policy decision makers define the threats and set the targets to be protected. Policy decision makers who have antagonistic relations tend to have more threat

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<sup>4</sup> Kim, Sang-Bae. 2014. "Cyber Security and Middle power Diplomacy : A Network Perspective." *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12 (2). 323-352.; Joe Burton, 2013, "Small states and cyber security : The case of New Zealand" *Political Science* 65(2). 216-238; Oleksandr V. Potii, Oleksandr V. Korneyko, and Yrii I. Gorbenko, 2015. "Cybersecurity In Ukraine: Problems and Perspectives." *Information & Security* 32 (1). 1-25.; Michael Kouremetis. 2015. "An Analysis of Estonia's Cyber Security Strategy, Policy and Capabilities (Case Study)." *European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security*; Reading : 404-412.; Matthew Crandall & Collin Allan. 2015. "Small States and Big Ideas: Estonia's Battle for Cybersecurity Norms." *Contemporary Security Policy* 36:2, 346-368.

<sup>5</sup> BBC. "Xi Jinping says Taiwan 'must and will be' reunited with China." 2 Jan., 2019.

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174>

<sup>6</sup> Hansen, L., & Nissenbaum, H. 2009. "Digital disaster, cyber security, and the Copenhagen School." *International Studies Quarterly* 53, 1156.

perception and there is more possibility for them to prioritize the cyber security as the national security. A cybersecurity strategy would inevitably make decisions based on circumstances in both the virtual and physical worlds.<sup>7</sup> The foreign relations which a state have in the real world tend to be influential in the relations on cyber space. One has antagonistic relationship can have more concerns and threat perceptions about the cyber conflict than those who don't. Therefore, responding to those strong threat perceptions, policy makers are likely to put the cyber security in policy priority. Securitization of cyber space in the states which have antagonistic relations and have cyber attacks from that antagonist can be stronger.

The representative state of high securitization on cyberspace with antagonistic relations is the U.S. which has kept concerned about cyber attacks from China. Besides great power rivalry, small or middle states has antagonistic relations are more active on the securitization of cyber threat such as Estonia, Ukraine and South Korea. The problem of ensuring cybersecurity in Ukraine has become urgent, in particular due to Russia's aggressive policy. Russia was conducting cyber warfare operations against Ukraine as part of its military incursion into Crimea.<sup>8</sup> Sovereignty and independence are directly related to the cyber security issues in small states. Small states such as Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine and Taiwan which have strong securitization of cyber space are likely to get the frequent cyber attacks and have coercive antagonistic power.<sup>9</sup> Small and Middle power states have antagonistic relationship can have more strong threat perception on cyber space. The cyber threat in these states are likely to be much more securitized and politicalized. In 2007, the Estonian government was the target of cyberattacks. Distributed denial of service attacks, originating from Russia, targeted the websites of the Estonian president, parliament, ministries, banks, and news outlets.<sup>10</sup> The Estonia as the part of former Soviet Union has always had security concerns toward Russia. South Korea also is typical middle power which has high threat perceptions toward the frequent cyber attacks from North Korea which has long been antagonist of South Korea. Ransomware attacks on South Korea exceeded 10,000 in the past three years.<sup>11</sup> South Korea tends to build up countermeasures, organizations, and institutions that focus on the 'national security' perspective due to North Korea's cyber threats, and various cyber threat issues tend to converge on cyber terrorism issues for national security.<sup>12</sup> The states which have had serious cyber attacks from antagonists tend to have more threat perception and stronger securitization on cyber space. Antagonistic relations, especially with greater power can strengthen the threat perception on the cyber attacks from antagonistic states. If the states has antagonistic relations with the great power, they can feel the threat perception about their sovereignty and territory relating to the cyber attacks by the antagonistic great power.

The special political situation between Taiwan and China, and their often antagonistic relationship, has encouraged the growth of malicious activities between them.<sup>13</sup> Having the antagonistic or tense relations with China, Taiwan's threat perception and securitization on cyber space can be stronger. "Cyber Security is Nation Security." Since taking office in May 2016, President Tsai Ing-wen raised the importance of cyber security. This discourse

<sup>7</sup> Hon-Min Yau. 2018. "Explaining Taiwan's Cybersecurity Policy Prior to 2016: Effects of Norms and Identities." *Issues and Studies* 54 (2), 14.

<sup>8</sup> Oleksandr V. Potii, Oleksandr V. Korneyko, Yrii I. Gorbenko, 2015. "Cybersecurity In Ukraine: Problems and Perspectives." *Information & Security* 32 (1). 2.

<sup>9</sup> Brandon Valeriano; Ryan C Maness. 2014. "The dynamics of cyber conflict between rival antagonists, 2001–11" *Journal of Peace Research* 51 (3), 347-360.

<sup>10</sup> Matthew Crandall & Collin Allan. 2015. "Small States and Big Ideas: Estonia's Battle for Cybersecurity Norms." *Contemporary Security Policy* 36:2, 351.

<sup>11</sup> Electronic News, "Ransomware attacks over 1million case in three years,"(2018/02/06). <http://www.etnews.com/20180206000358>

<sup>12</sup> Jung, Yong-Ae 2017. "Cyber threat and securitization, and active cyber peace." *Peace Studies* 18 (3): 106.

<sup>13</sup> Yao-Chung Chang. 2011. "Cyber Conflict between Taiwan and China." *Strategic Insights* 10 (1). 27.

represents the current Taiwan government's perception and policy direction for cyber security.

## **2. Unique Discourse and Securitization of Cyber Threat in Taiwan**

Taiwan has somewhat different perception and attitude toward cyber threat because of their unique political and international status. Taiwan is not a member of UN based on the China's "One China Policy." The number of countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan continues to dwindle, just 18 countries remained. With growing diplomatic isolations, Taiwan has getting more threat perception on the growing cyber attacks, losing political autonomy.

### **1) Political Coercion and Politicalization of Cyber Security**

Copenhagen School called the securitization of cyber space 'politicalization.' This means that securitization process has political. Taiwanese threat perceptions and securitization on the cyber space are pretty much related with the political stance of the administration toward China and Sino-Taiwan relations in reality. China can be treated by Taiwan as either an external military threat or an internal political adversary, and this approach could encompass both perspectives without overemphasizing a single aspect.<sup>14</sup> These perception toward China also applied to the cyber space. Cyber attacks from China can be treated by Taiwan as either a security threat and political coercion. In this context, Taiwanese security threats on the cyber attacks are related the political system and autonomy. The Taiwan's perceptions and securitizations on cyber threat has been influenced by the political relations between China and Taiwan.

The first widely reported "Cyber War" in the world occurred between China and Taiwan in 1999 when Taiwan's president Lee Teng-hui infuriated Beijing by suggesting the two countries accept state-to-state relations.<sup>15</sup> Taiwan's policy makers also have securitized the cyber threat since late 1990's, but securitization process has gone differently based on ruling party's political posture. Yau(2018) argues that the Taiwanese government has been relatively slow to exploit this advantage for national-defense purposes. Despite Taiwan's feeling threatened by cyber threats from China, if cyberspace does provide the above asymmetric advantage, why did Taiwan, being technologically capable, only establish such a cyber-warfare unit 19 years after the first well-known cyberattacks in 1999.<sup>16</sup> China-Taiwan relations were relatively good from 2008 to 2016 under Taiwan's then-president, Ma Ying-jeou, who regularly implied that Taiwan was part of China—albeit in some ambiguous and to-be-determined way. Cyber threat were also relatively loosened and less securitized compared to before. But with the inauguration of President Tsai Ing-wen, Beijing has expressed increasing frustration with what it sees as Taiwan quietly inching toward independence.<sup>17</sup> The Chinese Communist party, which considers Taiwan as part of its territory, has ratcheted up coercive measures against the government in Taipei since the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her Democratic Progressive party, which replaced the more pro-China Kuomintang. The rise in cyber warfare was part of a hardening of Beijing's approach to Taiwan.<sup>18</sup> The Department of Cyber Security(DCS) of Taiwan revealed that there were 288

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<sup>14</sup> Katzenstein, P. J. (Ed.). (1996). *The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 14. (Hon-Min Yau. 2018. "Explaining Taiwan's Cybersecurity Policy Prior to 2016: Effects of Norms and Identities." *Issues and Studies* 54 (2), 3

<sup>15</sup> The Sydney Morning Herald. "Taiwan a canary in the coalmine of cyber warfare." 8 December, 2014. <https://www.smh.com.au/technology/taiwan-a-canary-in-the-coalmine-of-cyber-warfare-20141205-120v73.html>

<sup>16</sup> Hon-Min Yau. 2018. "Explaining Taiwan's Cybersecurity Policy Prior to 2016: Effects of Norms and Identities." *Issues and Studies* 54 (2), 2.

<sup>17</sup> Derek Grossman, "Beijing's Threats Against Taiwan Are Deadly Serious," RAND, May 22, 2018. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2018/05/beijings-threats-against-taiwan-are-deadly-serious.html>

<sup>18</sup> Financial Times. "Taiwan hit by jump in cyber attacks from China." June 25, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/8e5b26c0-75c5-11e8-a8c4-408cfba4327c>



successful attacks from Beijing's state-sponsored apparatus and affiliated groups in 2017.<sup>19</sup> Taiwan have seen an increase in Chinese-led cyberattacks against Taiwan, with a prominent example being the hacking of ruling Democratic Progressive Party's web site on July 3 of 2018.<sup>20</sup> Securitization of the cyber space has been dramatically strengthened after the electoral victory of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) in the January 2016 elections. Chinese cyber attacks on Taiwan has been regarded as a motivation of political coercion. The 2016 election results can be led to the more tension between the China and Taiwan over political autonomy, with having more threat perception toward the China's political intervention by the cyber attacks. Therefore, how much Taiwan has concerned and securitized about the China's cyber attacks has been very much influenced by the Taiwan presidents' political attitudes on independent policy and China-Taiwan relationship.

### < Cyber Security Policy of the Taiwan Administration >

Term	President	Party	Cyber security Issues & Policy
1996-2000	Lee Teng-Hui	Kuomintang	cyber attacks (1999)
2000-2008	Chen Shui-Bien	Democratic Progressive Party	'Cyber Security Plan 2001-2004/ 2005-2008' NICST/ NCCST establishment(2001)
2008-2016	Ma Ying-Jeou	Kuomintang	'Cyber Security Plan 2009-2012/ 2013-2016'
2016-	Tsai Ing-Wen	Democratic Progressive party	"Cyber security is National Security" 'Cyber Security Plan 2017-2020' Dep. of Cyber Security establishment (2016) TCEFCCommand establishment (2017) Cyber security Management Law (2018)

## 2) Threat Perception on the Sovereignty and Territorial Security

Taiwan has unique political and international status and cyber attacks on their government and critical infrastructure can be regarded as a sovereignty threat and territorial threat. Most cyber attacks are from China which has more assertive attitude on the "One China Policy." Therefore threat perceptions and securitization on cyber attacks can be related to the national sovereignty. In 1999 President Lee declared that the relations between Taiwan and China were of state-to-state nature, or at least a "special" state-to-state relationship existed. Responding to that declaration, nationalistic Chinese hackers cracked into Taiwan's government websites to show their anger. The Administrative Yuan, the Control Yuan, the National Assembly, and Presidential Executive Office were replaced with an image of the Chinese five-star flag and with political statements such as "Taiwan is an indivisible part of China."<sup>21</sup> Cyber attacks from the China has become more assertive when the pro-independence movement or policy are more expanded in Taiwan,

Since 1999, Taiwan has suffered with a lot of cyber attacks related to the political coercion

<sup>19</sup> Asia Times. "Taiwanese under siege from blitz of Chinese cyber attacks." April 6, 2018.  
<http://www.atimes.com/article/taiwanese-siege-blitz-chinese-cyberattacks/>

<sup>20</sup> Taiwan Times. "China to escalate Taiwan cyberattacks ahead of local elections," Sep 20, 2018.  
<https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3534081>

<sup>21</sup> Yao-Chung Chang. 2011. "Cyber Conflict between Taiwan and China." Strategic Insights 10 (1). 28.

which is revoke to the Taiwanese pro-independent act.<sup>22</sup> After the the inauguration of Tsai administration which is the Democratic Progressive Party, pro-independent in 2016, China has put more pressure to assert its sovereignty over Taiwan. In a speech marking 40 years since the start of improving ties, Chinese President Xi Jinping has urged the people of Taiwan to accept it "must and will be" reunited with China. He also warned that China reserved the right to use force.<sup>23</sup> The Chinese Communist party, which considers Taiwan as part of its territory, has ratcheted up coercive measures against the government in Taipei since the 2016 election.<sup>24</sup> In this context, securitization of cyber threat in Taiwan is not just politicalization but related to the a sovereignty and territorial security concerns in reality.

### 3) Identity as the ‘Test-bed’ and Victimization of Cyber Attacks

Taiwan has threat perception on its victimization situation as a test bed for a various kind of cyber attacks. Taiwan has been regarded as the test-bed for cyber attacks domestically and internationally.<sup>25</sup> Taiwan has been ranked as one of top targets of advanced cyber attacks in the world, mainly state-initiated or state sponsored Advanced Persistent Threats, or APTs.<sup>26</sup> China, along with Russia and North Korea, may be increasingly testing out cyber-hacking techniques in Taiwan before using them against the US and other foreign powers, Taipei said. The tests involve malware tools mostly used to target government agencies, including Taiwan's foreign and economy ministries, said Mr Howard Jyan, director-general of its cyber-security department.<sup>27</sup> Taiwan has also been a test-bed for political intervention through cyber attacks. China, North Korea, and Russia may use Taiwan's local elections of 2018 as a testing ground for interference against Western democracies, head of the Executive Yuan's Department of Cyber Security, Howard Jyan(簡宏偉) told.<sup>28</sup> Taiwanese hacker-turned-entrepreneur Jeffery Chiu has suggested that “Taiwan is the island of APT.” Given reports of malware being tested on Taiwanese networks before being deployed worldwide, Taiwan’s government and private sector have leveraged the idea that Taiwan is a testing ground for malware and cyber attack to advance their own interests.<sup>29</sup> “Until the 2020 presidential elections Taiwan will become a global hotspot for cyber attacks and fake news," said a spokesperson for President Tsai.<sup>30</sup>

In 2013, Taiwan's National Security Bureau(NSB) believes that China's cyber army has more than 100,000 people working for it, with a budget of more than \$2.71 million a year. The NSB says the Chinese military has shifted its cyber attack focus from government institutions to think tanks, technology businesses, Internet node facilities, cloud storage and traffic signal

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<sup>22</sup> In 2002, a website constructed by the “Taiwan Tea Party”, which supports the independence of Taiwan, suffered consistent and serious DDoS(Chang 2011, 28)

<sup>23</sup> BBC. “Xi Jinping says Taiwan 'must and will be' reunited with China.” 2 Jan. 2019. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174>

<sup>24</sup> Financial Times. “Taiwan hit by jump in cyber attacks from China.” June 25, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/8e5b26c0-75c5-11e8-a8c4-408cfba4327c>

<sup>25</sup> NBC News, “For hackers in China’s cyber army, Taiwan is a test target,” July 19, 2013. <https://www.nbcnews.com/technology/hackers-chinas-cyber-army-taiwan-test-target-6C10679979>; Infosecurity, “China Uses Taiwan as Test-Bed for US Cyber-Espionage Attacks,” July 23, 2013. <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/report-china-uses-taiwan-as-test-bed-for-us-cyber/>

<sup>26</sup> The Jamestown Foundation. “Taiwan’s Emerging Push for “Cyber Autonomy.” July 25, 2018. <https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-emerging-push-for-cyber-autonomy-2/>

<sup>27</sup> The Straits Times, “Taiwan expects more Chinese cyber attacks as polls near,” Sep 21, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-expects-more-chinese-cyber-attacks-as-polls-near>

<sup>28</sup> Taiwan Times, “China to escalate Taiwan cyberattacks ahead of local elections,” Sep. 20, 2018. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3534081>

<sup>29</sup> The Diplomat, “Chinese Hacking Against Taiwan: A Blessing for the United States?,” January 23, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinese-hacking-against-taiwan-a-blessing-for-the-united-states/>

<sup>30</sup> Taiwan Times, “China to escalate Taiwan cyberattacks ahead of local elections,” Sep. 20, 2018. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3534081>

control systems.<sup>31</sup> Cyber attacks from China is getting more severe. The Department of Cybersecurity of Taiwan's Executive Yuan revealed that China's "internet army" accounted for 288 successful attacks against Taiwan's government agencies in 2017. In March of 2018, the Director of Taiwan's National Security Agency admitted to the Legislative Yuan that China's cyber penetration of Taiwan's networks is "worse than before."<sup>32</sup> Taiwan's geostrategical and political uniqueness have given space for hackers test-bed.

### III. Cyber security Strategy of Small-Middle Powers and Taiwan

#### 1. The Strategy of Small and Middle Power in Cyber security

How does small or middle power states make the cyber security strategy responding to cyber attacks on their government and core infrastructures? What kinds of strategy are the effective options for the small and middle power? Cyber security strategies of small and middle power states can be various based on their political, economic, and technological situations. With the rise of attentions on the cyber security, the cyber security strategies of the small or middle power states are getting more attentions even if the concept and role of small and middle power states are still controversial. While realists focus on state size and capacity, liberals emphasize the soft power such as perceptions and constructive role in the institution. Middle powers are states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system.<sup>33</sup> Koehane(1969) suggests that a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution.<sup>34</sup> The term of small states also has no consensus on how to define the concept of small states. Still "size", as a quantitative measure-geographic, demographic and economic size, has been considered important element in framing an operational concept of "small states." However, most of the scholars find necessary to employ rational factors which are based on underlying the notion that the essence of "smallness" is either lack of influence on the environment, or lack of immunity against influence from it, or both.<sup>35</sup> But, some small states also seek to establish rules and transparency within international institutions and encourage cooperative approaches to international security issues.<sup>36</sup> Here, the 'small power' is a term used in the field of international relations to describe the space that lies between small states and great powers. Small powers command influence and international recognition and whilst they may not be giants, they are nevertheless 'states that matter.'<sup>37</sup> Small power can be used differently from small states based on the its will and capacity to play a influential role in the multilateral institutions.

The strategies of small and middle power states on cyber security can be categorized into two major types. One is the multilateral diplomatic approach and pursuing the role of initiating or mediate the institutional and normative action for cyber security. This is the typical and major type of small and middle power states on cyber security strategy. The other is a little bit deviant type, pursuing the self-reliance and sometimes bilateral cooperation and

<sup>31</sup> eSecurity Planet, "Taiwan Says China's Cyber Army Now Numbers 100,000," May 1, 2013.

<https://www.esecurityplanet.com/hackers/taiwan-says-chinas-cyber-army-now-numbers-100000.html>

<sup>32</sup> JamesTown. "Taiwan's Emerging Push for "Cyber Autonomy."" July 25, 2018.

<https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-emerging-push-for-cyber-autonomy-2/>

<sup>33</sup> Eduard Jordaan, 2003, "The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers." *South African Journal of Political Studies* 30(1), 165.

<sup>34</sup> Robert O. Keohane, 1969. "Lilliputians' Dilemma: Small States in International Politics," *International Organization* 23:2. 296.

<sup>35</sup> Marleku, Alfred. 2013. "Small states foreign policy: The case of Kosovo." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 4:2. 289.

<sup>36</sup> Joe Burton, 2013. "Small states and cyber security : The case of New Zealand" *Political Science* 65(2). 219.

<sup>37</sup> Asle Toje. 2011. "The European Union as a Small Power." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49 (1). 46.

building up technological capacity.

Most small and middle powers tend to pursue the multilateral diplomatic approach and play a role as a mediating or facilitating cooperation and norm building on cyber space. A lot of case studies has published based on the small and middle power framework focused on the certain issues like terrorism, environment, and regionalism etc.<sup>38</sup> We can notice that both of middle power and small power are tend to use the multilateral approach to solve the security issues. Soft power, for example, which is the power of persuasion and attraction, can be effectively employed by small states.<sup>39</sup> Small states have a natural interest in promoting and developing international norms in international security, broadly defined as acceptable standards of behaviour.<sup>40</sup> This is also case for the middle power. Cyber security is the rising topic for the studies on the small and middle power states' role in international security.

Small and middle power states tend to pursue the constructive role in global norm. Estonia and New Zealand can be regarded as small power states which are focusing on the norm building for cyber security. These states seek to establish rules and transparency within international institutions and encourage cooperative approaches to international security issues. Estonia can be categorized as a typical small power in the cyber security issues, attempting at establishing cybersecurity norms. Estonia focused on digitalization as priorities as a EU member and attained 'Digital Presidency' and succeeded in setting the EU agenda accordingly. As a NATO member, Estonia has advantages and disadvantages in attempting to build norms. NATO has provided Estonia with a platform to advocate for the types of norms Estonia is interested in building.<sup>41</sup> Ukraine has also cyber security strategy focusing on the full participation of Ukraine in the European and regional systems ensure cyber security.<sup>42</sup> Kim(2014) pays attention to the middle power's strategic roles of "brokerage" and analyzes South Korea as a middle power.<sup>43</sup>

## **2. Taiwan's National Strategy for Cyber Security**

### **Toward Advanced Government System and Technological Superiority**

Taiwan has limited political and international recognition with having advanced technology and economy. Taiwan seems to take a deviated strategy on cyber security which is different from the case of other small and middle powers who are more concentrating on the multilateral approach and norm building. Taiwan are more focusing on the self reliance, self defense and development of technological power. For cyber security strategy, Taiwan knows about these unique environment. Taiwanese government's official report on Taiwan's cyber security also said that "due to our unique political and economic situations and the trend of global cyber security threats, we continuously facilitate and implement overall national cyber security protection to respond to external challenges with a sense of urgency and necessity." Taiwan National Security Council Member Lee Der-tsai listed promoting "defense-based autonomous cybersecurity research" as one of the government's strategic goals at the march 2017 Taiwan Cyber Security Summit. He compared Taiwan's situation with that of Israel,

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<sup>38</sup> Kurmashev, Aidar; Akhmedyanova, Dana; Zholdasbekova, Akbota; Sadri, Houman. 2018. "Kazakhstan's Middle Power Response to Terrorism." *Insight Turkey*; Ankara 20 (4). 111-128; Watson, Iain. 2014. "Environmental Security and New Middle Powers: The Case of South Korea." *Asian security* 10 (1). 70-95; Thomas Wilkins. 2016. "Australia and middle power approaches to Asia Pacific regionalism." *Journal Australian Journal of Political Science* 52 (1). 110-125.

<sup>39</sup> Joe Burton, 2013. "Small states and cyber security : The case of New Zealand" *Political Science* 65(2). 219.

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.* 220,

<sup>41</sup> Matthew Crandall & Collin Allan. 2015. "Small States and Big Ideas: Estonia's Battle for Cybersecurity Norms." *Contemporary Security Policy* 36:2, 347.

<sup>42</sup> Oleksandr V. Potii, Oleksandr V. Korneyko, Yrii I. Gorbenko, 2015. "Cybersecurity In Ukraine: Problems and Perspectives." *Information & Security* 32 (1). 7.

<sup>43</sup> Kim, Sang-Bae. 2014. "Cyber Security and Middle power Diplomacy : A Network Perspective." *The Korean Journal of International Studies* 12 (2). 323-352.

another victim of constant cyber attacks that promotes its domestic cybersecurity industry through government policy, including subsidies and extensive cooperation between the private cybersecurity sector and military.<sup>44</sup>

The cyber security strategy of Taiwan having limited international recognition and developed technology can be similar to that of Israel, more focusing on self reliance, technology, defense industry and bilateral relations. In Taiwan, there have been discussion on whether Taiwan can adopt the Israel Model as a cyber security strategy. In late 2016, the Taiwanese technology magazine ran a series of articles extolling the virtues of Israel's cyber security industry and suggesting lessons for developing a homegrown cyber industry that could be applied to Taiwan. In particular, the articles honed in on the importance of the Israeli Defense Force's Unit 8200 signal intelligence unit as a cyber vanguard, a start-up incubator nurturing new generations of cyber companies and hackers in addition to fulfilling its role as an elite military unit.<sup>45</sup> Taiwan and Israel are geographically small and politically in unique status. Both are having a lot of cyber threats from hostile neighbours. Both have strong high-tech industry sectors and substantial human capital in the technology space. Therefore, Taiwan and Israel can share about the cyber security strategy focusing on technology an industry. But still there are differences between twos. Taiwan are more facilitating the civil industry sector, while Israel is more focusing on the military technology which can lead to the development to the private cyber security industry. Taiwan's government has been utilizing the nation's human hacker capital to facilitate the cyber security industry and national capacity.

Taiwan government officially passed the 'Developing a National Information and Communication Infrastructure Security Mechanism Plan 2001-2004.' Since 2001 Taiwanese government has published the cyber security plan every four year. With these official report Taiwan's cyber security strategies can be divided into two main focuses – the development of cyber security technology and industries, the enhancement of cyber security governance model. Diplomatic approach or norm building which are the main focuses of cyber security strategies in the most small and middle powers are not main focuses in the Taiwan's cyber security strategy. Because of unique political situation, Taiwan is hard to pursue the multilateral approach or international cooperation as options for cyber security.

#### < Taiwan's Cyber Security Strategies and Main Task ><sup>46</sup>

Goals	Constructing a national united defense system in cyber security Upgrading the overall protection mechanism in cyber security Enhancing the development of self-managed industries in cyber security			
Strategies	Complete the cyber security infrastructure	Construct united defense system in cyber security	Increase the self-development energy of cyber security	Nurture excellent talents in the field of cyber security
Tactical Approaches	regulation/standards	protection of critical infra	Promote the emerging cyber security industries	the manpower supply of cyber security talents

<sup>44</sup> China Brief. "Taiwan's Emerging Push for "Cyber Autonomy"." James Town Foundation. Jul, 25, 2018. <https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-emerging-push-for-cyber-autonomy-2/>

<sup>45</sup> Taiwan Insight. "Developing Taiwan's Cybersecurity Industry: Is Israel a Good Model." 12 November 2018. <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/11/12/developing-taiwans-cybersecurity-industry-is-israel-a-good-model/>

<sup>46</sup> 『National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan(2017-2020)』, 23.

	resilience	cross-regional united defense system	divert cyber security industries to upgrade	Improve the professional capabilities of government cyber security personnel
	government's cyber security governance model	recharge the energy for cyber-crimes	apply the research energy of industries and schools to develop innovative cyber security technology	

### 1) Pursuing the Technology Power to Enhance the Cyber autonomy, Self-Reliance

Under the current administration's policy of "Cyber Security is National Security", promoting cyber autonomy policy positions at major cybersecurity conferences. Taiwan government has worked to develop Taiwan's indigenous cyber security industry through a policy of "cyber autonomy"(资安自主). Developing independent capability of Cyber security industry is the main tasks of 'National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan 2017-2020.' Taiwan has strong private sector to facilitate the national capacity on cyber security. Taiwan's military force is obviously not of a sufficient size to contend with China, but Taiwan's leading role in the information and technology industries may give it an advantage in the virtual battlefield of cyberspace.<sup>47</sup> In these perspectives, the Taiwanese government has been increasingly promoting cybersecurity as an industry in which the country excels.

Taiwanese government's strategy in cyber security is mostly related to enhance and develop the technology and industry in the cyber space. In 2014, New Frontier Foundation, a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) think tank, first described cyber security as one of Taiwan's "Core Defense Industries" along with the aerospace and shipbuilding industries. It argued that Taiwan's Ministry of Defense should assist in the development of Taiwan's cybersecurity industry and create a local market for cyber products by opening up its cybersecurity contracts to small and medium-sized cyber companies.<sup>48</sup> President Tsai Ing-wen also said that "given the great challenges in information and communications security that Taiwan faces, the government is to invest more resources on improving related infrastructure and training security experts to strengthen national security."<sup>49</sup> This idea is similar to the Israel's cybersecurity strategy. Israel is also producing lots of cyber-security startups. The number of Israeli cyber-security companies has doubled over the past five years to 300.<sup>50</sup>

With this strong efforts of Taiwanese government on developing the cyber security industries, Taiwan has achieved the desired results on developing the technological innovation of cyber security and cultivating its home-grown cyber security industry. The domestic cyber security market has expanded at an annual rate of 12.2% since 2013, increasing in scale from US\$926.6million that year to US\$1.44billion in 2017. 11.6% of the total IT budget for private enterprise went to cybersecurity in 2017, compared to only 3.4% in 2013.<sup>51</sup> Taiwanese firms are providing equipment to many of the world's top brands in cybersecurity and have gained

<sup>47</sup> Hon-Min Yau. 2018. "Explaining Taiwan's Cybersecurity Policy Prior to 2016: Effects of Norms and Identities." *Issues and Studies* 54 (2), 13.

<sup>48</sup> China Brief. "Taiwan's Emerging Push for "Cyber Autonomy" James Town Foundation. July 25, 2018. <https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-emerging-push-for-cyber-autonomy-2/>

<sup>49</sup> Taipei Times, "Government to increase cybersecurity investment," Nov. 14, 2018. <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2018/11/14/2003704182>

<sup>50</sup> "Cyber-boom or cyber-bubble?; Israel's computer-security firms." *The Economist* 416:8949 (Aug 1, 2015), 56-57.

<sup>51</sup> Taiwan Business Topics, "Taiwan Wakes Up to the Need for Stricter Cybersecurity." May 11, 2018. <https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2018/05/taiwan-wakes-up-to-the-need-for-stricter-cybersecurity/>

the market share. Taiwan is ranked fourth globally in terms of innovation capability, recognizing the strength of the country's R&D capabilities.<sup>52</sup> These technological advantages continue to increase the value of Taiwan's cyber security industry, achieving US\$1.26 billion in 2017 according to Industrial Technology Research Institute(ITRI), and provide a fertile environment for future growth.<sup>53</sup> As a technology power in cyber security, Taiwan pursues the role as a global front runner in the cyber technology, hosting the international hacking contest 'HITCON CTF).

## 2) Developing Governance Model in Cyber Security

Taiwan has comprehensive and centralized government system for cyber security. Taiwan government officially passed the 'Developing a National Information and Communication Infrastructure Security Mechanism Plan 2001-2004', and formed the 'National Information and Communication Security Task force(行政院國家資通安全會報, NICST)' in January 2001.<sup>54</sup> Taiwan which has a limited sovereignty have struggled for political recognition as a independent state-even if that's informal. Taiwan's cyber security strategy reflects on Taiwan's unique political situation. Although cybersecurity is a transnational problem, the way in which Taiwan and China interact makes interstate cooperation less likely. Hence, Taiwan's cyber security interests can only be secured by its efforts alone.<sup>55</sup> In this context, Taiwan has been a first runner in constructing the government system for cyber security management in order to have more united self-defend system.

The NICST has played the role of headquarter for cyber security. It is responsible for developing national cyber security policies, creating report and response mechanisms, providing consultations and advice for major projects, promoting cross-agency coordination, and supervising cyber security affairs. Since 2001, the NICST has been facilitating basic cyber security construction tasks and has already completed four promotional phases. The focus of second phases(2005-2008) was 'Become equipped with cyber security protection capabilities and form a national cyber security operation center.' The focus of third phases(2009-2012) was 'Enhance the overall cyber security response capabilities and upgrade mechanisms for reporting and responding.' The focus of fourth phases was "Enhance the secondary surveillance and control mechanism for cyber security protection and information sharing." In 2017, Taiwan proposed the vision and tasks of fifth phases for cyber security, 'National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan (2017-2020).' Taiwanese government has been developing not only the government system but also the strategical completeness.

## IV. Taiwan's Institutional Efforts for Cyber security : Government system, Law and Policy

### 1. Taiwan's Government System for Cyber Security

Taiwan has comprehensive and centralized government system for cyber security. The NICST which has played the role of headquarter for cyber security is responsible for national IC security matters such as providing consultancy on IC security policies, providing consultancy on IC security emergency report and response mechanisms, providing consultancy on major IC security programs, coordinating and supervising inter-ministry cyber security efforts, and implementing other related measures assigned to it by this Yuan.<sup>56</sup> After

<sup>52</sup> World Economic Forum. 『Global Competitiveness Report 2018』. 2018. 545.

<sup>53</sup> Security Asia. "Innovation is empowering Taiwan's cyber security capabilities." November 22, 2018.

<https://www.networksasia.net/article/innovation-empowering-taiwans-cyber-security-capabilities.1542886073>

<sup>54</sup> National Center for Cyber Security Technology. "About NCCST"

<https://www.nccst.nat.gov.tw/About?lang=en>

<sup>55</sup> Hon-Min Yau. 2018. "Explaining Taiwan's Cybersecurity Policy Prior to 2016: Effects of Norms and Identities." *Issues and Studies* 54 (2), 3.

<sup>56</sup> National Information and Communication Security Taskforce(行政院國家資通安全會報)

the NICST was established in January 2001, Taiwan National Computer Emergency Response Team(TWNCERT), the National Center for Cyber Security Technology(NCCST) was created in March 2001.<sup>57</sup> It was known as the Information & Communication Security Technology Center(ICST), initially aimed to create a government response center that can help optimize the capability of immediate monitor, coordination, response, and handling in the face of cyber security incidents, also help enhancing the government's ability to respond to and deal with cyber security incidents. Now it is supervised by the Department of Cyber Security and extending services to critical infrastructure sectors, academic organizations, government-owned enterprises and government-funded institutes.<sup>58</sup> Taiwan Academic Network Computer Emergency Response Team(TACERT) has also established by Ministry of Education in June, 2010. The main purposes of TACERT are to prevent and actively assist the computer networks security incidents in organizations in Taiwan Academic Network(TANet).<sup>59</sup> Electronic Commerce-Computer Emergency Response Team(EC-CERT) has established by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2011. This is responsible for the information security events that occur within the e-commerce network, and further activate early prevention.<sup>60</sup>

Information and communication security advisory committee was also established to appoint various professional cyber security experts and scholars to provide their insight with regard to national cyber security policies, management, and technologies in order to enhance the national cyber security policies and promotional strategies, industry-government-academy research energy on cyber security technologies, and information and experience sharing to ultimately empower cyber security facilities. Since 2001 when NICST was established, Taiwan has completed the mechanism for classifying government agencies' cyber security responsibilities, promoting the Chief Information Security Officer(CISO) in administrative institutions, forming the National Security Operational Center, developing report and respond mechanisms for cyber security incidents, and developing a united cyber security protection and information sharing mechanism in government agencies, among others, all of which have effectively elevated our national cyber security readiness.<sup>61</sup> Taiwan has tried to build the united cyber defense system under the NICST, while developing technological unit and response unit together.

After Tsai Ing-Wen got elected as a president in 2016, cyber security has become the more important task. In order to implement the strategy of "Cyber Security is Nation Security", Taiwan upgraded the leadership of cyber security. The Executive Yuan formed a unit focused on cyber security on August 1st, 2016- the Department of Cyber Security(DCS) to replace the cyber security office as the assistant to NICST.<sup>62</sup> DCS was set up under the Executive Yuan to improve the implementation of information security measures and delegate responsibilities.

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[https://www.nicst.gov.tw/en/News\\_Content.aspx?n=11B0E260E6E03508&sms=C22B05A29C978D0F&s=A88A5340E446C672](https://www.nicst.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=11B0E260E6E03508&sms=C22B05A29C978D0F&s=A88A5340E446C672)

<sup>57</sup> National Center for Cyber Security Technology. "About NCCST"

<https://www.nccst.nat.gov.tw/About?lang=en>

<sup>58</sup> This ICST has been changed the name to National Center for Cyber Security Technology (NCCST) after establishment of the Department of Cyber Security(DCS) on August 1, 2016 in order to fulfill the goal of "Cyber Security is National Security" and raise the cyber security protection levels in Taiwan. in Taiwan National Computer Emergency Response Team(TWNCERT, 國家電腦事件處理中心) Homepage.

<http://www.twncert.org.tw/Mission>

<sup>59</sup> Taiwan Academic Network Computer Emergency Response Team(TACERT, 臺灣學術網路危機處理中心)

<http://tacert.tanet.edu.tw/prog/aboutus-eng.php>

<sup>60</sup> Electronic Commerce-Computer Emergency Response Team(EC-CERT, 臺灣常務咨文服務中心) <http://ec-cert.org.tw/>

<sup>61</sup> National Information and Communication Security Taskforce, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 2017.

『National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan(2017-2020)』, 16.


<sup>62</sup> National Information and Communication Security Taskforce, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 2017.

『National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan(2017-2020)』, 13.



Besides, Information Communication Electronic Force Command(ICEF) was set up in Jan. 2017 to strengthen the capacity for the cyber warfare. Taiwan established the National Communications and Cyber Security Center (NCCSC) on November 2018. The President Tsai attended the opening ceremony of NCCSC and noted that “We don’t have much time”, urging various government ministries to work together and speed up the construction of information technology protection, as well as the incubation of talent and experts in the field of cyber security.<sup>63</sup> Taiwan’s cyber security governance is more systemized and upgrade.

< Taiwan’s Cyber Security Governance ><sup>64</sup>



Each Group has competent authority and roles. NICTS is led by the Convener, Vice Premier, the Vice Convener, the Minister without Portfolio of the Yuan and one specified Minister, and the Co-Vice Convener, an Advisory Committee Member of the National Security Council. Each is appointed by the Premier of the Yuan. Other commissioners may include members of information and communication security agencies, deputy mayors of special municipalities and experts in the field. The taskforce will have 18 to 35 commissioners in total, the Convener, the Vice Convener and the Co-Vice Convener included. The operations of this Taskforce are managed by the Department of Cyber Security.<sup>65</sup> Cyber Protection System is

<sup>63</sup> Taiwan News, “Opening of a national cyber security center in Taiwan a landmark: President Tsai,” 2018/11/15. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3576232>

<sup>64</sup> National Information and Communication Security Taskforce, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 2017. 『National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan(2017-2020)』, 14.

<sup>65</sup> NICST(行政院國家資通安全會報). [https://www.nicst.gov.tw/en/News\\_Content.aspx?n=11B0E260E6E03508&sms=C22B05A29C978D0F&s=A88A5340E446C672](https://www.nicst.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=11B0E260E6E03508&sms=C22B05A29C978D0F&s=A88A5340E446C672)

under DCS, Executive Yuan, responsible for integrating cyber security protection resources and drawing up cyber security policies. Its divisions and assignments are Critical Information Infrastructure Protection(CIIP) Group, Industrial Promotion Group, Information and Communication Security Protection Group, Standards and Specification Group, and Awareness Education and Personnel Training Group. Secondly Cyber-crime Detection and Prevention System is under both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, responsible for preventing cyber-crimes, protecting citizens’ privacy, facilitating the information and communication environment, and enhancing Internet content security, etc. Its divisions and assignments are Personal Information Protection and Legislation Promotion Group, Cyber-crime Prevention and Control Group, and Information and Communication Environment and Internet Content Security Group.

**< The Organization and Role of Each Group > <sup>66</sup>**

Group	Belong to	Responsibility
CIIP Group	DCS, Executive Yuan	Planning and Promoting CIIP Mechanism, supervising the implementation of security protection, audit and exercise, among other tasks.
Industrial Promotion Group	Ministry of Economic Affairs	Facilitating the development of cyber security industries and integrating the research resources of industries, government, and academics to develop innovative applications.
Information and Communication Security Protection Group	DCS, Executive Yuan	Planning and facilitating security mechanisms of governmental information and communication application services with technical support. Supervising government agencies implementing cyber security protection and reporting and responding to any cyber security incident. Security audits, cyber attack exercises and helping government agencies to improve the completeness and effectiveness of their cyber protection
Standards and Specification Group	DCS, Executive Yuan	Making and Revising cyber security-related ordinances or regulations, and developing national standards. Establishing and maintaining the cyber security operational standards and guidelines of government agencies
Awareness Education and Personnel Training Group	Ministry of education	Promoting basic cyber security education, enhancing the cyber security of educational system, raising public literacy of cyber security, providing cyber security services, constructing an integrated platform with universal functions, holding international cyber security competitions, facilitating industrial and academic communications, and reinforcing cyber security talent cultivation
Personal Information Protection and Legislation Promotion Group	Ministry of Justice	Promoting personal information protection, makes amendments to citizens’ privacy protection, and revises regulations and standards related to cyber crimes.
Cyber-crime Prevention and	Ministry of	Investigating cyber-crimes, preventing computer crimes, and

<sup>66</sup> This chart is made based on the contents of 『National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan(2017-2020)』, 14-16.

Control Group	Interior/ Ministry of Justice	carrying out digital forensics, etc.
Information and Communication Environment and Internet Content Security Group	National Communica tion Committee	facilitating the security of information and communication environment and Internet content, as well as assisting in preventing cyber-crimes, etc.
Critical Infrastructure Protection System	Office of Homeland Security	
Other Cyber Security System	Competent Authority	

Each working group shall appoint one convener from among the commissioners of the managing ministry. Professionals in related agencies or academia will be appointed by the General Convener to serve as commissioners in the Information Security Consulting Committee, with the group totaling 17 to 21 commissioners. Each term of the commissioner is two years, but can be appointed continuously. This Taskforce shall convene a meeting every six months and may schedule ad hoc meetings if needed. In order to actively deliberate national cyber security policies and promote strategies, enhance cyber security experiences sharing and exchanging between private sectors, the Government, and academic & research facilities, this Taskforce should set up an Information Security Consulting Committee.<sup>67</sup> After president Tsai inauguration, Taiwanese government has kept developing the government agency based on the agenda of “Cyber security is National Security.”

## 2. Cybersecurity Management Act (資通安全管理法)

Tsai administration is fully aware of cyber security threat and has tried to make the development of cyber security capacity in legal aspects. On May 11 of 2018, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan passed the Cybersecurity Management Act, Taiwan’s first national cyber security law. The Act was published by the presidential office in June 2018. This Law, which mandates cyber security requirements for Taiwan’s government agencies and operators of critical infrastructures, represents the latest initiative in the Tsai administration’s push for cyber security under the policy “Cyber Security is National Security.”<sup>68</sup> This law came into effect in Jan. 1, 2019.

This law shows the strategies of Taiwanese government are focusing on the developing government system for cyber security and promoting the cyber security industry. <Article 1> of this Act explains the purpose for Taiwan to enact this law, that is to actively promote the national capital security policy and accelerate the construction of a national capital security environment to safeguard national security and safeguard social public interests. The competent authority of this Law is the Executive Yuan. <Article 4> is about the government role for upgrading the cyber security competence. It says that in order to improve cyber security, the government should integrate the private and industrial forces. Besides, (1)the cultivation of professional talents for safety, (2)the research and development of cyber

<sup>67</sup> National Information and Communication Security Taskforce.  
[https://www.nicst.gov.tw/en/News\\_Content.aspx?n=11B0E260E6E03508&sms=C22B05A29C978D0F&s=A88A5340E446C672](https://www.nicst.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=11B0E260E6E03508&sms=C22B05A29C978D0F&s=A88A5340E446C672)

<sup>68</sup> Philip Hsu. “Taiwan’s Emerging Push for ‘Cyber Autonomy.’” The JamesTown Foundation. China Brief 18 (13). July 25, 2018.  
<https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-emerging-push-for-cyber-autonomy-2/>

security technology and its application to the industry (3)the development of the security industry, (4)development of services and mechanisms related to the technical and software standards of cyber security.<sup>69</sup>

This law are pressing for government agencies to have more readiness and resilience. Chapter II of the Act is about the duties of public agencies to maintain the security of their information systems. Public agencies must put in place information security policies and appoint chief information security officers. They are also required to report cyber security planning and management situation to superior agency every year. If there is cyber security incidents, public agency must report to the superior agency and competent authority and get the investigation from those authority.<sup>70</sup> This law puts importance on the responsibility of government for cyber security and can lead to develop the united defense system of government.

On the private sector, this law is focusing on the critical infrastructure. Chapter III is about the obligation of private sector cyber Security. Regulation of the private sector is generally limited to designated critical infrastructure operators. Private entity designated as a critical infrastructure operator subject to regulation under the Act, the operator's sectorial regulator will consult with personnel from public agencies, private sector representatives, and experts. For example, the Ministry of Economic Affairs will designate which power plants are critical infrastructure in consultation with the public agencies, the private sector, and experts because the Ministry of Economic Affairs is the sectorial regulator for energy producers.<sup>71</sup> Designated critical infrastructure operators will be required to implement cyber security policies and to report to the Public agency on cyber security incidents. A designated critical infrastructure operator is required to audit its cybersecurity policy during the legislative process in response to the Executive Yuan's original draft. In the event of a security incident, the critical infrastructure operator must first report the incident to its sectorial regulator and then file a separate post-incident improvement report regarding the security incident at a later date.<sup>72</sup>

The law is much more enforceable with having fine penalty. Chapter IV is about the penalty. If the personnel of a public service organ fail to abide by the provisions of this Law, they should be disciplined or punished according to its seriousness. If designated critical infrastructure operators violate the law<sup>73</sup>, the fines of NT\$100,000(US\$3,300) to NT\$1million(\$33,000) can be imposed on them. Failure to report a security incident will result in a fine of NT\$300,000 to NT\$5million.<sup>74</sup> Like many Taiwanese laws, the Cyber Security Management Act sets out broad principles and leaves many of the key details to regulations issued by the regulator. The Executive Yuan's Department of Cyber Security has drafted six regulations under the Act. Of these, four are relevant to designated critical infrastructure operators.<sup>75</sup> The Cyber Security Management Act can be the important start for developing the institutional competence on cyber security.

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<sup>69</sup> 中華民國總統室, “資通安全管理法,” June 6, 2018, 1-2.

<https://www.president.gov.tw/.../9c1bd62a-2150-4ccf-a8cf-15354bc4a91a>

<sup>70</sup> *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>71</sup> Michael R. Fahey, “Taiwan enacts Cyber Security Management Act,” July 17, 2018.

<http://www.winklerpartners.com/?p=8933>

<sup>72</sup> 中華民國總統室, “資通安全管理法,” June 6, 2018, 4-5.

<sup>73</sup> 1.violation of rules governing information security policies; 2.failure to implement a reporting and response mechanism for security incidents; or 3.failure to file reports on the investigation, handling, and remediation of security incidents or the filing of an incomplete security incident report.

<sup>74</sup> 中華民國總統室, “資通安全管理法,” June 6, 2018, 5-6.

<sup>75</sup> 1.The Cyber Security Act Enforcement Rules; 2.The Regulations for Classification of Cyber Security Responsibility; 3.The Regulations for Reporting and Responding to Cyber Security Incidents; 4.The Regulations for Inspecting Implementation Status of Special Non-official Agencies' Cyber Security Maintenance Programs.

### 3. Cyber Defense Policy

Taiwan has been pushing for the “Defense Self-Reliance(國防自主).” Related this defense policy, Taiwan is also working to develop “Cybersecurity self-reliance(資安自主).” Small states seeks to enter into alliances with more powerful states to compensate for the vulnerability from the lack of cyber security capacity. This can take the form of balancing behaviour, where small states join forces against a threatening state.<sup>76</sup> But Taiwan has unique political and international status, it’s hard to have alliance or participate in the multilateral organization. That’s the reason for Taiwan to focus on the self-defense in cyber space.

Taiwan needs to focus on the asymmetric balancing toward China as the Taiwan's naval forces have become obsolete compared to China's growing naval power.<sup>77</sup> Cyber security has been an important factor for the asymmetric strategy. Taiwan has developed the defense doctrine and operational system on cyber space.

In June 2017, Taiwan established the Information Communication Electronic Force Command(ICEFC), which was the world’s first independent military cyber command. In this new cyber unit, around six thousand personnel was formally launched. The ICEFC will create a comprehensive national cyber defense force through integrating resources from various branches of the ROC military. It will also draw on expertise from National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology, the MND’s primary research and development organization, as well as academic institutions and the private sector.<sup>78</sup> The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology is the premier research and development institute of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, and is involved in a host of offensive and defensive projects. Taiwan’s military is simultaneously recruiting specialists to strengthen the nation’s cyber defenses, as well as to counter growing cyber attacks from China.<sup>79</sup>

Besides the military organization, Taiwanese government has raised defense budget in the cyber security. The promised budget includes NT\$33billion(around US\$1.1 billion) in four years for system acquisition on proactive defense, infrastructure hardening, and cyber intelligence.<sup>80</sup> ICEFC, a military cyber command has earmarked more than NT\$1.6 billion(\$71 million) in the 2018 budget to safeguard websites and databases most targeted by mainland cyber spies.<sup>81</sup> The Taiwan government has earmarked over NT\$1.5billion(US\$48.36 million) to improve Taiwan's cyber defensive capabilities in the 2019 general budget.<sup>82</sup>

### 4. Technological & Industrial Investment for Cyber Security

The developing the technology and industry have been the most important task for Taiwan’s

<sup>76</sup> Joe Burton, “Small states and cyber security : The case of New Zealand” *Political Science* 65(2). 2013 216–238.

<sup>77</sup> Taiwan could assemble a potent defense force using a combination of small but stealthy fast-attack boats armed with the new anti-ship missiles such as the enhanced HF-3 and robust cyber capabilities that could target command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR). *World Politics Review*. “To Counter China's Military Build-Up, Taiwan Must Go Asymmetric.” Nov. 29, 2012. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12529/to-counter-chinas-military-build-up-taiwan-must-go-asymmetric>

<sup>78</sup> Taiwan News. “Ministry of National Defense launches new cybersecurity command.” July 4, 2017. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3202752>

<sup>79</sup> Taiwan News. “Taiwan expands cyber defense; Taiwan to expand defensive and offensive cyber capabilities.” 2018/12/31. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3607662>

<sup>80</sup> NBR. “Taiwan sees its cyber capabilities as the hard reality of soft power.” Aug.24, 2017. <https://www.nbr.org/publication/taiwan-sees-its-cyber-capabilities-as-the-hard-reality-of-soft-power/>

<sup>81</sup> The Straits Times, “Taiwan expects more Chinese cyber attacks as polls near,” Sep 21, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-expects-more-chinese-cyber-attacks-as-polls-near>

<sup>82</sup> Taiwan Times, “China to escalate Taiwan cyberattacks ahead of local elections,” Sep. 20, 2018. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3534081>

cyber security strategy. Taiwanese private sector, especially industrial sector has played important roles for implementing the Taiwan's cyber security strategy. Taiwan officials have just announced they will share the details of millions of Chinese hacks with private companies to help train artificial intelligence software to predict and prevent future cyber attacks.<sup>83</sup> The information sharing and cooperation between the government and private can be the main mechanism to enhance not only the government's capacity on cyber security but also the development of cyber security industry. Taiwanese governments have opted to develop "clusters" of cybersecurity companies in their own way like Israel. Israel through developing the Beersheba cybersecurity industrial cluster, and Taiwan in consolidating its support of its cyber sector through its new Cybersecurity Management Law and both military and non-military spending.<sup>84</sup> These efforts would henceforth be led by Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), as that agency begins to take a leading role in developing Taiwan's cybersecurity industry as a whole.<sup>85</sup>

The government has promoted a number of initiatives for enhancing its cybersecurity sector, including adoption of the National Strategy for Cybersecurity Development Program (2017-2020), which integrates cybersecurity industry development into Taiwan's 5+2 Industrial Innovation Plan.<sup>86</sup> Taiwan is developing an action plan for the industry's development, 'National Technology Development Plan and the Forward-looking Infrastructure Development Plan(資安產業發展行動計畫).' The purpose of this plan is "building global entrepreneurship base in the cybersecurity industry and giving the Taiwanese cyber security industry global brand(建立全球資安產業創業基地，打造臺灣產業優質安全品牌)." This plan includes an investment of NT\$11 billion into cyber security industry.<sup>87</sup> Taiwan government has raised its spending on cybersecurity from 4.2 percent of the total IT budget in 2013 to 8.8 percent in 2017, more than doubling outlays. The top security technologies purchased by the government were anti-virus protection(89.7 percent), fire walls(89.3 percent), mail filtering devices(44.9 percent), intrusion detection/defense systems(39.9 percent), and web content filters(26.7 percent).<sup>88</sup>

Taiwanese government's investment on cyber security industry can lead to the nation's new economic achievement. It can be opportunities for not only raising the economic growth but also creating the new jobs. The Out of confidence that Taiwan's advantages in this sector can translate into growing export sales for Taiwan's cybersecurity companies, the government has budgeted NT\$11 billion over the next three years to promote the industry around the world.<sup>89</sup> Cyber security industry has great potential for exports, Taiwanese government will keep the priority of industrial development in cyber security strategy.

Taiwanese government has also invested in human capital for developing technological

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<sup>83</sup> Financial Times. "The cyber secrets of Taiwan" October 23, 2018.

<https://www.ft.com/content/fca36400-d69e-11e8-ab8e-6be0dcf18713>

<sup>84</sup> Philip Hsu. "Developing Taiwan's Cybersecurity Industry: Is Israel a Good Model." Taiwan Insight. 12 November 2018.

<https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/11/12/developing-taiwans-cybersecurity-industry-is-israel-a-good-model/>

<sup>85</sup> This was the remarks of Taiwan National Security Council Member Lee Der-tsai, who has become one of the primary spokespersons for the Tsai government's cybersecurity initiatives in the Taiwan Cyber Security Summit in March 2018. China Brief, "Taiwan's Emerging Push for "Cyber Autonomy"" James Town Foundation, July 25, 2018.

<https://jamestown.org/program/taiwans-emerging-push-for-cyber-autonomy-2/>

<sup>86</sup> Taiwan Business Topics, "Taiwan Wakes Up to the Need for Stricter Cybersecurity." May 11, 2018.

<sup>87</sup> 資通安全處. "資安產業發展行動計畫" Mar. 22, 2018.

[https://www.nicst.gov.tw/News\\_Content3.aspx?n=E8A3CADF59C2DC49&sms=C254FFD10CAFF809&s=98AF440FDBD4EEBD](https://www.nicst.gov.tw/News_Content3.aspx?n=E8A3CADF59C2DC49&sms=C254FFD10CAFF809&s=98AF440FDBD4EEBD)

<sup>88</sup> The New Lens, "Taiwan Gets Its Act Together on Cybersecurity," May 5, 2018.

<https://international.thenewslens.com/article/95683>

<sup>89</sup> Taiwan Business Topics, "Taiwan Wakes Up to the Need for Stricter Cybersecurity." May 11, 2018.

competence in cyber security. In April 2018 the government also created a cabinet-level cybersecurity academy to increase the availability of cybersecurity talent in the government. Cybersecurity is conceptualized as a driver of employment, economic growth and national security through the government's policy of "cyber autonomy."<sup>90</sup> In December 2018, Taiwan had plans to open a government cyber-security training programme for companies and non-governmental organizations to send their IT personnel, with grants for up to 150 students yearly.<sup>91</sup> In Taiwan, the annual tournament for white hackers competition-the Hacks in Taiwan Conference (HITCON)- has been hold, which can foster the human capital in cyber security sector.

### 5. Taiwan's Diplomatic Strategy for Cyber Security

Taiwanese government has pursued the diplomatic strategy for getting the recognition as a cyber power and attracting the international cooperation even if it has limitation on the international status. Taiwan's official report on cyber security pointed out "Our national cyber security situation is unique, and dark attacks have been diverse, so we can attract other countries to initiate collaboration with us."<sup>92</sup>

Taiwan's diplomatic strategy for cyber security constitutes of mainly two facts. One is to strengthen the cooperation with the U.S. on cyber space. President Tsai in meeting with U.S. Senate representatives said that she hopes to have U.S-Taiwan collaboration on cyber security.<sup>93</sup> The US has recently taken steps to reaffirm its support for Taiwan. This month it opened a new \$255m de facto embassy in Taipei and in March President Donald Trump signed a new law promoting closer relations between officials in Washington and Taipei. The US is also considering more frequent arms sales to Taiwan.<sup>94</sup> Taiwan-U.S. cooperation on cyber security is more focusing on industrial aspects with the limitation of defense and diplomatic alliance because of China's one China policy. The US-Taiwan Business Council and the Taiwan Defense Industry Development Association co-hosted Taiwan-US Defense Business Forum (台美國防產業論壇) on May 10, 2018. The discussion examined ways that Taiwan defense industry can participate in the defense supply chain, and opportunities for bilateral U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in the shipbuilding, cybersecurity, and aerospace industries.<sup>95</sup> The US-Taiwan Business Council works closely with its member companies in the defense, aerospace, and national security sectors on issues that influence the Taiwan business environment in these sectors.<sup>96</sup> Taiwan has been "sharing" information with Japan and the US on its investigations into attacks, cyber espionage and major data breaches.<sup>97</sup>

Another international action for the cyber security is technological networking and initiating. Taiwan National Computer Emergency Response Team(TWNCERT) Joined and been member of Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT)<sup>98</sup> and the

<sup>90</sup> Taiwan Insight. "Cybersecurity as national security, and economic opportunity, in Taiwan." 14 November 2018. <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/11/14/cybersecurity-as-national-security-and-economic-opportunity-in-taiwan/>

<sup>91</sup> The Straits Times, "Taiwan expects more Chinese cyber attacks as polls near," Sep 21, 2018. <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwan-expects-more-chinese-cyber-attacks-as-polls-near>

<sup>92</sup> National Information and Communication Security Taskforce, Executive Yuan, Republic of China, 2017. 『National Cyber Security Program of Taiwan(2017-2020)』, 23.

<sup>93</sup> Focus Taiwan, "President Hopeful of U.S.-Taiwan Collaboration on Cyber Security." (2017/09/22).

<sup>94</sup> Financial Times. "Taiwan hit by jump in cyber attacks from China." June 25, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/8e5b26c0-75c5-11e8-a8c4-408cfba4327c>

<sup>95</sup> Taiwan Insight, "Cybersecurity as national security, and economic opportunity, in Taiwan." Nov 14, 2018. <https://taiwaninsight.org/2018/11/14/cybersecurity-as-national-security-and-economic-opportunity-in-taiwan/>

<sup>96</sup> The U.S.-Taiwan Defense Council. <http://www.ustaiwandefense.com/mission/>

<sup>97</sup> Asia Times. "Taiwanese under siege from blitz of Chinese cyber attacks." April 6, 2018. <http://www.atimes.com/article/taiwanese-siege-blitz-chinese-cyberattacks/>

<sup>98</sup> APCERT is a regional community for Computer Emergency Response Team(CERTs) to help create a safe,

Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) in 2003. TWNCERT held Cyber Offense and Defense Exercise (CODE) for the first time in 2013. CODE is a national drill exercise event to examine the cyber security readiness against cyber threats. It hosted APCERT 2014 Conference and Annual General Meeting in Taipei and served as APCERT Steering Committee. It established and served as the convener of APCERT Training Working Group in 2015.<sup>99</sup>

## V. Conclusion

While the cyber security has been becoming the one of main arenas for the competition between the great powers, the cyber security can be a matter of survival for many small and medium-sized nations. Taiwan has been a test-bed for a variety of the cyber attacks and getting more threat from the China which is advancing the asymmetric weapons in cyberspace. The militarization of cyber space and cyber arms race between the great powers has enlarged the threat perception of the small and medium sized states toward the great power into cyber space.

Despite growing interest in cyber security, the small and medium-sized countries have been negligent in the research fields. Most studies on the cyber security of small-medium countries are their efforts on the multilateral diplomacy and norm building. Few case are studied in the comparative perspectives. Taiwan can be the good case for the comparative studies on the cyber security strategies of small-middle power states. Taiwan can be said the middle power in the cyber security area, even if it has certain limitation on its political and international role as a middle power because of China's 'One China Policy.' Still Taiwan has been a strong middle power on the government system, technology, and industry for cyber security. 'Cyber security is National security,' this slogan of Tsai Ying-wen administration on the cyber security shows the Taiwan's desperation on defending cyber space. Taiwan's unique strategy to build a cyber power can be meaningful case for cyber security studies to have broader and diverse views of the cyber security studies. Also small and medium-sized countries can discover the policy implication from the Taiwan's unique cyber security strategy.

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clean and reliable cyber space in the Asia Pacific Region through global collaboration.

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<sup>99</sup> <http://www.twncert.org.tw/milestone>



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**Friday, October 18, 13:30 –15:30**

**Two Parallel Round Tables: Round Table B**

**Jana S. Rošker:**

**A precarious Relation or the long and windy road of Taiwanese philosophy in Balkan**

**Abstract**

The main goal of the CCKF research project dealing with Taiwanese philosophy, which has been currently implemented at the Department of Asian Studies at the Ljubljana University, is to systematically introduce it to the European (and especially South-East European) academic public. It aims to spread the most important achievements of modern and contemporary Taiwanese philosophers, along with their contributions in the field of contemporary philosophical theory to the academic public in the Balkan area. There are two main reasons for the immense importance of Taiwanese philosophy for East Asia and the contemporary academic world: 1. First, they can be found in its contributions to the preservation of traditional Chinese thought during the latter half of the 20th century. 2. Secondly, its development of specific innovative philosophical approaches and systems have been since this period profoundly influencing the theoretical discourses in the entire East Asian region. Since the Western academic world is to a large extent unaware of both above-mentioned facts, the aim of our project is to raise awareness about the importance of these contributions in Europe, especially in the regions of Balkan. These regions have been hitherto namely completely ignorant about the vivid and important role Taiwanese scholars were playing in the East Asian academic world at the threshold of the third millennia. Therefore, this presentation introduces several methods by which the cultural, academic, and educational exchange between the two areas can be achieved, strengthen and developed.

**Nevad Kahteran:**

**The quest of the global significance of Tu Wei-ming's Concrete Confucian Humanity, Daisaku Ikeda's New Horizons in Eastern Humanism, and Lee Ming-huei's Intellectualised Confucianism in the project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans**

The author of this paper was invited as a visiting professor by the Harvard-Yenching professor Tu Weiming (1940-), born in Kunming, grew up in Taiwan, and pursued his graduate studies in the United States, and who is one of the best representatives of the third generation of the Confucian revival, to join him in the summer of 2010 at his newly-established Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies (Peking University, from 5 July to 5 August 2010), upon his leaving Harvard to serve as professor of philosophy and the founding dean of the IAHS. The research gave insightful perspectives on the core values in Confucian humanism with a view of the future.

Tu's revitalisation of the Confucian discourse is an indication that a new vision of *Chineseness* from pluralistic, tolerant, and dialogical perspectives is emerging on the horizons with full recognition of the value of openness, cultural diversity and self-reflexivity, hoping that through this newly-established "Chinese subjectivity" (Professor Luo Yulei's phrase) China is an integral part of a diverse world in search of shared values and universal ethics, taking into account that Tu believes that China, including *hualiaoqiao* (the overseas Chinese), will be a major spiritual resource for rethinking the human in the global community. Thus, by emphasising cultural roots, Chinese intellectuals in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and North America hoped to build a transnational network for understanding the meaning of being Chinese within a global context and, according to professor Tu in his work *The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China*, 2010, the meaning of being Chinese is basically not a political question; it is a human concern pregnant with ethical-religious implications. This is reason to include Daisaku Ikeda (池田 大作, born in 1928), who is president of the Soka Gakkai International Buddhist network, which actively promotes peace, culture and education, with membership from more than 190 countries with Tu as well.

The author is indebted to professor Tu in this regard for his kind help during the writing of his own research from that academic year on *A Platform for Islamic-Confucian-Daoist Dialogue in the Balkans*, hoping that paving the way on religious-cultural communication will broaden the philosophical horizons. That the project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans should find a place at this conference is an unexpected grace of Heaven.

The cultivation of a new spirit of philosophy that transcends the classical borders and opens its understanding of "universality" to a multitude of cultural and intellectual histories is subject of the recently published *Nove granice kineske filozofije (New Frontiers of Chinese Philosophy)* and the very much needed knowledge in Bosnia Herzegovina to enhance young scholars working in the Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian language in the Balkans was encouraged with bringing another distinguished scholar like Lee Ming-huei (1953-) from Academia Sinica in Taipei to deliver his series of public lectures in this country. Finally, the importance of Islamic works in the language of Neo-Confucian, i. e. *Han Kitab*, and Tu's contribution to the work on Liu Zhi, which attracted me additionally to him, is a deep interpenetration of the Confucian and Islamic traditions, without any kind of syncretism.

**Key words:** *Tu Weiming and his revitalisation of the Confucian discourse, Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans, Lee Ming-huei's series of public lectures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the quest for global peace.*



*In the memory on my wife Amira who passed away on 4 March this year  
(photos taken on the Beida in the summer 2010 by Tu Weiming's wife Aibei)*

I will start with Mou Zongsan's sentence that in every single cultural system there is philosophy. Otherwise, it will not succeed in being counted a cultural system.<sup>1</sup> Philosophers have always been busy comparing various views within their own tradition or in cross-cultural fashion. In this regard, comparative philosophy is a kind of dialogue among philosophers. The importance of the task undertaken by comparative philosophers becomes more and more evident, and being the 'comparativist' (i.e., the practitioner of comparative philosophy)<sup>2</sup> means that you are at the same time an interpreter, a commentator, a critic, a connoisseur of good philosophical arguments and interesting ideas, an educator, and a communicator – with the main object to help each of the interlocutors to understand the position of the other. So, all three mentioned philosophers in this paper are of the contemporary importance in this regard, and these thinkers can be especially helpful in finding bridges to non-Western philosophical traditions. In addition, those acquainted with Islamic languages will find a wealth of terminology that will help bridge the gap between the Islamic and the Confucian conceptual universes, especially reading the book *The Sage learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic thought in Confucian terms* by Sachiko Murata, William C. Chittick and Tu Weiming.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, comparative philosophy is a historically necessary project for establishing a critical discourse between different philosophical systems aimed at broadening the philosophical horizons and possibilities for better understanding – with a special task of establishing international peace in a specific manner, but, at the same time, an intellectual endeavour within multicultural communities for developing awareness of the need for inter-

<sup>1</sup> Mou, *Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi*, p. 4., quoted according to Ralph Weber and Robert H. Gassmann, "Introduction: 'What is Chinese Philosophy?'" in: Raji C. Steineck, Ralph Weber, Robert Gassmann and Elena Lange, eds. *Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic world*. Brill, 2018.

<sup>2</sup> See Bo Mou's article in *Comparative Philosophy* 1(1): p. 1-32: <http://comparativephilosophy.org/>.

<sup>3</sup> Harvard University Press, 2009.

traditional, intercultural, inter-system, integrative and global studies, beyond the prevalent cult of nation and with the idea of philosophical resonance and complementarity of different philosophical positions at its core, or rather, our care for a discourse rid of domination in the dialectics of intercultural logos. That the project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans should find a place in this conference in the centennial year of the Ljubljana University<sup>4</sup> is an unexpected grace of Heaven, or to quote Zvi Ben-Dor Benite:

“...At the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this dialogue takes new shape as Western scholars join it and, most notably, it acquires a new locus in the Balkans.

The joining of the Balkans to the ongoing Islamic-Confucian dialogue is most significant and most exciting. The Balkans was always a major zone of engagement where Islam and other cultures and religions met exchanged and contended. Balkan scholars, bringing in Balkan heritage and legacies are best suited to bring in new insights, new angles, and fresh perspectives. It is exciting to think that a major Muslim Community from what was once the westernmost Islamic frontier joins a dialogue begun by an Islamic community from easternmost Islamic frontier. This volume, therefore, should be seen as just beginning of new phase in the ongoing dialogue. And a most promising one”.<sup>5</sup>

Or our Jana Rosker:

“Recognizing the comprehension, analysis and transmission of reality based on diversely structured socio-political contexts as a categorical and essential postulate always offers the prospect of enrichment. It also protects us from the tyranny of universalized unidimensional ideologies. This is why we need Chinese philosophy to become an indispensable part of our globalized intellectual world.

And this is also what makes this book so immensely important: it offers us possibilities for fruitful fusions of hitherto unknown horizons. In our time, it is also especially meaningful that it was created and published in a place which enables these new horizons to emerge on the fruitful crossroads of many different histories, cultures, ideologies and religions”.<sup>6</sup>

### **Tu Weiming (杜维明)**

is the world’s leading Confucian scholar who has played a leading role in the creative development of modern Confucianism as a global intellectual discourse, spending more than six decades in an ongoing dialogue with other Axial Age civilisations and indigenous spiritual traditions, engaging himself in the re-appreciation of traditional values and thinking in contemporary China, particularly Confucianism because of his stressing the significance of religiosity within Confucianism and what he calls **“anthropocosmic unity” (vision of the unity between Heaven and Humanity)**.

Active in many public bodies, professor Tu is the author of 19 books in English, 13 books in Chinese, and well over 100 articles and books chapters.

Tu Weiming (1940-), who was teaching at Princeton University, the University of California at Berkeley, and Harvard University, is one of the most famous Chinese Confucian

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<sup>4</sup> University with its rich tradition was founded in 1919: <https://www.uni-lj.si/university/>.

<sup>5</sup> Zvi Ben-Dor Benite’ Afterword in Nevad Kahteran (2010). *Platforma za islamsko-konfucijansko-daoistički dijalog na Balkanu / A Platform for Islamic-Confucian-Daoist Dialogue in the Balkans*. ITD Sedam, Sarajevo, p. 144. Also, see Ben-Dor Benite, Z. (2005). *The Dao of Muhammad: A cultural history of Muslims in late imperial China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Jana Rosker’s Afterword, “On the Tiny Bridge of Understanding: Chiese Philosophy, Western Discourse and Fusion of New Horizons” in Nevad Kahteran & Bo Mou (牟博) (eds.) (2018). *Nove granice kineske filozofije (中國哲學新探索) New Frontiers of Chinese Philosophy*, El-Kalem, Sarajevo, p. 421.

thinkers of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries and a prominent member of the third generation of “New Confucians”.<sup>7</sup>

Tu Weiming is lifetime professor of philosophy and dean of Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at Peking University and a research professor and senior fellow of the Asia Center at Harvard University. He was born on 6 February 1940 in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China (age 79), and he is a Harvard-Yenching Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy and of Confucian Studies, Emeritus, at the Asia Center of Harvard University.<sup>8</sup> As someone who grew up in Taiwan and obtained a BA in Chinese Studies at the Tunghai University (1961), he is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Professor Tu is a leading expert in Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. In 2009, Tu left his professorship at Harvard University for Peking University’s Department of Philosophy, and his mission was to contribute the reform of Chinese humanistic education against a tide of rising nationalism and anti-globalisation sentiment.

His assertion is that Confucianism can learn something from Western modernity without losing recognition of its own heritage, and by engaging in such “civilizational dialogue” Tu hoped that different religions and cultures could learn from each other in order to develop a global ethic. From the above mentioned, it is obvious that Tu’s perspective, the Confucian ideas of *ren* (“humaneness” or “benevolence”) and what he calls “anthropocosmic unity” to designate this holistic, correlative vision of Heaven, Earth, and Man, can make powerful contributions to the resolution of issues facing the contemporary world, so he coined the term “spiritual humanism”<sup>9</sup> vs. secular humanism, a defining characteristic of the Enlightenment mentality of the modern West (according to Tu, the Enlightenment mentality is the justification for secular humanism, and, as an emerging global discourse, it is attempting “to situate the universal call of ethics in an open, integrated and harmonious house in which body and spirit, the individual and society, humanity and nature, the secular and the sacred are all welcome, and to provide human rather than abstract solutions to the many problems we face”).<sup>10</sup> As a spiritual humanism, Confucianism’s project for human flourishing involves four dimensions: self, community, Earth, and Heaven. “The time is ripe for us to rethink the human in the 21st century. We are in need of a comprehensive spiritual humanism capable of integrating the four inseparable dimensions of human flourishing: self, community, Earth, and Heaven... The cultivation of a spirit of caring for the earth is widely recognized as a universal principle of global citizenship. Therefore, it is imperative that all citizens of the world take part in the ongoing dialogue among civilizations to facilitate this vision.”<sup>11</sup>

In 1949, he moved to Taiwan for studies at the Taipei Municipal Jianguo High School and enrolled the Taiwan’s Tunghai University. That is an obvious reason for him to be regarded as Taiwanese, taking into account the differences between the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and

<sup>7</sup> Tu Wei-Ming’s official website: <http://www.tuweiming.net>.

杜维明的中文博客: <http://blog.sina.com.cn/weimingtu>.

<sup>8</sup> See the following web-sites about this Institute: <http://iahs.en.pku.edu.cn/>;

<https://www.facebook.com/The-Institute-for-Advanced-Humanistic-Studies-at-Peking-University-165137716836692/> ;

<http://www.east-west-dichotomy.com/institute-for-advanced-humanistic-studies/>;

[http://newsen.pku.edu.cn/news\\_events/news/focus/619.htm](http://newsen.pku.edu.cn/news_events/news/focus/619.htm);

<https://www.iep.utm.edu/tu-weimi/>;

[https://everything.explained.today/Tu\\_Weiming/](https://everything.explained.today/Tu_Weiming/).

The inauguration of the Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies (IAHS) was held in Shouren International Studies Center on September 28, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> See [http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/images/Tu\\_Weiming\\_Paper\\_2.pdf](http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/images/Tu_Weiming_Paper_2.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> See <http://tuweiming.net/> and information about a recently held conference: 11-13 June 2019, Confucianism in Dialogue with Cultures and Religions, A Conference in Honour of Professor Tu Weiming, Georgetown University.

<sup>11</sup> See [http://earthcharter.org/invent/images/uploads/19%20Manuscript\\_Tu.pdf](http://earthcharter.org/invent/images/uploads/19%20Manuscript_Tu.pdf).

Hong Kong, philosophical and otherwise.<sup>12</sup>

What attracted me to this philosopher is his ongoing dialogue with non-Confucian religions and social theories, as well as his strong emphasis on inter-cultural, inter-religious, inter-disciplinary, and inter-civilizational dialogue as one of the defining features of Tu's Confucianism, who deliberately crafted the word "anthropocosmic" to designate a kind of humanism that is compatible with and sympathetic to an ecological consciousness. Through such a civilizational dialogue, Tu believes that Confucianism can both renew itself and become a valuable resource for the world. And through acknowledging the fact that Tu is, as a modernizer of Confucian thought, a champion of Confucian engagement with non-Confucian traditions especially including Islamic philosophical legacy in China (for example, see Kristian Petersen, *Understanding the Sources of the Sino-Islamic Intellectual Tradition: A Review Essay on The Sage Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic Thought in Confucian Terms*, by Sachiko Murata, William C. Chittick, and Tu Weiming, and *Recent Chinese Literary Treasuries*),<sup>13</sup> I am personally deeply convinced that we are moving in the right direction concerning his legacy, because Tu's vision has proved influential, and a theological approach to Confucianism will remain a strong suit in the years to come.

**Collaborative project with Daisaku Ikeda (池田 大作),  
New Horizons in Eastern Humanism:  
Buddhism, Confucianism and the Quest for Global Peace<sup>14</sup>**

Having portrayed Tu Weiming, now I would like to introduce Daisaku Ikeda (born in 1928), president of the Soka Gakkai International Buddhist network, which actively promotes peace, culture and education, with membership from more than 190 countries. Both authors have a deep belief that dialogue can transcend the borders of ethnicity, religion and ideology, and that it is certainly the best and surest method to achieve a peaceful solution for any problem, since it includes a continuous discussion with various world leaders and other people, representing various culturological, educational and religious organisations. This is why this book opens with a statement derived from a conversation of these two mighty and strong spiritual people: that the 21<sup>st</sup> century represents a Chinese era, and, in accordance with Arnold J. Toynbee's announcement, the belief that China holds the key for a future solidarity of people around the world, namely that this great country will significantly contribute to this goal through its culturological strength and power. As a matter of fact, this book, written as a series of conversations between Tu Weiming and Daisaku Ikeda, tells about the dialogue between civilizations concerning globalisation and culturological pluralism, that is, it discusses the

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<sup>12</sup> Jana Rosker (ed.). (2019). *Filozofija na Tajvanu: značilnosti, vloga in pomen*, Ljubljana, pp. 220, as well as Rošker, Jana S. (2016). *The Rebirth of the Moral Self: the Second Generation of Modern Confucians and their Modernization Discourses*. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, and Rošker, Jana S. "The Concept of Harmony in Contemporary P. R. China and in Taiwanese Modern Confucianism" in: *Asian studies*. vol. 1 (17), issue 2. <https://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/as/article/view/398>.

<sup>13</sup> See <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/446720/pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> See my previously published review of this work at:

[file:///C:/Users/aaa/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge\\_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/disputatio\\_213\\_219%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/aaa/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/disputatio_213_219%20(1).pdf).

Daisaku Ikeda is viewed as a campaigner for peace and Ikeda's specific contribution to peacebuilding, notably through the central emphasis he has placed on the significance of dialogue. At the same time, Ikeda is the author of more than 100 books on Buddhist themes, and the winner of more than 300 academic awards given by universities from all over the world. He wrote a large number of books in the form of a dialogue, form focusing on leaders and scientists from various fields, including, among others British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Ji Xianlin, Ba Jin, Chang Shuhong, Jin Yong, and other prominent Chinese personalities. For more information on his organisation promoting world peace, Soka Gakkai International (SGI), visit: <http://www.sgi.org>; whereas information about Ikeda himself can be obtained at <http://www.sgi.org/sgi-president/president-overview.html>, or at his own website <http://www.daisakuikeda.org/>.



importance of dialogue as a mechanism for conflict resolution between civilizations, stressing the constant engagement and effort within the civilizational dialogue as a path towards social and cultural reform.

Congruently with the above-stated, both authors agree about three essential issues in leading a dialogue to affirm and respect cultural diversity: 1) a true listening to what the dialogue partner has to say; 2) the importance of direct dialogue; and 3) studying and embodying the wisdom of our predecessors in philosophy, since *kanji* (the Chinese sign used for a sage: 圣人 - *shèng rén*) is written so that it unifies the signs designating the ear and mouth, put above the element designating the ruler, or, in other words, a sage is the ruler of good listening and responds only after that. In the process of achieving such wisdom, professor Tu stresses the importance of his mentor Mou Zongsan (牟宗三) (1909–1995), and Mr. Ikeda of his mentor Jōsei Toda (戸田 城聖) (1900 — 1958) who fought against Japanese militarism, thus introducing us to the sources of Confucian humanism, Confucian renewal and comeback, stimulating the spiritual renewal throughout Asia. These two renowned thinkers (one from the Confucian and the other from the Buddhist Mahayana tradition) try to explore this renewal of Confucian ethics in the most urgent issues of the modern world such as: Chinese–Japanese–American relationships, transformation of societies through education and dialogue, and the role of major religions in promoting human happiness and welfare. This is why the pages of this book mirror fascinating correspondences of Confucian and Buddhist worldviews in discussing Mencius, Zhang Zai, Spinoza, Gandhi, Max Weber, Levinas, Tang Junyi, Habermas, and others. Their research and views focus on vital aspects of dialogue culture and peace culture, as well as reforms they offer to the modern world — through the process of dialogue and more than meticulous textual analysis, namely interpersonal and intercultural exchanges based on respect of differences, openness and tolerance.

The function of the dialogue is not only in search for sameness or uniformity, but it is also an enriching way to learn how to be human. Namely, through dialogue we cultivate the art of listening, the ethics of caring and the feeling of self–discovery through the meeting of various lifestyles. We are all the children of Enlightenment and this fact is especially important in inventing a new paradigm of thinking in international relations, as well as inventing a new vision for the rising world order of harmonic coexistence, since it is obvious that we must redirect the modern world to liberate it from its obsession with progress and individualism, inspired by Enlightenment itself. This opens the issue of a build–up of a dialogical civilization for the total global community. Opposed to this intention is Huntington’s dichotomy “West and the rest”, which includes ethnocentrism, chauvinistic nationalism, culturological imperialism, expansionism, and religious fundamentalism. If there is an imminent danger of civilizational clash, then the promotion of dialogue among civilizations, at least in the sense in which these two thinkers advocate, is imperative and an urgent need.

Here we reach the insight that an original understanding of culturological diversity demands an art of listening, the cultivation of which might require years. This is the first step in realization of a true dialogue and the building of a culture of peace in the present radically complex world of conflicting hatreds, contradictory interests and conflicts. In it, at least in the opinion of these two thinkers, the most significant bilateral relationship in constructing a healthy world order is the Sino–American connection, whereas the position that China is only a threat truly and significantly hinders such efforts.

Further on, in this series of dialogues between Tu Weiming and Daisaku Ikeda, a new ethos of understanding and cultivating the civilization of dialogue is being developed, since the true philosopher and the religious leader destroy the conventional barriers to create pioneering new forms of thinking and new ways of acting. Of course, they realize that religion plays a crucial role in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, namely that the religious leaders have to take a greater responsibility for the welfare of the global community, and not allow the relegation of such issues to the

private sphere, in spite of the fact that secularisation was often marked as a defining characteristic of modernization. Yet, religions continue to be present in the modern world as an important aspect of the contemporary society, having a powerful influence on economy, politics and culture. No doubt, we shall have to learn and demand criteria to evaluate religious spirituality which gives a philosophical basis for coexistence, namely, standards, that are necessary for the religion of our age, which implicitly include the building of peace as the prime responsibility of world religions, while the realization of such demands and criteria necessitates the promotion of intercultural dialogue and creation of a worldview of harmony and coexistence, overcoming the extremely negative history.

Namely, the secular humanism of European Enlightenment marginalised religion as a vibrant power in modern Western political culture, so we have to drift away from the already worn-out dogma that human history advances from religion (prejudice) to philosophy (metaphysics) and science (rationality) which is still prevalent in many parts of the world and in the academic community as well, even in philosophers such as John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, who take it for granted that religion, as a thing of the heart, has to be relegated to private sphere, out of the political process, that it should not be an issue in the public discourse. On the other hand, the present day has obvious tendencies of desecularisation of the society and discussion how the spiritual resources which religions possess must be activated to revitalise the contemporary civilization and the philosophical–theological bases for the building of a harmonious society of peaceful coexistence, great harmony (大同 - *dàtóng*) or the harmony of differences, with the aim of achieving and building a contemporary society on a more hopeful basis of here strongly advocated dialogical civilization to be contrasted to Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations.

An example of such efforts is the above mentioned Confucian comeback whose complete acceptance came only in 1987, after centuries of rupture with this ancient tradition, as a legitimate subject of serious scientific research of thinkers such as Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan (1903–1982), and Tang Junyi (1909–1978), in spite of the fact that 28 September 2019 was actually Confucius’ 2570<sup>th</sup> birthday, which rather obviously shows the temporal depth of this tradition deeply embedded in the soul of the Chinese people (let us remind ourselves that Voltaire praised Confucius as a supreme model, and Kant considered him the “Chinese Socrates”, while Dewey himself spent two years in China, spreading the influence of American pragmatism there). For instance, the Confucian golden rule (“don’t do to others what you would not want to be done to yourself”),<sup>15</sup> expressed in a negative way, considers the existential situation of the Other. Therefore, this seemingly passive principle includes an active view to the welfare of others through acknowledging and honouring ideas which they advocate, i.e. promoting the welfare of others through Confucian reciprocity and the Chinese ideal of self-ennoblement, that is, ‘interior wisdom and exterior kingdom’ (*naisheng waiwang*). Moreover, this insistence on caring for others could be connected to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), a modern Jewish thinker (through the inclusive philosophy of ‘radical otherness’ which advocates the promotion of culture of peace)<sup>16</sup>. What Levinas means by “the face of the Other” is summarised in philosophy which does not originate in metaphysics, but in a sense of obligation that arises from the encounter with the Other (“the face of the Other”), and develops into a form of ethics that he calls the “first philosophy”:

[T]he face [is] a source from which all meaning appears. (*Totality and Infinity* 297)

The face opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation. (*Totality and Infinity* 201)

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<sup>15</sup> Or law of reciprocity, which is the principle of treating others as one would wish to be treated oneself. It is a maxim of altruism seen in many human religions and human cultures.

<sup>16</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987).

[T]he Other faces me and puts me in question and obliges me. (*Totality and Infinity* 207)

In the face the Other expresses his eminence, the dimension of height and divinity from which he descends. (*Totality and Infinity* 262).

These dialogues address the issue of globalism and anti-globalism too, and it seems that it is the only possible and practical solution, as well as a balance of the global integration which does not limit culturological diversity. The disease of the modern society can be healed only through a spiritual revolution in human hearts and minds, since an opposite action can only be artificial, superficial, of a controlling character, or mere imitation. This is an important question for the development of a culturological pluralism *hic et nunc* to stand against the prevailing tunnel images of the world and the parochial consciousness of the small-town philosophy or the philosophy of a Muslim residential alley<sup>17</sup>. For these reasons, this is much simpler and more feasible from the perspective of Confucian or Buddhist humanism, which is not anthropocentric or anthropological but anthropocosmic.

But are we participants in the same kind of humanism advocated by Sakyamuni and Confucius, namely the one about widening the conversational circle, that is the developing of ‘dialogical community’? Unfortunately, that is not the case. In spite of the already-established Confucian institutes in the region, we fail to use such an opportunity because we do not want to be part of an established network and such an indispensable cooperational conversation, although it is an imperative of a deeper understanding<sup>18</sup>.

Finally, one needs to take into account the fact that, in the last three decades, the leading neo-Confucian thinkers (Qian Mu from Taiwan, Tang Junyi from Hong Kong and Feng Youlan from Peking) have independently concluded that the most important contribution Confucian tradition can offer to the global community is precisely the idea of unity of Heaven and the human race, that is, the vision of anthropocosmic worldview in which the man is put into the cosmic order, rather than the one in which man is alienated, either because of his own choice or because of ignoring nature. According to this, the remark of Daisaku Ikeda and Tu Weiming that Chinese philosophy deepened and is caught in language, this feeling of symbiosis seems to us quite interesting, namely, that the essence of this philosophical tradition is contained in the concepts *tian ren he yi*, or Heaven and humankind as one. It did not come as a surprise that FISP (Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie / International Federation of Philosophical Societies)<sup>19</sup> did not miss this development, and it decided that its previous world congress took place precisely in Peking (XXIX WCP, Peking University, 2018), due to, among other things, Professor Tu who is one of its most eminent members and advocates of cooperative conversations between neo-Confucian thinking models and Western philosophy<sup>20</sup>.

Finally, let me express my extraordinary pleasure for being able to witness such activities at the initial stage of his Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies at Beida (Peking University, 2010) as a guest professor, as part of the exchange at his personal invitation, an activity that was already announced by the appearance of his work *The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China* (Centre for Studies

<sup>17</sup> See Radomir Konstantinović (1928-2011), *Filozofija palanke (Small Town Philosophy)* — 1969, a philosophical treatise.

<sup>18</sup> We live in a rapidly changing global environment where intercultural interaction is a fact of life and these are the imperatives of understanding within the complexities of intercultural communication.

<sup>19</sup> See their web-site: <http://www.fisp.org/index.html>.

<sup>20</sup> The very initiative to host the congress in Beijing and indeed the theme of the Congress itself “Learning to be Human” came initially from Professor TU Weiming of the Peking University, a member of the Steering Committee of FISP. On Saturday, 18 August 2018, Professor TU Weiming gave an invited WANG YANGMING keynote LECTURE 王阳明讲座 during the 24<sup>th</sup> World Congress of Philosophy. The title of the lecture was “Spiritual Humanism: Self, Community, Earth, and Heaven”. See the following link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTiPiMaroY0>.

in Civilizations, New Delhi, 2010), while the book that is here revisited only witnesses that the time has finally come for Chinese intellectuals (from the mainland and overseas) to transcend the Western-oriented modernist mentality and formulate their own cultural identity. They need to completely acknowledge the value of openness and culturological diversity and revitalize the Confucian discourse, especially the one about living according to the golden mean, the philosophy of the middle way or golden middle way (*zhongyong*), in accordance to the mandate of Heaven. We hope that China will create a new spiritual culture of symbiosis and harmony adapted to the needs of the global society of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and in accordance with the teaching of the three contemporary inheritors of this Chinese wisdom: Ji Xianlin from Peking, Jao Tsung-I-ju from Hong Kong, and precisely Tu Weiming, the Harvard-Yenching professor of Chinese history and philosophy and undoubtedly the leading neo-Confucianist of this third generation.

### Ming-huei LEE (李明輝)<sup>21</sup>

This one of East-Asia's most prominent Kant authorities and Confucian scholars, born in Taipei, Taiwan, Ph.D., University of Bonn. He is a long-time distinguished research fellow at the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica (the Taiwanese Academy of Sciences in Taipei). His scholarly work has focused on classical and modern Confucianism and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Undoubtedly, he is one of the most renowned scholars in the field of contemporary Confucianism and at the same time a representative of this philosophical school of thought – a leading proponent of what is often called “contemporary new Confucianism” (當代新儒家; pinyin: *dāng dài xīn rú jiā*).

In addition, Lee is currently a professor of the Graduate Institute of National Development, National Taiwan University, Taipei, as well as a professor of the Graduate Institute of Philosophy, National Central University, Chungli, Taiwan. He was also a Changjiang Scholar Chair Professor of Philosophy at Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China, as well as a two-time winner of the “Distinguished Research Award” (philosophy) of Taiwanese National Science Council twice (1998, 2002). Professor Lee's special fields include Kant's philosophy, traditional Confucianism, and modern Confucianism. His main works include *Das Problem des moralischen Gefühls in der Entwicklung der kantischen Ethik, Konfuzianismus im modernen China, Rujia yu Kangde* (Confucianism and Kant), *Ruxue yu xiandai yishi* (Confucianism and Modern Consciousness), *Kangde lunlixue yu Mengzi diode shikao zhi chonhjian* (Kant's Ethics and the Reconstruction of Mencius' Moral Thinking), *Dangdai ruexue zhi ziwo zhuanhua* (The Self-transformation of Contemporary Confucianism), *Siduan yu qiqing: guanyu daode qinggan de bijiao zhexue tantao* (The Four Buddings and the Seven Feelings: A Comparative Philosophical Investigation of Moral Feelings), and *Rujia shiye xia de zhengzhi sixiang* (Political Thought from a Confucian Perspective).

Confucianism has emerged as a prospective ideology since China's “reform and opening up” in the 1980s, and, his recent book *Confucianism: its roots and global significance* (Ming-huei Lee, David Jones, Roger T. Ames, Peter D. Hershock<sup>22</sup>), published as the inaugural volume in the University of Hawai'i Press new series, *Confucian Cultures*, is exploring ways in which contemporary Confucianism can challenge and change the international order, as well as looking at past shortcomings and areas of future growth for Confucianism, seen simultaneously as various distinctive local traditions and as pan-Asian and potentially global. In fact, we can discover in a single volume the work of this one of Taiwan's most distinguished scholars, which undoubtedly adds a sizable appendage to Confucian scholarship. He is deeply convinced that

<sup>21</sup> See: <http://www.litphil.sinica.edu.tw/people/researchers/Lee,%20Ming-huei>, <http://as.ff.uni-lj.si/datoteke/azijski/Dokumenti/Raziskovanje/lee-cv.pdf>.

<sup>22</sup> University of Hawaii Press; October 2017, 162 pp.

Confucian traditions can still function as a main resource for cultural *Bildung* with good prospects of Confucianism in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in governing the country and pacifying the world: opening up another aspect of Confucianism, that is, an intellectualized Confucianism, and only through such exchanges can Confucianism profess to be a globally relevant philosophy. In many ways, this is the meaning of his endeavour of bringing Confucianism to the contemporary world.

Professor Lee Ming-huei (李明輝), a distinguished research fellow of the Academia Sinica Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, visited us in Sarajevo in late September 2017, when he delivered a series of public lectures, taking Kant's concept of the "ethical religion" as the starting point of a new reflection on the problem. Contemporary new Confucians also speak of "Confucian humanism", but are not at one on its characteristics, because this kind of religion is a religion without the structure of a religion, and pertains to what Thomas Luckmann<sup>23</sup> calls "invisible religion." In Professor Lee's opinion, German philosopher Immanuel Kant's concept of an "ethical religion," originally suggested with respect to Christianity, offers an extremely worthwhile point of reference. For this reason, Professor Lee used Kant's view of ethical religion as a reference point to reflect on the questions of Confucianism as a religion underlying that it followed a different course of development than the Western thought, and so avoided the dilemma faced by Kant's ethical religion. This is neither ideology nor state religion, but "a main resource for cultural *bildung*, i.e. for education, formation, and cultivation of self and society", and here Lee focuses on the cross-cultural dimension of modern Confucianism and, in this context, Confucian traditions assume distinctive contemporary relevance and may be a force for challenging and a peaceful changing of the international order. Definitely, he surveys the prospects Confucianism still has as a cultural resource for the modern world and they will be constantly reminded that all philosophy should be truly comparative. Following this line of thinking, it is a special contribution to the Confucian project in English-speaking countries across the world.

In addition, as in professor Lee's case, comparative philosophy is not an exclusively Western undertaking, as some think since many non-Western philosophers have been engaging in their own approaches and development of methods.

In this regard, his project "Spiritual Confucianism" - a Phenomenon of the Dialectics of Modernization? is very interesting, as well as A Conceptual History of Religion in Ancient and Medieval China from 2010. Lee particularly emphasises fruitful results of an ongoing dialogue between Confucianism and Kant and other German philosophers (Lee received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Bonn).<sup>24</sup> "Spiritual Humanism" here means an emerging global discourse.

Beside this, Lee Ming-huei was a student of one of the great masters of contemporary Confucianism, Mou Zongsan, and he himself has emerged as one of its major spokespersons today. In Lee's view, Confucianism has proven itself by going through what the author calls "its self-transformation", as "not merely a passive response to external challenges, but also a self-conscious choice and reorientation". This project deserves much attention from people both inside and outside all schools of contemporary Confucianism identifying *Nei-sheng-wai-wang* 內聖外王 (inner sageliness and outer kingliness)<sup>25</sup> as the unchanging or unchangeable essence of Confucianism. Actually, Lee has provided us with a concise and precise statement of one of

<sup>23</sup> Berger, P. L. and T. Luckmann (1966), *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

<sup>24</sup> Lee, Ming-huei (1986). *Das Problem des moralischen Gefühls in der Entwicklung der kantischen Ethik*. Dissertation Universität Bonn, and I would like to stress the existence of the corpus of his non-Chinese writings published in German.

<sup>25</sup> See Bo Mou (2009). *Chinese Philosophy A-Z*, Edinburgh University Press, p. 31.

the most important contemporary Confucian projects.<sup>26</sup> It is noteworthy that the focus of his work is the role of Confucianism for today's China and for the rest of the world as well.<sup>27</sup>

He concluded his Sarajevo<sup>28</sup> and Banja Luka<sup>29</sup> public lecture with this statement: "It may not be inconvenient for Confucianism to stay invisible. On the contrary, it can better meet the diversified demands in the modern society and provide a set of methods for people to live in the world. As for the roles of Confucianism in politics, society and culture and other external dimensions, the author would not give a prolonged discussion in this thesis but deliberate them in other texts".

For me as a philosopher-comparativist, it is extremely important to see his insistence and opening debate on the New Confucians over the relationship between the traditional Confucianism and modern democracy as well, and the quest for global peace through cross-cultural dialogue or collaborative conversation, because many Confucian scholars argue that Confucianism is a form of humanism, hence the term "Confucian Humanism" in exploring the possibilities for mutual intellectual enrichment.

The term 'Confucian Humanism' is a commonly acknowledged in contemporary New Confucianism, but views differ as to the characteristics of this form of humanism. This is explained in an amazing book: *Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic world*.<sup>30</sup> The first volume on China and Japan includes an article by professor Lee, "Reviewing the Crisis of the Study of Chinese Philosophy – Starting from the 'Legitimacy of Chinese Philosophy' Debates", and this is really a nice connection with the essence of my own contribution in this regard.

### **The importance of *Tianfang* Trilogy as a Paradigm**

Chinese Muslims (*Huihui*, or Sinophone Muslims: Chinese: 回族; pinyin: *Huízú*) developed their unique tradition of Islamic teachings during mid-7<sup>th</sup> century, introducing Islam into China. There are over 35.000 mosques in China, 40.000 Islamic religious persons (imams), more than 400 Islamic associations in the entire country, there are 13 Islamic institutes, and more than 90% of the Chinese Muslims are the Sunni, while only 1.3% of them are Shia. Islam in China keeps good relationships with other religions, and among the 55 Chinese minorities in China, there are 10 observing Islam, namely, Hui Minority, Uyghur, Kazak, Khalkhas, Uzbek, Tajik, Tatar, Dongxiang, Sala and Baoan, mainly inhabiting the northwest provinces of Xijiang, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai and the southwest province of Yunnan, while individual Muslims live almost in every city in the country. The Islamic presence in China is as old as Islam itself and with **over 1400 years of Sino-Islamic relations**, ranging from the early efforts of the Prophet's companion, Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas (died 674 AD in Guangzhou, China), to the pioneering journeys of the greatest naval commander in Chinese history, Admiral Zheng He (Chinese: 鄭和; 1371 – 1433 or 1435). In addition to the fact that there are over 23 million Muslims living China today, Islam and Chinese Muslims have made significant contributions to China and Chinese civilisation and vice versa, and without any doubt we can say that Muslims have a rich

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<sup>26</sup> About his willingness to engage with scholarship across cultures see Max Fong. "Reviewing the Position Lee Minghui" Self Published (2017) Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/mfong/1/>.

<sup>27</sup> See Makeham J. (2003) *The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism*. In: Makeham J. (eds) *New Confucianism: A Critical Examination*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York

<sup>28</sup> See <http://www.unsa.ba/događaji/ciklus-javnih-predavanja-profesora-leea-ming-hueija-konfucijanski-humanizam-i-religije>.

<sup>29</sup> See [http://as.ff.uni-lj.si/raziskovanje/raziskovanje/raziskovalni\\_projekti/modern\\_and\\_contemporary\\_taiwanese\\_philosophy/history](http://as.ff.uni-lj.si/raziskovanje/raziskovanje/raziskovalni_projekti/modern_and_contemporary_taiwanese_philosophy/history).

<sup>30</sup> By Raji C. Steineck, Ralph Weber, Robert Gassmann and Elena Lange, eds, Brill, 2018. Also, see: <https://brill.com/view/title/32218?lang=en>. The essays assembled in two volumes deal, each in their own way, with the question of what philosophy is when one turns to China, Japan, India and the Islamic World.

and unique relationship with China.<sup>31</sup>

Philosophy needs to increase its engagement with Chinese, Japanese, Indian and Islamic traditions in order to live up to its own aspirations. Portraying the distinctive traditions of Chinese Muslims and the Islamic heritage in China, as well as its relevance to understanding both the evolution of the Chinese history and culture, and appreciating the complex, multi-ethnic influences on modern China, is now quite traceable.<sup>32</sup> This multifaceted cultural heritage continues to the present day, because Muslims in China are scattered all over the country and they have adapted to the local cultural circumstances, while continually adhering to their Islamic traditions.

To summarise, this is, in a way, *art without borders*, to paraphrase the very title of Ben-Ami Scharfstein's well-known masterpiece<sup>33</sup>, which elucidates human thinking about art in all its facets, a philosophical exploration of art and humanity, the entire idea of an open aesthetics and this is extremely important for a deep understanding in such an urbanised and modern society of China, where mosques are, undoubtedly, a brilliant landscape in skyscraper-crowded cities. Also, to memorise the sages who introduced Islam into China in the early years, Chinese Muslims have not only built up exquisite mosques, but they have also constructed amazing *khanqahs*, *qubbahs*, *mazars* and mausoleums dedicated especially to their Sufi masters or those who have made significant contribution to Islam<sup>34</sup>.

That project on Islamic-Confucian-Daoist dialogue in the Balkans should find a place in this conference should be applauded in this cacophony in the post-9/11 world, with the rise of interest in Islam and Islamic matters across the globe, necessitating an explanation of the authentic teaching of this religion anew in light of the challenges of the present-day situation not only in the EU, U. S., or China, but worldwide.

As for the relationship between the Islamic thought and Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, which is part of my paper, it is a newly-discovered continent now being studied in depth for the first time in European languages especially by Sachiko Murata, William Chittick, Osman Bakar, Tu Weiming and others, with indirect presence and influence of the late Tosihiko Izutsu-sensei<sup>35</sup>.

The author of this paper has initiated this pioneering project to introduce recent remarkable scholarship in philosophical studies of Chinese philosophy to the philosophical circles of the ex-YU countries for the purpose of exploring how philosophical ideas and approaches from this area (such as Islamic philosophy) and those from the Chinese philosophical tradition can learn from each other and make joint contributions to the common philosophical enterprise. The focus has been on new frontiers of contemporary philosophical

<sup>31</sup> Mi Shoujian & You Jia (2004). *Islam in China*, Chinese Intercontinental Press, translated into Serbian by Vuk Vuković, Albatros Plus, Beograd, 2014., chapters I & II.

<sup>32</sup> See especially Anthony Garnaut, an expert on the Muslim Chinese culture: [anthony.garnaut@anu.edu.au](mailto:anthony.garnaut@anu.edu.au), and his article in: *China Heritage Newsletter* No. 5, March 2006, available at: <http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/islamic-heritage-china-general-survey>. Also, there is my own translation of *Islamic Art in China* by Yang Guiping (China Intercontinental Press, 2013) – to be published.

<sup>33</sup> by The University of Chicago, Chicago and London, 2009.

<sup>34</sup> See especially in this regard: Murata, Chittick, and Tu (2009). *The Sage Learning of Liu Zhi: Islamic Thought in Confucian Terms*, Harvard-Yenching monograph series; the volume on Liu Zhi, ca. 1670-1724, one of the most important scholars of Islam in traditional China, and above all, his *Tianfang* trilogy: James D. Frankel, "Uncontrived Concord: The Eclectic Sources and Syncretic Theories of Liu Zhi, a Chinese Muslim Scholar" in: *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Volume 20, Issue 1, January 2009, pages 46–54, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jis/etn062>. Liu Zhi's work represents the most systematic and sophisticated attempt to harmonise Islam with Chinese thought and provide a glimpse at Chinese Islamic metaphysics. Liu Zhi found in Sufi theories a bridge between the religio-philosophical traditions of East and West. The most methodical scholar of the Han Kitāb, Liu Zhi's bibliographies reveal a significant debt to medieval Sufi literature.

<sup>35</sup> See Nevad Kahteran, "Recognizing a Model of Postmodern Pluralism through Looking at Islam from the Standpoint of Far Eastern Traditions" in: *Synthesis Philosophica* Zagreb 2016, vol. 31, pp. 433-450.

studies of Chinese Philosophy, now published as *Nove granice kineske filozofije / New Frontiers of Chinese Philosophy*,<sup>36</sup> followed by my own translation of the pioneering work in this field *Islam and Confucianism: A Civilizational Dialogue* by Osman Bakar and Cheng Gek Nai.<sup>37</sup>

These published materials have tried to answer some of these questions and to offer a vista onto the world of Chinese Muslim literati who produced this primary source material of their educational network, i.e. *Han Kitāb* (汉克塔布; pinyin: *Hàn kètǎbù*), a collection of over one hundred texts of canonical status, the basic curriculum within the Chinese Muslim learned community and their own education. As it explained, this corpus lays in the essence of the Chinese form of Islamic knowledge, the rise of intellectual current in China, which was done through successful “sinization” and accommodation. It is our hope that these materials will help to generate a new interest among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ex-YU countries in the comparative study of Islam and Confucianism in their own quest for a new Asia and points of convergence, recognising religious pluralism and multiculturalism and recognising that urgent need for sharable common values and arguments for pluralism vs. exclusivism, especially among our academic and scholarly community. Or, as professor Chung-ying Cheng himself points out there: “we need to ponder whether Confucian culture and Islamic culture could indeed form a union, on the one hand to meet the challenges of Western domination and on the other to foster a greater mutual understanding, thereby presenting a model of postmodern pluralistic form of intercultural and international life.”<sup>38</sup>

Taking into account that in recent years there has been an increased academic interest in the long history of Islam in China, as well as its interaction with the Chinese culture and civilization, the study of Islam and Muslims in China has to be promoted from a cross-disciplinary approach intending that the interlinking of included traditions be very helpful to the interested scholars in this field, taking into account that their collection of *Han Kitāb* is the product of remarkable, centuries-long period of intense intellectual interaction between Islam and Confucianism, and this is the very reason why professor Tu Weiming is convinced that it is a major contribution to Neo-Confucian thought from a comparative philosophical perspective,<sup>39</sup> as well as that those acquainted with these issues will find a wealth of possibilities that will help bridge that gap between the Islamic and the Confucian conceptual universes<sup>40</sup> “to interpret the thought of Islam through Confucianism”, “to make a supplement to Confucianism by Islam” and “to achieve flourished development of both Islam and Confucianism”.<sup>41</sup>

## In conclusion

The author hopes this paper is a clear indication that a new vision of Chineseness from pluralistic, tolerant, and dialogical perspective is emerging, especially with inclusion of the Chinese-Muslim heritage. The thinkers mentioned in this paper expressed full recognition of the value of openness, cultural diversity, and self-reflexivity, revitalising the Confucian discourse. It is crucial to stress the emergence of a “common awareness” (*gongshi*) among Chinese intellectuals throughout the world hoping to build a transnational network for

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<sup>36</sup> Nevad Kahteran & Bo Mou (2018). *Nove granice kineske filozofije / New Frontiers of Chinese Philosophy*, El-Kalem, Sarajevo, pp. 432.

<sup>37</sup> Osman Bakar & Cheng Gek Nai (2018). *Islam and Confucianism*, El-Kalem, Sarajevo, pp. 318.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>39</sup> In his “Epilogue” to *The Sage Learning of Liu Zhi*, p. 598.

<sup>40</sup> Chinese term for Confucianism is “scholarly tradition” (*ru-jia*), which is primarily intended to mean the school as a philosophical movement of thought with regard to humanism. See Bo Mou (2009). *Chinese Philosophy A-Z*, Edinburgh University Press, p. 31.

<sup>41</sup> Yihong Liu, “Islamic Philosophy in China” in: *Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy* 8:173-178 (2008).



understanding the meaning of being Chinese within a global context.<sup>42</sup> For professor Tu himself, the meaning of being Chinese is basically not a political question; it is a human concern pregnant with ethical-religious implications.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, I am quoting Tu Weiming's words from the Epilogue about what is a major contribution to Neo-Confucian thought from a comparative philosophical perspective characterising Liu Zhi's approach as presenting Islam in Neo-Confucian terms:<sup>44</sup>

“This is, so far as I know, a significant event even in Islamic theology. It has often been assumed that Arabic and the languages that employed the Arabic script – Persian, Turkish, and Urdu – were the languages for expounding original Islamic thinking before the nineteenth century. If classical Chinese could also facilitate such a subtle and sophisticated task in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it means that Islam is more than a regional phenomenon in philosophy”. It also means that the classical Chinese can extend its scholarly community beyond the so-called Confucian cultural area....”<sup>45</sup>

Some preliminary efforts in these directions have been made, but, for the moment, perhaps on a smaller scale, much remains to be done, because the very notion of philosophy has to be interpreted in a wider sense when applied to the Islamic context and Sino-Muslim Intellectual Evolution from the time of Han Kitāb until today. Apparently, there has been a plurality of philosophical approaches in the Islamic world and, in consequence, in the Chinese context too.

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<sup>42</sup> Tu Weiming, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem.*

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**Selected works by Lee Ming-huei:**

<http://www.litphil.sinica.edu.tw/people/researchers/Lee,%20Ming-huei>

**Ivana Buljan:**  
**Sinology and Taiwanese studies in Croatia**

**Abstract**

This speech will be organized around three topics, related to sinology in Croatia.

Firstly, I will introduce my own PhD research on one of the main texts of Chinese Confucianism, *Chunqiu fanlu*. *Chunqiu fanlu* is ascribed to a pivotal Han scholar Dong Zhongshu. However, recent research shows that *Chunqiu fanlu* is a composite work with many different layers. In this study, I have also included several secondary sources from modern Taiwanese interpreters and theoreticians.

Secondly, I will outline the history, the current state of affairs and future perspectives of the study of Sinology at the University Zagreb.

Thirdly, I will include brief reports on lectures of a prominent Taiwanese scholars delivered at the University of Zagreb. 2014 Professor Lee Ming-huei from Taiwan delivered a lecture on Contemporary New Confucianism and 2019. Saša Istenič Kotar who has established the Taiwanese study center at the Ljubljana University, has also brought to the Zagreb University several renewed experts in this field of research.



**PANEL 5:**  
**Religion, Ethics and Culture**



**Friday, October 18, 16:00 –17:30**  
**Panel 5: Religion, Ethics and Culture**

**Bart Dessein:**

**The Heritage of Taixu: Taiwan, Philosophy, and Beyond**

Early twentieth-century Buddhism in China was dominated by two main developments. Confronted with the intrusion of ‘Western’ modernity, one group of monks attempted to purify Buddhism through a fundamentalist reform, focusing on a select number of texts. Diametrically opposed to this movement, was the movement led by Taixu (1890–1947) (original name Lü Peilin) who embraced modernity. Taixu advocated a superstition-free Buddhism (in this criticizing the Buddhist ritual practices as they had become prominent since the Ming Dynasty), that would turn the here-and-now into a ‘pure land’. In the so-called ‘Buddhist academies’ (Foxue yuan) he established, a curriculum that emphasized the study of Yogâcâra and Madhyamaka texts – texts that were especially appreciated by European academics at that time – was offered.

The thisworldly orientation of Taixu’s reform movement explains the concept ‘renjian fojiao’ (humanistic Buddhism) that is association with him. After the Communist Party had taken over power in mainland China, a younger generation of Buddhists developed this ‘renjian fojiao’ on Taiwan: Hsing Yun (Foguang Shan), Sheng Yen (Fagu Shan), Wei Chueh (Chungtai Shan), and Cheng Yen (Tzu Chi movement). This progressive social engagement of Taiwanese Buddhism stands in surprising contrast to the political conservatism of these same monks. In a context in which, against the background of political developments in the mainland, Taiwan was perceived as the ‘repository of Chinese traditions,’ the conservative climate under KMT rule was appreciated by them as a guarantee for the safeguarding of the Buddhist faith.

In this paper, I will address the issue of Taixu’s heritage, focusing on the ‘national’ value of his Republican thinking for the contemporary period, as well as on how his philosophy has encroached on the field of Buddhist studies in Taiwan.

## **1. Introduction**

As is well known and well researched, China’s confrontation with European economic and military supremacy in the nineteenth century led to a self-criticism among the Chinese intellectuals. While some groups advocated a radical Confucianism (*junxue*) that would go back to the times before the unification of China under the Qin – a movement that had been prevalent in Japan as well,<sup>1</sup> other intellectuals advocated a complete overthrow of the Confucian system, and still others had a more pragmatic attitude. Hu Shi 胡適 (1891–1962), one of the most important intellectuals of that period, characterized the problem of his time as follows:

“The problem is: How can China adjust herself so that she may feel at home in that modern western civilization which has become the civilization of the world? The problem suggests three possible ways or solutions. China may refuse to recognize this new civilization and resist its invasion; she may accept the new culture whole-heartedly; or, she may adopt its desirable elements and reject what she considers to be non-essential or objectionable. The first attitude is resistance; the second, wholesale acceptance; and the third, selective adoption”.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Takahiro Nakajima 2018. For ‘Radical Confucianism’: see Hon 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted through Walker [1956] 1967: 138.

Less attention has, however, gone to how not only the secular world redefined itself in the post-Opium War (1839–1842) and post Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864) global order, but how also Buddhism for the first time saw itself confronted with the need to adjust itself to the contemporary world.<sup>3</sup> Buddhism had (1) to find an answer to anti-Buddhist feelings that came along with the idea of modernity and secularization, had (2) to present an alternative for the Christian challenge, a faith to which some of the new intellectuals converted, and had (3) to overcome what it perceived as a spiritual decline within its own ranks.<sup>4</sup> It is to this Buddhist challenge that the following pages are devoted. Focus will more precisely be on the figures of Taixu 太虛 (1889/1890–1947), Zhang Zongdai 張宗戴 () and Lin Qiuwu 林秋梧 (1903–1934). I will also discuss how the proposal for a reform of Buddhism was interconnected with Marxist and nationalist political philosophies.

## 2. Historical background

Taixu 太虛 (1889/1890–1947; original name Lü Peilin 呂沛林) was born in the village of Chang'an in Haining county of northern Zhejiang province. After his father had died when he was only one year old and his mother had remarried, he was taken care of by his maternal grandmother. A devout Buddhist, she made sure that Lü Peilin not only received a decent classical education, but also that he read Buddhist texts and visited Buddhist monasteries. After the death of his mother and confronted with health problems himself, he, at the age of fourteen, decided to renounce lay life.<sup>5</sup> In the Spring of 1908, when Taixu as he was now called, was eighteen years old, the reformist monk Huashan 華山 came to Xifang si 西方寺, a temple in Jiangsu Province, where Taixu was residing at that moment.<sup>6</sup> According to Don A. Pittman (2001: 67), Huashan was impressed with Taixu, and he:

“[t]old him about those working for revolutionary political and social changes within China, asserting that the monastic order itself must modernize and promote educational reform”.

Initially, Taixu would have been uncertain about Huashan's ideas and about the way such a modernization process would have to be realized. After reading works such as Kang Youwei's 康有為 (1858–1927) *Datong shu* 大同書 (The Book of the Great Community), Liang Qichao's 梁啟超 (1873–1929) *Xinmin shuo* 新民說 (On New People), Zhang Taiyan's 章太炎 (1868–1936) *Gao fozi shu* 告佛子書 (Letter to Followers of the Buddha) and *Gao baiyi shu* 告白衣書 (Letter to Lay Buddhists), Yan Fu's 嚴復 (1894–1921) *Tianyan lun* 天演論 (On Evolution), and Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865–1898) *Renxue* 仁學 (An Exposition on Benevolence) – all books that were recommended to him by Huashan – however, Taixu became convinced of Huashan's ideas.<sup>7</sup>

Soon after having made his acquaintance with Huashan, Taixu met Qiyun 棲雲 (), an early member of the 'Revolutionary League' (Tongmeng hui 同盟會) founded by Sun Yatsen in 1905. An iconoclastic spirit, Qiyun was intent on the overthrow of the Qing government. Through Qiyun's influence, Taixu further came to know of the works of Sun Yatsen and Zhang Taiyan's *People's Journal* (*Min bao* 民報), Liang Qichao's «*New People's Review*» (*Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報), and Zou Rong's 鄒容 (1885–1905) «*Revolutionary Army*» (*Geming jun* 革命軍). Taixu was particularly intrigued by the political program of Sun Zhongshan that is known as the 'San min zhuyi' 三民主義 (Three People's Principles) – (1) nationalism

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<sup>3</sup> See Jiang 1992: 4.

<sup>4</sup> See Pittman 2001: 1-2, 34-40.

<sup>5</sup> See Pittman 2001: 65.

<sup>6</sup> According to Yinshun (1973: 33), Huashan was actually “the first person to start modernizing the samgha”.

<sup>7</sup> Pittman 2001: 67-68.



(removing the Qing); (2) power of the people (introducing a Western style democracy in three phases: military dictatorship; guided democracy; full democracy with a ‘trias politica’); (3) wellbeing of the people (social-economic program), and this influence convinced him of the possibility of broad political and social reforms.<sup>8</sup> As Don A. Pittman (2001: 68) states:

“[c]ommitted to both political reform for the nation and religious reform for the Buddhist community, he formalized a special alliance of friendship with Huashan and began to consider how in practical terms a “new Buddhism” could be created in China to parallel the creation of a new nation”.<sup>9</sup>

Venerable Yinshun 印順 (1906–2005), a pupil of Taixu, has described Taixu’s endeavor as follows in his “Taixu dashi nianpu” (太虛大師年譜):<sup>10</sup>

“Because of Taixu’s great resolve to save the world through Buddhism, he [...] could never again restrain himself. Turning from the kind of religious path that seeks to transcend the human realm in order to enter the Absolute, rather he chose to distance himself from the Absolute in order to confront the world of humankind”.<sup>11</sup>

The process of the reform of Buddhism Taixu proposed therefore appears to be intricately connected with the political events that determined the end of the Chinese Empire and the founding of the Republic. Indeed, in the revolutionary atmosphere that preceded the declaration of the Republic of China in 1912, Taixu had not only cultivated close relationships with members of the ‘Tongmeng hui,’ but also with important socialists and revolutionaries in the Southern province of Guangdong. With them, he engaged in reading and studying the works of revolutionary authors such as Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), Mihail Bakunin (1814–1876), Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), and Karl Marx (1818–1883), in this way becoming familiar with the political doctrines of anarchism, socialism, democracy, and constitutional monarchy.

It was also in these years, more precisely in 1911, that he, in Shanghai, met with the revolutionary monk Zongyang 宗仰 (1861–1930?), a close associate and supporter of Sun Zhongshan 孫中山. While in Shanghai, he learned of the Military Revolt of Wuchang (*Wuchang Qiyi* 武昌起義) that led to the fall of the Qing dynasty and the installation of Sun Zhongshan as temporal President of the Republic of China.<sup>12</sup> As will be shown in what follows, Taixu’s acquaintance with socialism and nationalism, as well as his knowledge of the fact that at the time of the 1911 revolution, some monks actually organized monastic troops – so-called *seng jun* 僧軍 – to support and participate in the military overthrow of the Manchus,<sup>13</sup> had as a result that Taixu’s political thinking oscillated between (revolutionary) socialism and Sun Zhongshan’s form of nationalism.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>8</sup> See Pittman 2001: 68-69.

<sup>9</sup> Pittman 2001: 67-68.

<sup>10</sup> Jiang 1992: 13.

<sup>11</sup> Yinshun, Taixu dashi nianpu (Chronological Biography), 33-34.. Also See Pittman 2001: 68.

<sup>12</sup> See Pittman 2001: 72-73. When a bomb exploded by accident in the headquarters of a revolutionary movement in Wuchang and the police found the names of some army men of the national army on the movement’s members list, these army men staged a military coup – the so-called Military Revolt of Wuchang (*Wuchang Qiyi* 武昌起義) – to prevent their arrestation. Similar revolts occurred in other provinces, and discussion arose on who would have to lead the Republic that they proclaimed. It was agreed that Sun Zhongshan who at that moment was in the United States would be appointed as provisional President in Nanjing. The inauguration of Sun Zhongshan as President on January 1 1912 in Nanjing was thus the official beginning of the Republic of China.

<sup>13</sup> See “Taixu zizhuan” in Taixu 1956: 19.58.18: 200

<sup>14</sup> See Pittman 2001: 72-73. As Welch 1968: 157 stated, Taixu is “probably the closest thing to a ‘political monk’ during the Republican era” imaginable.

### 3. Taixu's Reform of Buddhism

After Sun Zhongshan's inauguration as provisional President of the Republic of China, Taixu traveled to Nanjing where he established the 'Association for the Advancement of Buddhism' (Fojiao xiejin hui 佛教協進會). With the support of members of the Socialist Party and encouraged by Venerable Renshan 仁山 (1887–1951), he transformed the Jin Shan Monastery (jin shan si 金山寺) in the vicinity of Nanjing, a traditionally conservative monastic institution, into a modern school for monks and the headquarters of the 'Association for the Advancement of Buddhism'.<sup>15</sup> It may be no surprise that this event caused a fundamental rupture in the Chinese Buddhist community between traditionalists on the one hand, and reformers on the other hand. Soon after, in 1912, the 'Association for the Advancement of Buddhism' merged with the 'Chinese General Buddhist Association' (Zhonghua Fojiao zonghui 中華佛教總會), established in Shanghai in April 1912. The charter of the latter association in which it was stipulated that "the association would not sanction activities beyond the religious sphere proper to Buddhism," was, importantly, approved by Sun Zhongshan in his function of provisional President of the Republic.<sup>16</sup>

The replacement of Sun Zhongshan by Yuan Shikai as President of the Republic of China in 1912 was a next important event that impacted on China's intellectual movement of the 1910s. Against this background, the journal «*New Youth*» (*Xin Qingnian* 新青年) that was founded in September 1915 in Shanghai under the editorship of Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀 (1879–1942) and that inaugurated China's 'New Culture Movement' (Xin wenhua yundong 新文化運動), at first was "a vehicle for radical intellectuals anxious to counteract what they saw as retrogressive forces in politics and culture which were growing stronger as the experiment in republicanism faltered under the presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai".<sup>17</sup> As a result, 'democracy' and 'science' – Chen Duxiu's famous Mr. Science (賽先生 *Sai xiansheng*) and Mr. Democracy 德先生 (*De xiansheng*) – became important elements of the revolutionary movement. In this way, «*New Youth*» developed to be a journal characterized by a "straightforward affirmation of [an] optimistic philosophy of progress".<sup>18</sup> Also the successful experience of the Russian revolution was a great source of inspiration. Not only Chen Duxiu became an advocate of Communism, but communist ideas spread among the youth in general, and Communism was advocated as an alternative to the erstwhile Confucian society.<sup>19</sup>

To understand the reform of Buddhism in the Republican era, it is, however, important to also point to the obvious failure of the Republic in the Versailles Treaty, leading to the famous 'May Fourth Movement' (Wu si yundong 五四運動). With respect to the Versailles Treaty, «*New Youth*» welcomed the fourteen points President Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) formulated to make an end to World War I in a speech to the American Congress on 8 January 1918 as a sign of the advance of Western democracy and science, and as a sign that the Allied victory in World War I would make an end to the imperialist encroachments on Chinese territory – the Versailles Treaty, so it was expected, would at least return the German possessions in Shandong to China. The allied forces did, however, not feel obliged by Wilson's 'fourteen points,' and many elements of them were not realized. As is well known, the German possessions were not returned to China, but transferred to Japan.<sup>20</sup> Assessing the impact of

<sup>15</sup> See Pittman 2001: 74-77.

<sup>16</sup> See Wei-huan 1939: 153; Dongchu 1974: 1: 102.

<sup>17</sup> See Furth 2002: 87.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>19</sup> See Jiang 1992: 6.

<sup>20</sup> Eight of the fourteen points had, according to Wilson, obligatory to be introduced: (1) public peace agreements (end of secret diplomacy); (2) absolute freedom of navigation on the sea, outside of territorial waters, both in times of peace and of war; (3) abolition of economic barriers, i.e., introduction of free trade; (4) guarantees to diminish national armament to the minimum that is compatible with internal peace; (5) decolonization, taking into account

World War I, Benjamin A. Elman (2006: 225) stated that,

“a turning point had been reached, and the dark side of what New Culture enthusiasts called ‘Mr. Science’ had been exposed. Behind it lay the colossal ruins produced by Western materialism”.

In their assessment of the impact of World War I on the New Culture Movement, John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman (1992: 267) stated:

“The creativity of the New Culture Movement is fully visible only in its historical context. The great World War of 1914–1918 disclosed the barbaric potentialities of Europe’s arrogant civilization. The empires of Austria-Hungary, of the Russian tsars, and finally Germany all collapsed. Woodrow Wilson proclaimed great principles of self-determination for all peoples and open diplomacy among them. Ideas of several kinds of socialism, of the emancipation of women, and the rights of labor versus capitalists swept around the globe and flooded into Republican China. China’s scholar-elite, still a tiny top crust of their ancient society, instinctively took on the task of understanding and evaluating this revolutionary outside world at the same time that it struggled to reevaluate China’s inherited culture”.

That is to say, to the same degree that Chen Duxiu had enthusiastically called for the entry of Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy in China, the First World War also showed the negative side of capitalist modernity. This is a major element that helps to explain the reform of Buddhism proposed by Taixu. As pointed out by Taixu’s disciple Yinshun, Taixu felt devastated by the events of World War I, and went into three years of solitary meditation (*biguan* 閉關), a period during which he read the works of Zhang Taiyan and Yan Fu, both of whom were interested in Buddhism and the works of whom he was already familiar with through his earlier contacts with Venerable Huashan. According to Yinshun, it was during these years of solitary meditation that Taixu “blended socialism with Buddhist teachings”.<sup>21</sup> While this can be seen as a device to overcome the difficulty that the contemporary world was characterized by a tendency towards secularization, the devastation of World War and, in this sense, the failure of Western culture, helps to explain why Taixu proposed Buddhism as an alternative for Christianity and as a ‘universal’ religion. As Taixu said on a lecture he held in Taiwan in October 1917:

“Buddhism is representative of East Asian civilization. Now Christianity, which is representative of contemporary Western civilization, has already at this point lost its religious power in Europe and America. Europeans and Americans have thus lost their basis for a secure life and the fulfillment of their destiny. It is because of this fact that the great World War is now

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the sovereignty of the concerned people; (6) self-government of post-tsar Russia (i.e. retreat from Russian territory); (7) Belgium had to be rebuilt without limiting its sovereignty; and (8) the establishment of a ‘League of Nations’ in which both small and big states would be politically independent and territorially uncontested. Six other points formulated by Wilson were not strictly necessary, but desirable: (1) French territory had to be liberated and the occupied territories given back to France; the injustice done to France by Prussia in 1871 concerning the region of Alsace-Lorraine had to be made undone (= redressing the Peace of Frankfurt); (2) revision of the Italian borders (settling the matters of Istria, Savoy, Valle d’Aosta, Trieste, and South Tirol); (3) the people of Austria-Hungary had to be given freedom for autonomous development (= liberation of Slavonic peoples); (4) Romania, Serbia and Montenegro had to be liberated and occupied territories had to be returned, and Serbia had to have free access to the sea; (5) the Turkish parts of the contemporary Ottoman Empire had to be given sovereignty, but the other nationalities that were then under Turkish rule had to be given the security of peaceful life and unhindered independent development; the Dardanelles had to be open as a free passage under international guarantees for trade ships of all nations; and (6) an independent Polish state had to be established, comprising the territories inhabited by a Polish population. The Polish state had to be given security of free access to the sea. Also see Furth 2002: 92–93.

<sup>21</sup> Yinshun 1973: 76.

taking place. We ought to proclaim our East Asian good word of peace and spread Buddhism universally throughout the world in order to change their murderous perversions and save all beings from great disaster”.<sup>22</sup>

After the May Fourth Movement, Taixu established the journal «*Sound of the Sea Tide*» (*Haichao Yin* 海潮音), apparently after he had heard “the sound of the sea tide,” i.e., the Buddha’s voice.<sup>23</sup> In «*Sound of the Sea Tide*», a monthly publication aimed at the exploration of models for the organization and education of “new monks”,<sup>24</sup> he advocated to combine Buddhism with socialism. In this, Taixu was clearly inspired by the ideas of Venerable Huashan and Venerable Shanhui. This position is evident from articles such as “Nongchan gongchan” (農禪工禪; Peasant’s Chan, Worker’s Chan), “Fuwu Shehui” (服務社會; Serving Society), “Zishi qi li” (自食其力; Support Oneself by One’s Own Labor), and “Heshang xia shan” (和尚下山; Monks Descending from the Mountain). Especially in his text “Seng zizhi shuo” (僧自治說; Explanation of Self-governance of Monks) of 1921, he makes explicit that Buddhist disciples have to “under a voluntarily communism” pursue the cause that agricultural work, labor, medicine, education and arts are for the cause of becoming a Buddha, and that one can be a police, lawyer, official, servant or merchant in what he called *quanmin zhuyi* 全民主義 (peaceful civilianism).<sup>25</sup> This position was echoed in his call that monastic and lay communities had to “reorganize and reorient themselves for the radical demands of the bodhisattva path in the modern world”.<sup>26</sup> This also explains why he “called for an engagement with, rather than a withdrawal from, the issues of the socio-political world,” whereby he saw “compassionate social service both as a necessary result of and as a means to an experience of complete enlightenment”.<sup>27</sup>

This social engagement explains why Taixu was of the opinion that, although anarchism and Buddhism might be very close in political perspective, he was also of the opinion that this state of anarchism could best be achieved through a form of ‘democratic socialism’.<sup>28</sup> Socialism and Buddhism, so he contended, “similarly advocate human equality and social welfare, and he was impressed with the principle that people ought to contribute to society according to their abilities and receive according to their needs”.<sup>29</sup>

The thisworldly orientation of Taixu’s reform movement explains the concept ‘*renjian Fojiao*’ 人間佛教, ‘humanistic Buddhism,’ that is association with him. Focusing on the aspects of (1) transformation of the self and the world, (2) transcending local culture, and (3) harmony with science, the teaching of Taixu is also referred to as ‘*rensheng Fojiao*’ 人生佛教, ‘Buddhism for the living’.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> See Yinshun 1973: 92.

<sup>23</sup> See Pittman 2001: 61.

<sup>24</sup> See Pittman 2001: 93.

<sup>25</sup> See Jiang 1992: 6.

<sup>26</sup> Pittman 2001: 60.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>28</sup> Taixu, “Taixu zizhuan” (Autobiography), in Taixu dashi quanshu (Complete Works), 19.58.18: 194.

<sup>29</sup> Pittman 2001: 182.

<sup>30</sup> See Pittman 2001: 169, who also states that ‘*rensheng Fojiao*’: “was a theme that Taixu first began to explore in a 1928 lecture in Shanghai, and [...] was one that he continued to detail until his final lecture on the subject in Zhenjiang in August 1946”. For Taixu’s 1928 lecture “*Rensheng fojiao de shuoming*” (An Explanation of a Buddhism for Human Life), see Taixu dashi quanshu (Complete Works), 2.5.17: 205-216. For his 1946 lecture “*Rensheng de fojiao*” (A Buddhism for Human Life), see *ibid.*, 2.5.17: 238-242. Hong Jinlian has remarked that “this seminal concept is rooted in the various influences of late Qing modernism, Tiantai philosophy, Chan iconoclasm, and western scientific optimism”. See Hong Jinlian, *Taixu dashi fojiao xiandaihua zhi yanjiu* (Research into the Venerable Master Taixu’s Modernization of Buddhism), Taipei, 1995, 137 ff. On the one hand, in propagating a Buddhism for human life, Taixu was influenced by aspects of western humanism that were sweeping Asia and by the radical enthusiasm of the reformers of the New Culture Movement. In this sense he was

By the mid-1920s, Taixu began to express a more moderate socio-economic perspective. He moved more toward the political center, distancing himself from those in the Communist Party and developing relationships with important Guomindang officials. This shift might have been the result of his struggle with the role of social conflict.<sup>31</sup> It is, in this respect, interesting to note with Don A. Pittman (2001: 169) that “Taixu presented his ‘Buddhism for human life’ as a complement to and perfection of Sun Yat-sen’s form of nationalism. [...] On occasion, Taixu even referred to his own efforts in terminology that paralleled Sun’s sanmin zhuyi, advocating a “three-principled Buddhism” (sanfo zhuyi) that entailed an ideal sangha of Dharma teachers (fosfeng zhuyi), and ideal lay Buddhist order of active bodhisattvas (fohua zuyi), and a national culture infused with the spirit of Mahayana Buddhism and reaching out to the entire world (foguozhuyi)”.<sup>32</sup> The parallel between Sun Yat-sen’s ‘sanmin zhuyi’ and the ‘three-principled Buddhism’ was even expressed in terms of “Buddhism being the ultimate goal of Sanminism and Sanminism being Buddhism put into practice”.<sup>33</sup> Related to the above, Taixu further recognized the two basic principles of essence (*ti* 體) and function (*yong* 用) in Buddhism. With ‘essence,’ he referred to the Buddhist truth as such, with ‘function’ to the application of Buddhism for the needs of human beings.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4. The Creation of Buddhist Academies

It is with the aim of creating ‘new monks’ that Taixu proposed the construction of so-called ‘Buddhist Academies’ (*Foxue yuan*), offering a curriculum that emphasized the study of Yogâcâra and Madhyamaka texts – texts that were especially appreciated by European academics at that time. These studies would have to be complemented with charitable action – very similar to the work Christian missionaries were doing in China.<sup>35</sup> The first of such ‘Buddhist Academies’ was the famous ‘Wuchang Buddhist Academy’ (Wuchang Foxueyuan 武昌佛學院), established in 1922. Among his first disciples in Wuchang was Zhang Zongdai. Zhang Zongdai, a native of Sichuan, had studied law, literature, philosophy, and Buddhism in the Pingmin University of Beijing, and had, in 1921, gone to Russia to investigate socialism. Back in China, he actively participated in the patriotic student movement. In Wuchang, he founded the journal «*New Buddhistic Weekly*» (*Xin Fohua xunkan* 新佛化旬刊) that soon changed names to «*Buddhistic New Youth*» (*Fohua xin qingnian* 佛化新青年), a name that is

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a Chinese intellectual of his times, urging the nation to embrace the challenge of building a new country with new values within a new world order.

Dessein, 2000: 1233: Taixu headed a small group of progressives who advocated the idea that Buddhist monasteries had to be economically self-supporting, an opinion that refers back to the Tang ideal of Huaihai (720-814). This group of progressives claimed that the only way for Buddhist monasteries to survive in the modern world was to become more engaged in social affairs. Accordingly, they urged Buddhist monasteries to socially engage themselves without, however, also engaging themselves politically. (cfr. liberte). ...it is to be remembered that, also in the past, noninterference with worldly matters had been a condition for gaining the support of the laity. Still this demand met with some resistance among monks who feared that social engagement would endanger the concept of noninterference with worldly affairs and thus would contradict their religious vow and obstruct their religious aim. He became editor-in-chief of the Fojiao Yuebao (Buddhist Monthly), in which articles in favor of the “movement for revitalizing Buddhism” were published. With Zhang Taiyan he published the Jueshe Congkan (Collection of the Association for Awakening), the periodical of the Jueshi (Association for Awakening). This periodical evolved into the monthly Haichao Yin (Sound of the Tide of the Sea), which published Taixu’s lectures.

<sup>31</sup> See Pittman 2001: 182-183, who adds that Taixu also struggled with the question “whether, within the context of his “Buddhism for human life,” the most effective strategies for ultimate transformation ought to be designed narrowly, for the individual citizen, or more broadly, to include the socio-political structures in which all persons found themselves.

<sup>32</sup> See Taixu, “Duiyu zhongguo fojiao geming seng de xunci” (Instructions to Chinese Buddhism’s Revolutionary Monks), in Taixu dashi quanshu (Complete Works), 9.34.47: 598-603.

<sup>33</sup> Pittman 2001: 184.

<sup>34</sup> Taixu, “Renshang fojiao de shuoming” (An Explanation of a Buddhism for Human Life), in Taixu dashi quanshu (Complete Works), 2.5.17: 206. Also see Pittman 2001: 174.

<sup>35</sup> See Birnbaum 2003: 130.

reminiscent of the already mentioned «*New Youth*» founded by Chen Duxiu. From Wuchang, Taixu returned to Beijing to start a social movement.<sup>36</sup> The ‘Wuchang Buddhist Academy’ delivered criticism against the conservatives within the Buddhist community in the journal «*New Monks*» (*Xin Seng* 新僧).<sup>37</sup> The journal «*New Monks*» can be seen as paralleling the creation of a ‘*xin min*’ 新民 (new people) by the revolutionaries.<sup>38</sup>

With his aim to create ‘new monks,’ Taixu criticized the actual situation of Buddhism. He characterized the existent Chinese monastic world as:

“nothing but rules, practicing meditation, explaining scriptures, thinking about the Buddha, reciting scriptures, worshiping. Their life depended on the monastic production, and what come in from doing rituals for people”.

The alternative he proposed was a superstition-free Buddhism (in this referring to and criticizing Buddhist ritual practices as they had become prominent since the Ming Dynasty) that had to turn the here-and-now into a ‘pure land’.<sup>39</sup>

In the same vain, when Taixu organized a first ‘East Asian Buddhist Conference’ in Tokyo in 1925, Venerable Shanhui 善慧 (1881–1945), a monk born in Taiwan but ordained on the mainland who had, upon his return to Taiwan, established a temple near Keelung 基隆,<sup>40</sup> delivered a talk in which he claimed that the monastic system corresponded to the Marxist idea of a classless society without having to resort to violence. Buddhism, so was his point, could therefore help bring about world peace and egalitarianism.<sup>41</sup>

It should be reminded here that 1925 was also the year Sun Zhongshan died and the year of the removal of Communist elements from the Guomindang. 1925 was also the year that Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇 established the ‘Zhonghua quanguo zonggonghui’ (中華全國總工會), the year of strike in Shandong, the protest of students in Shanghai against Japan in which 11 students were killed and several tens wounded in the so-called atrocity of Wusa. This all fostered the communist movement.<sup>42</sup>

## 5. Japan and Taixu’s Reform of Buddhism

This brings us to another important element that helps to explain the reform of Buddhism proposed by Taixu: viz. the Japanese presence of in Taiwan. Against the background of growing nationalism and left-wing ideas, the ‘Taiwan Culture Society’ (Taiwan wenhua xiehui 臺灣文化協會), a group of young Chinese intellectuals who, during the period of Japanese rule, had studied in Japan, lived up in Taiwan.<sup>43</sup> One of the members of this society was Lin Qiuwu 林秋梧 (1903–1934), who had entered the society in 1921. After a study period in Taiwan, he went to the Mainland where he studied philosophy in Xiamen University. In 1926, he returned to Taiwan, but continued reading Buddhist texts and books on Western culture.<sup>44</sup> Between

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<sup>36</sup> Jiang 1992: 5.

<sup>37</sup> Jiang 1992: 17.

<sup>38</sup> See Pittman 2001: 62.

<sup>39</sup> See Birnbaum 2003: 129. Also see Pittman 2001: 175.

<sup>40</sup> See Welch 1918: 160-173.

<sup>41</sup> See Sengcan 1981: 2. For more information on the conference itself, see Welch 1968: 56, 166-167.

<sup>42</sup> Jiang 1992: 22.

<sup>43</sup> Jiang 1992: 24.

<sup>44</sup> Jiang 1992: 22. Also Lin Qiuwu joined the ‘Meitaituan’ (美臺團) movie group. In 1925 and 1926, he went to all cities and villages and received welcome.

So, mainland and Taiwan have common developments

In 1926, the “Taiwan nongmin zuhe” (臺灣農民組合) was established. In 1927, also the “Taiwan Minzhongdang” (臺灣民眾黨) was established. Simultaneously, also the Zhongli-incident (incited by the Nongmin Zuhe) took place.

1927 and 1930, he studied in Japan. The Buddhism he studied in Japan is Caodong zong, a school with a close connection between Taiwan and Japan.<sup>45</sup> He was dissatisfied with superstition and corruption in the contemporary Taiwanese Buddhism. He stated:

“Those who develop bodhisattva are the vanguards of social change. Their fundamental aim is in creating a paradise on earth, a Western land here, let whole mankind be without suffering (to be extended to all creatures, to only receive all happiness. The world of extreme happiness mentioned by the Buddha is precisely a description of this happy society”.<sup>46</sup>

For Lin Qiuwu, there were six points on which Buddhism had to be reformed: (1) opposition against superstition and ghosts, and respect for reason, (2) monks should have a broad education, value of social principles, (3) opposition to rigid rules, (4) advocate of female emancipation and gender equality, (5) monks cannot sycophant, (6) advocate of unity of Taiwanese Buddhism.<sup>47</sup> With respect to the latter, he compiled a three volume work entitled “Taiwan Fojiao de tongyi fang’an” (臺灣佛教的統一方案). The first volume is ‘the unity of monks, the second is the unity of monks and lay Buddhists, and the third volume is the unity of all Buddhists on the island.’<sup>48</sup> According to Jiang (1992: 33-34),

“Analyzing the scriptures of Lin Qiuwu, it is to be seen that there is a lot of reference to Sun Zhongshan’s ‘three people’s principles’. It is to be seen that probably, while he was studying at Xiamen University, he came into contact with the Guomindang or their publications. It is also possible that this influence came from people like Lin Yutang who were part of the ‘Culture Society’.

It is interesting to remind here that at that moment, also Taixu was combining Buddhism with the ‘three people’s principles’ in his speeches and writings on the Mainland. Another point of Lin Qiuwu was his opposition to the unity of Taiwan temples and Japanese temples. This standpoint can be explained as follows: many monks in Taiwan had come to the island as soldiers in the nationalist army. Their recruitment had begun in 1936, a period in which Taixu worked closely together with the chairman of the Nationalist Party, Lin Sen 林森 (1868–1943).<sup>49</sup> This position of Lin Qiuwu’s stood in contrast to the endeavor of the Japanese who ruled over Japan after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895 and the 1895 ‘Peace Treaty of Shimonoseki’. They had become aware of the importance of good contacts with the Buddhists on Taiwan in the so-called ‘Tainan Xilai Hermitage Incident’ (Xilai an shijian 西來庵事件) of 1915, a widespread anti-Japanese conspiracy that had instigated the establishment of some important Buddhist associations, such as the ‘Patriotic Buddhist Association,’ the ‘Buddhist Youth Association,’ the ‘Taiwan Friends of the Buddhist Way,’ and the ‘South Seas Buddhist Association’.<sup>50</sup> As remarked by Charles B. Jones (1999: 41), the Japanese saw cultivating good

<sup>45</sup> Jiang 1992: 31. Sheng Kai, 2001, p.317: wat diepe invloed geeft op China van Japans modern boeddisme, is dat het ervoor zorgt dat de boeddhistische sixiang van op zich en gesloen naarlogisch en open evolueert, dat modern boeddisme naar etenschap toegaat en naar openheid van filosofie, en met een boeddhistisch begrip van wetenschap en filosofie. Omdat Japan tijdens de Meiji periode, het Japans boeddisme vroeger westerse religie en aanraking met filosofie ondervond en in moeilijkheid kwam, dit is waarom Japans boeddisme vroeger verwetenschappelijkte.

<sup>46</sup> Jiang 1992: 27.

<sup>47</sup> Jiang 1992: 278.

<sup>48</sup> Jiang 1992: 33.

<sup>49</sup> Taixu had convinced the National Assembly to exempt monastic recruits from doing any work that would force them to break their precepts, and let them train as battlefield medics, do sanitary work, and in the disposal of bodies, and perform other compassionate jobs. See Dongchu 1974: 2/468-469; Welch 1968: 45. However, by the 1940s the government was hard-pressed and apparently no longer willing to grant such concessions; all army personnel had to be prepared to do any kind of work. See Jones 1999: 105-106.

<sup>50</sup> See Jones 1999: 66-75.

contacts with the Chinese Buddhists as a means of preparing the ground for their eventual takeover of the rest of China – the most important leaders of Buddhism in the Japanese period of Taiwan had a united Buddhist association that was aligned with the Japanese Caodong 曹洞 school, but they also were active in the mainland Buddhist world and had contacts with Taixu whose first visit to Taiwan in 1917 had been on their invitation. It can also be remarked here that it was in Taiwan that Taixu for the first time experienced the Japanese Buddhist activities and curricula, and that when he, in 1922, established the famous ‘Wuchang Buddhist Academy’ (Wuchang Foxueyuan 武昌佛學院), this academy’s curriculum was inspired by the Japanese model.<sup>51</sup>

In his endeavor to push forward his cause of modernizing Buddhism, Taixu created the ‘Association of the Buddhist New Youth’ (Fohua xin qingnian hui 佛化新青年會) and the ‘World Buddhist Union’ (Shijie fojiao lianhehui 世界佛教聯合會). The latter was housed in the Dalin temple (Dalin si 大林寺) on Mount Lu, and had the ‘World Association of the Buddhist New Youth’ (Shijie Fohua xin qingnian hui 世界佛化新青年會) on its premises. The purpose of these organizations was manifold: on the one hand, as its name indicates, the Association had (1) to draw support from the youth to completely change the traditional Buddhism, but on the other hand, the Association also had to (2) draw support from the Japanese Buddhist society and link up the Buddhist societies of all countries, and (3) foster the plan of Taixu to turn to the European and American personalities believing in Buddhism.<sup>52</sup>

## 6. The Legacy of Taixu

After the take-over of power in mainland China by the Communist Party, the ‘Buddhist Association of the Republic of China’ (BAROC), established in 1936, took over control of Buddhism on Taiwan. Article 5 of the charter of the Association of 1936 put the Association directly under the oversight of the Ministry of the Interior; and it was this ministry, along with the Ministry of Social Affairs, that gave Taixu the mandate to reorganize the BAROC in 1945.<sup>53</sup>

In Taiwan, the struggle between the traditionalists, represented mainly by Baisheng 白聖, continued.<sup>54</sup> At first, the reform faction was victorious and many monks who had been educated in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces and the city of Shanghai, i.e. areas in which Buddhism was the most active and vibrant.<sup>55</sup> One of these monks is the famous Yinshun. Around the person of Yinshun, a struggle between traditionalists and reformers developed. In his *«New Treatise»*, a text he wrote on the basis of a few lectures he had given in the winter of 1951 in Hong Kong, he criticized those who take Buddha-recitation as sole form of practice for all people, even by those with the intelligence and leisure to undertake true bodhisattva practice. According to Yinshun, this was a degradation of Buddhism. As he says in his autobiography:

“It appears to have elicited some disgust from those people who only want to practice calling the name of Amitābha”.<sup>56</sup>

Yinshun’s standpoint – a secularization of Buddhism that even goes further than was proposed by Taixu – did more than ‘elicit some disgust. A campaign against Yinshun was launched by traditionalist, leading among others, to the burning of his books in the city of Taizhong.<sup>57</sup> Some within the BAROC even used their influence with the government to have certain Nationalist

<sup>51</sup> Also see Jiang 1992: 22.

<sup>52</sup> Jiang 1992: 7-8. The activities of the ‘Association of the Buddhist New Youth’ were brought to a halt in Autumn of the year 13 of the Republic, but were revived in the year 14 of the Republic. See Jiang 1992: 17.

<sup>53</sup> Welch 1968: 46, 140-141.

<sup>54</sup> See Jones 1999: 110.

<sup>55</sup> See Jones 1999: 111; Welch 1967: 246-252.

<sup>56</sup> Yinshun 1985: 20.

<sup>57</sup> Yang 1991: 23.



Party officials issue a statement that Yinshun's writing were infected with the position of Communism.<sup>58</sup> The final outcome of the controversy was that Venerable Baisheng succeeded in giving the traditionalists back the control of the BAROC. In 1960, not long after this controversy, he was elected as president of the organization. Traditionalists have remained in control of the BAROC ever since.

After the controversy died down and tempers cooled, however, Yinshun, along with other members of the reform faction, were able to gain acceptance for some of Taixu's ideas about a modern reformulation of Buddhist ideals. With Yinshun as example, a younger generation of Buddhists developed '*renjian fojiao*' on Taiwan: Hsing Yun (Foguang Shan), Sheng Yen (Fagu Shan), Wei Chueh (Chungtai Shan), and Cheng Yen (Tzu Chi movement). This social engagement of Taiwanese Buddhism stands in surprising contrast to Taiwanese Buddhist political conservatism.<sup>59</sup> In a context in which, against the background of political developments in the mainland, Taiwan was perceived as the 'repository of Chinese traditions,' the conservative climate under KMT rule was appreciated as guarantee for the safeguarding of the Buddhist faith.<sup>60</sup> Indeed, the Buddhist Association of the Republic of China has benefited considerably from the corporatist structure imposed by the Guomindang.<sup>61</sup> This helps to explain the opposition against Taixu's movement from conservative groups within the Buddhist community, and why Taixu's movement was not successful. One such major conservative opponent was the Pure Land Master Yinguang 印光 (1861–1940) who was of the opinion that Buddhism did not a reform, but, instead, was in need of a refocusing itself on its ancient patterns of spiritual discipline.<sup>62</sup>

In post 1949 Taiwan, the new political circumstances changed the pursuit of internationalism that had been initiated by Taixu. Because Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government wanted China to be internationally recognized as a world power to be reckoned with, rather than a colonial territory to be exploited.<sup>63</sup> During the Cultural Revolution, many Buddhists in Taiwan saw the island as the repository of Chinese traditions. This made them very cautious towards any attitude of modernization or secularization.<sup>64</sup>

## 7. Taiwanese Buddhism and Democratization

In sharp contrast to the times of Taixu, the Buddhist organizations in contemporary Taiwan can,

<sup>58</sup> Jones 1999: 132.

<sup>59</sup> Jiang Canteng, *Taiwan Fojiao yu Xiandai Shehui* (Taiwanese Buddhism and contemporary society), Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 1992.

<sup>60</sup> Jiang Canteng, *Taiwan Fojiao Bainianshi zhi yanjiu*, pp.251-320.)

<sup>61</sup> Charles B. Jones, *Buddhism in Taiwan: Religion and the State: 1660-1990*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999, pp.179-80.

<sup>62</sup> See Pittman 2001: 2.

<sup>63</sup> See Jones 1999: 164, who continues that "After 1937 the government was also seeking aid and sympathy in its war against Japan. Taixu was able to play on this by promising that his efforts would draw the world's attention to China's great cultural and religious heritage; incidentally, these efforts would also draw attention to him personally and enhance his prestige within Chinese Buddhism. Jiang Canteng (1992). *Taiwan Fojiao yu Xiandai Shehui* (Taiwanese Buddhism and contemporary society), Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, p.42 After the Japanese period, the organization of Buddhism on Japan was readjusted. In the year 35 of the Republic (1945), on 31 December, representatives coming from all over the province, gathered in the Longshan temple in Taipei, and held the "Taiwan Fojiao zuzhi choubeihui" 臺灣佛教組織籌備會, first session. In 1946, on 25 February, a meeting was held, and the "Taiwan Sheng Fojiao hui" 臺灣省佛教會 was established. As at that moment, the mainland Buddhist association of China (Zhongguo fojiao hui) was not yet established, it was independent of themainland. However, the Japanese influence remained.

Jiang Canteng (1992). *Taiwan Fojiao yu Xiandai Shehui* (Taiwanese Buddhism and contemporary society), Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, p.43: In 1947, 26 May, the Zhongguo Fojiao hui gathered in the Pilu temple in Nanjing. Taiwan sent a delegation. As a result, he Taiwan Fojiao hui became a Taiwan sheng fojiao fenhui (a branch).

The conservatives' agenda at that time was simply to forestall government encroachments on temple properties, and they did not see how Taixu's international ventures would help".

<sup>64</sup> See Laliberté 2006: 63.

in the words of André Laliberté (2006: 55) best be described as:

“[i]ndifferent to politics, in general, and to the process of democratization, in particular. Buddhist leaders have avoided opposing the government since the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang, or KMT) established its control over Taiwan in 1945 and they have maintained that attitude toward the Democratic progressive Party (Minjindang, or DPP) government”.

When the leaders of the BAROC criticized the lifting of martial law and the possibility to create political parties in 1982, this indifference can even be claimed to be reactionary. This attitude may be explained as the outcome of – as was stated above – the BAROC was under direct control of the Ministry of the Interior. The corporatist structure imposed by the Guomintang made it illegal for any other Buddhist institution to be established outside of its authority. This helps to explain why BAROC leaders asked for more control by the central government over religious affairs, hoping to strengthen their declining position within the Buddhist community by maintaining their role as custodians of the faith.<sup>65</sup> Since the beginning of political reforms in the mid-1980s, only a few Buddhist individuals have thus joined other actors in the consolidation of democracy. Cooperation with those who favor PRC sovereignty over Taiwan may appear a better guarantee for the survival of Taiwanese Buddhist (p.68) institutions in the long run.<sup>66</sup> While the KMT conservative leanings are not necessarily incompatible with democracy – as the evolution of the past decade demonstrates – democracy appears problematic for many Buddhist leaders.<sup>67</sup>

This political conservatism of Taiwanese Buddhism also helps to explain why Taixu has, in the PRC, been compared to no one less than Martin Luther.<sup>68</sup> This thus leads to the awkward situation that, in the PRC, mainland Buddhism is portrayed as the politically more democratic form. The historical connection of Taiwanese Buddhism to Taixu has, in the contemporary period, resulted in it that Taiwanese Buddhist organizations have developed close relations with their mainland brethren. ‘Humanistic Buddhism’ has thus developed to be not only a religious bond across the strait, but also a political one: Taiwanese Buddhist organizations have never openly supported Taiwanese independence, fearing that cross-Strait violence would have devastating effects for Buddhism in Taiwan. Taiwanese Buddhist organizations thus align with those political forces that favor a status quo in cross-Strait relations. Harking back in history, it can even be claimed that Taiwanese Buddhist leaders align with Sun Yat-sen for whom ‘national freedom’ was more important than ‘individual freedom’.<sup>69</sup> As religious institutions, Foguangshan and Ciji aim to reach a larger audience than the Taiwanese polity. Ciji, in particular, harbors the hope of developing “great love” across the Taiwan Strait: The fact that it appears “untainted” by collaboration with the KMT or the DPP must serve it very well.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Laliberté 2006: 61-62.

<sup>66</sup> Laliberté 2006: 67-68.

<sup>67</sup> Laliberté 2006: 69.

<sup>68</sup> See Deng Zimei, “Taixu yu Mading Lude: Xiandaihua Shijiaoxiade Zongxi Zongjiao Gaige Bijiao” (Taixu and Martin Luther: A comparison on the basis of religious reformation viewed from the perspective of modernization), in *Shijie Zongjiao Yanjiu*, no.1, 2000, pp.22-33

<sup>69</sup> See Svensson 1995: 7.

<sup>70</sup> Laliberté 2006: 77.

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**Lin Ming-chao:**

**The Contemporary Studies on the Ethics of the Zhuangzi in Taiwan**

**Abstract**

The current study of the Zhuangzi in Taiwan academic circles has begun to care about the ethical issues. If ethics is a study of the normative issues about interpersonal relationships, interaction and behavior, what then is the reflection on the issue in the Zhuangzi? Is there a meaningful discussion of ethical issues in this text? What is the difference in the ethical thinking of Zhuangzi on the one, and Confucianism on the other side? Can we find the specific guidelines on ethical behavior in the Zhuangzi? What is the image of the ideal community in the Zhuangzi? These are some important points of discussion in the current academic circles in Taiwan about the ethical implications in the Zhuangzi. This article will introduce and comment on the important themes of Taiwanese scholars' research on Zhuangzi's ethics, point out its significance and value, and reflect on the possible development in the future.

**Matjaž Vidmar:**

**“A Confucian Confusion”: Confucian Virtues in the time of Globalisation, consumerism and individualisation of Taiwanese Society in the 1990s**

**Abstract**

The development of Taiwanese film was similarly to the development of mainland Chinese film characterized by the tradition of family drama, that provided the foundation for the narrative structure, which was based on the Confucian ethics within the family and on the dramatization of conflicts within it. This tradition was respected in Taiwanese cinema until the arrival of the Taiwanese new wave. A radical break with tradition is represented in the films of the second wave in the 1990s. Film characters often appear to be goalless individuals without a sense of home, their relations are empty and in a Confucian sense unethical, as they are not based on reciprocity. They desperately seek their identities in the new environment, they embody the emptiness of a modern consumerist society and under the influence of globalization only aim to satisfy individual needs. One of the main themes of Taiwanese films in the 1990s is precisely the exposure of this moral vacuum created as a result of economic development, globalization and consumerism on the one hand, and as a result of the loss of a strong political and ideological tension on the other hand. This moral vacuum has replaced Confucian virtues, which were predominant in previous periods of Taiwanese cinema. Due to innovations in film techniques, the narrative structure is no longer based on the dramatization of conflicts within the family, but builds a tension on the absence of Confucian virtues. Through the analytical comparison of stylistically rather different film directors Tsai Ming-liang and Yang De-chang (Edward Yang), the paper evaluates Confucian virtues in the socio-political situation of the 1990s in Taiwan.

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